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Rebuild, Retreat, or Resilience: Can Taipei Plan for Resilience?
Abstract
Taiwan is ranked as the country most exposed to multiple hazards (The World Bank 2005). Taipei City is the
capital city as well as the economic and political center of Taiwan. The United Nations report World
Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision places Taipei City third on the list of the worldâ??s top 10 urban
areas exposed to three or more natural hazards, with the highest risk of cyclones, floods, and landslides. In
order to gauge the vulnerabilities and damages of Taiwan and Taipei City, this research creates a natural
disaster density indicator (NDDI) to conduct a comparative study of Taiwan, Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K.,
France, and the Netherlands over the past three decades. The results indicate that Taiwan has both the highest
disaster occurrence and highest death toll among these seven countries. The Taipei case study, a chronology of
policies implemented to prevent flooding, explains that costly engineering structures, rebuilding, and
fortification against floods eventually created a false sense of security, which has encouraged more intensive
residential and commercial developments in flood-prone areas, and led to a higher level of vulnerability.
This research further simulates and evaluates the vulnerabilities of population, land value, properties, GDP,
and critical facilities in three scenarios: heavy rainfall, typhoon conditions, and extreme weather rainfall,
through the technology of Geographic Information System (GIS) by using ArcMap 10.2.2 software. The
results indicate 40% of Taipei City is located in flood risk areas in an extreme weather scenario. This
percentage is higher than other global cities such as Londonâ??s 15%, Tokyoâ??s 10%, and New York Cityâ??s
25%. Based on the 10% of total flooding areas above 0.5 meter, the vulnerable population is estimated at
200,000 people, or 7% of the total population. The GDP impact will be more than $28 billion. More than $67
billion of land value is vulnerable. A least one million subway passengers will be impacted each day. There is
little evidence that the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to floods. On the contrary, some neighborhoods
with high income households face a higher risk of floods. Very few medical centers, oil and gas stations, and
electrical power substations are located in flood-prone areas, but, a large number of public schools,
administrative buildings, and major subway stations are susceptible. Additionally, the likelihood analysis of
flooding in an extreme weather rainfall scenario concludes that the possibility will be five times that of the
existing assumption with a flood in every 200 years. Thus, Taipei Cityâ??s infrequent once-in-two-century
floods are likely to occur more frequently. Further, the 1% of Taipei metropolitan region flooding above 1
meter will possibly cost up to $ 1.5 billion in damages. Therefore, in the future, rather than strengthening and
rebuilding costly structures, Taipei should focus on land-use and environmental planning for resilience. Urban
policies should include environmentally responsible development in the face of continued population and
economic growth, and being resilient regarding natural disasters. Most important is the need of a strong
political commitment and leadership to initiate and implement urban policies toward resilience. In doing so,
resilience can be achieved in Taipei.
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ABSTRACT 
REBUILD, RETREAT, OR RESILIENCE: 
CAN TAIPEI PLAN FOR RESILIENCE? 
Yu-Shou Su 
Eugenie L. Birch 
Taiwan is ranked as the country most exposed to multiple hazards (The World Bank 
2005). Taipei City is the capital city as well as the economic and political center of Taiwan. The 
United Nations report World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision places Taipei City 
third on the list of the world’s top 10 urban areas exposed to three or more natural hazards, 
with the highest risk of cyclones, floods, and landslides. In order to gauge the vulnerabilities 
and damages of Taiwan and Taipei City, this research creates a natural disaster density 
indicator (NDDI) to conduct a comparative study of Taiwan, Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, 
and the Netherlands over the past three decades. The results indicate that Taiwan has both 
the highest disaster occurrence and highest death toll among these seven countries. The 
Taipei case study, a chronology of policies implemented to prevent flooding, explains that 
costly engineering structures, rebuilding, and fortification against floods eventually created a 
false sense of security, which has encouraged more intensive residential and commercial 
developments in flood-prone areas, and led to a higher level of vulnerability.  
This research further simulates and evaluates the vulnerabilities of population, land 
value, properties, GDP, and critical facilities in three scenarios: heavy rainfall, typhoon 
conditions, and extreme weather rainfall, through the technology of Geographic Information 
System (GIS) by using ArcMap 10.2.2 software. The results indicate 40% of Taipei City is 
located in flood risk areas in an extreme weather scenario. This percentage is higher than 
other global cities such as London’s 15%, Tokyo’s 10%, and New York City’s 25%. Based on 
the 10% of total flooding areas above 0.5 meter, the vulnerable population is estimated at 
200,000 people, or 7% of the total population. The GDP impact will be more than $28 billion. 
More than $67 billion of land value is vulnerable. A least one million subway passengers will be 
impacted each day. There is little evidence that the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to 
floods. On the contrary, some neighborhoods with high income households face a higher risk 
of floods. Very few medical centers, oil and gas stations, and electrical power substations are 
located in flood-prone areas, but, a large number of public schools, administrative buildings, and 
major subway stations are susceptible. Additionally, the likelihood analysis of flooding in an 
extreme weather rainfall scenario concludes that the possibility will be five times that of the 
existing assumption with a flood in every 200 years. Thus, Taipei City’s infrequent 
once-in-two-century floods are likely to occur more frequently. Further, the 1% of Taipei 
metropolitan region flooding above 1 meter will possibly cost up to $ 1.5 billion in damages. 
Therefore, in the future, rather than strengthening and rebuilding costly structures, Taipei 
should focus on land-use and environmental planning for resilience. Urban policies should 
include environmentally responsible development in the face of continued population and 
economic growth, and being resilient regarding natural disasters. Most important is the need of 
a strong political commitment and leadership to initiate and implement urban policies toward 
resilience. In doing so, resilience can be achieved in Taipei.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview and Research Questions 
Since the 1980s, the number of climate-related disasters around the world has 
increased dramatically, often devastating cities. The United Nations’ estimation of 
losses from disasters around the world is between $250 billion to $300 billion each 
year (Wahlström 2015). Making cities resilient to natural disasters has therefore 
become a priority for many policy makers. In developing countries, approximately 
30-50% of urban populations live in environmentally fragile areas (United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013). The World Bank also describes the 
growth in developing countries as sensitive to natural disasters. Asian nations in 
particular have experienced significant damage, accounting for approximately 70% of 
all disaster-related economic losses worldwide in 2011 (Munich RE 2012). Much of 
the vulnerability facing Asian nations stems from the region’s rapid urbanization. 
Their cities are among the most vulnerable to natural disasters, and remain the least 
prepared to deal with them. Further, the United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (2013) describes Asia as having weak policies and actions, 
inadequate risk information, insufficient budgets and poor implementation capacities. 
The rapid urbanization in Asian nations along with little preparedness for natural 
disasters are likely to dramatically increase the damage from natural disasters in the 
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future.  
Taiwan has performed well economically during the past four decades, with 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increasing from $432 in 1970 to $21,141 in 
2013. However, economic development can be profoundly hampered by natural 
disasters. Sustainable economic development requires environmental resilience. With 
23 million people occupying only 13,974 square miles of land,
1
 Taiwan is both 
densely populated and highly exposed to natural disasters: 73.1% of the total 
population lives in vulnerable areas, and Taiwan is ranked as the country most 
exposed to multiple hazards (The World Bank 2005). Storms and floods damage 
Taiwan frequently, with an average of six typhoons hitting Taiwan annually for the 
past four decades. According to EM-DAT,
2
 an international disaster database, 
Taiwan had the highest occurrence and highest death toll on the natural disaster 
density indicator (NDDI) in comparison with China, Japan, U.S.A, U.K., France, and 
the Netherlands from 1985 to 2014. Also, Taiwan’s economic losses during the past 
thirty years are estimated at $650, 000 per km². This is approximately 5 times that of 
the Netherlands’ $134,362 and the U.K.’s $135,292, 8 times that of the U.S.A.’s 
                                                      
1 The land area is approximately one-third that of Pennsylvania. 
2 EM-DAT is under the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). EM-DAT was 
created with the initial support of the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Department 
of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-DHA), the Belgian Government, and United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). 
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$78,186 losses, and 9 times that of France’s $70,599. Research finds that every dollar 
invested into disaster preparedness would save $4 to $7 dollars in post-disaster 
damages (Multihazard Mitigation Council 2005; The National Academy of Sciences 
2012). Hence, promoting urban resilience policies for disaster risk reduction should 
become a priority in Taiwan and other Asian nations in the future.  
Taipei City is the capital city as well as the cultural, economic, and political 
center of Taiwan. New Taipei City, which surrounds Taipei City, is the most populous 
and fastest-growing city in Taiwan. Approximately 30% of Taiwan’s total population 
lives in the Taipei two cities (hereinafter referred to as “Taipei Twin Cities”). The 
GDP of Taipei Twin Cities represents more than half of the country’s total GDP.
3
 
Hence, the Taipei Twin Cities are economically the most important cities of Taiwan. 
However, Taipei City is also the most vulnerable among Taiwan’s major cities. 
According to the United Nations report World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 
Revision (2012), Taipei City is third on the list of the world’s top 10 urban areas with 
750,000 or more inhabitants exposed to three or more natural hazards, with the 
highest risk of cyclones, floods, landslides, and earthquakes. For instance, Typhoon 
Nari flooded most of Taipei City in 2001, causing 94 deaths and approximately $800 
million of damage. Over the last forty years, Taipei has promoted flood resilience 
                                                      
3 Taiwan’s total GDP is approximately 489 billion as of 2013. 
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mainly through engineering and other structural interventions aimed at reducing flood 
risk. These massive structures were intended to control, block out, and resist water, 
rather than accommodate water. Riverside dikes, floodways, flood prevention gates, 
flood diversion systems, storm sewer systems, and pumping stations were the major 
facilitates developed to reduce flood risk in Taipei City. Despite Taipei City 
improving flood control facilities during the past four decades, the lack of integration 
between flood control engineering and land-use planning remains. Taipei City is still 
vulnerable to floods due to lack of resilience planning policy and strategies. As Chang, 
Seto, and Huang (2013) point out, “the lack of integration between flood control and 
land-use planning is the main problem. The unclear government responsibilities and 
the minimal coordination among governmental agencies have resulted in ineffective 
policies in flood risk reduction”. They indicate that “despite numerous policies, Taipei 
is still highly vulnerable to flooding and the risks are not distributed equally among 
the population” (Chang et al. 2013).   
The issues surrounding Taipei’s resilience elicits several questions: What has 
been done and what still needs to be done to promote flood resilience in Taipei? How 
vulnerable is Taipei in different flooding scenarios? How can Taipei achieve more 
effectiveness in flood resilience through land-use planning? To respond to these 
questions, this dissertation first analyzes the urban resilience literature discourse and 
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conducts a comparative study of damage from natural disasters in Taiwan and six 
other countries. Second, it analyzes Taipei’s current approaches, assessing and 
explaining important gaps. Next, this research also uses GIS-based simulations to 
assess Taipei’s vulnerability under a set of varying flooding scenarios and likelihoods. 
This dissertation concludes by proposing remedies to fill the gaps these flood 
simulations reveal and, in doing so, promotes urban resilience in Taipei. This 
dissertation provides an example for other cities in Taiwan and Asian nations.   
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1.2 Research Design and Method 
This research first builds on the current urban resilience discourse, debate, and 
practice through literature review and case studies. Second, because the number of 
floods around the world has soared since the 1980s, there are few studies analyzing 
the environmental vulnerability of major cities around the world. This research 
analyzes flooding issues in five major global cities: New York City, London, Tokyo, 
Randstad, and Shanghai. Third, in order to understand Taiwan’s vulnerability and 
damages from natural disasters, this research creates a natural disaster density 
indicator (NDDI) to conduct a comparative study with six other countries, including 
Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands. This dataset is retrieved 
from the EM-DAT in 1985-2014. Fourth, this research undertakes a case study of 
Taipei to survey current practices and historic analysis as a tool to evaluate a 
chronology of policies implemented to make Taipei resilient to flooding. Fifth, this 
research conducts flood simulation and scenario analysis, a method similar to the 
U.S.A.’s Hazus model for estimating potential losses, through the technology of 
Geographic Information System (GIS)
4
 by using ArcMap 10.2.2 software to gauge 
                                                      
4 Most research in flood simulation is done through the method of mapping in GIS. Luino et al. (2012) 
indicate that the identification of flood-prone areas can be well approached by GIS to capture, store, 
extract, transform and display real-world spatial data. Suriya and Mudgal (2011) explain that GIS adds 
a great deal of versatility to the hydrological analysis, due to its spatial data handling and management 
capabilities.  
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the vulnerabilities in Taipei. These GIS-based datasets are collected from Taiwan’s 
central and local governments, including the National Development Council, the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
the Water Resource Agency, the Central Weather Bureau, and Taipei City Government. 
This research analyzes the vulnerability of population, land value, residential 
properties, GDP, and critical facilities, such as major subway stations, medical centers, 
public schools, major public buildings, electric power substations, and gas/oil stations. 
Additionally, it analyzes the likelihood and cost-benefit of different flooding scenarios 
based on typhoon and rainfall datasets in 1975-2014. After a thorough analysis of 
vulnerability, likelihood of flooding, and cost-benefit analyses, this research develops 
Taipei resilience policies to address the vulnerabilities. 
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1.3 Significance of the Study 
Asian nations experience significant damage from natural disasters. The urban 
population has grown faster than in any other region in the world. The rapid 
urbanization in Asian nations is likely to exacerbate the risk and damage from natural 
disasters in the future. However, a focus on urban resilience is still lacking in most 
studies of Asian cities. This research provides an important contribution and example 
of urban resilience to Asian cities as well as other cities in Taiwan.  
This research analyzes vulnerability on both a national and city scale. On the 
national scale, this research creates a natural disaster density indicator (NDDI), and 
compares seven countries’ disaster occurrence, death toll, number of affected people, 
and economic loss from natural disasters. On the city scale, this research includes case 
studies of urban flood resilience in five major global cities: New York City, London, 
Tokyo, Randstad, and Shanghai. Additionally, Taipei city flood simulation, likelihood, 
and cost-benefit analyses will be demonstrated. Although some research exists on 
Taipei flood damage in the central Taipei area, none of the research in flood resilience 
builds on a comprehensive city-wide analysis and simulation as well as a regional 
approach through the newest datasets from Taiwan’s central and local governments. 
This study simulates flooding scenarios, assesses vulnerability, and analyzes the 
cost-benefit of floods in Taipei City, and also evaluates the possible cost of a severe 
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flood in the Taipei Twin Cities. Finally, this study promotes resilience planning and 
policy through the integration of land-use planning and water management as well as 
a regional cooperation approach. Overall, this study will provide examples for 
promoting urban resilience that can be replicated in other cities of Taiwan, and Asian 
cities in general.   
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1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has eight chapters (see Figure 1-1). Chapter 1 is the 
introduction of the research question, design, and method. Chapter 2 is the urban 
resilience discourse, debate, and content. Chapter 3 includes case studies on 
rebuilding and resilience. Urban flood resilience in New York City, London, Tokyo, 
Randstad, and Shanghai are also included. Chapter 4 analyzes Taiwan’s vulnerability 
to damage, and creates a natural disaster density indicator (NDDI) to compare Taiwan 
with six other countries: Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands. 
This will help to explain the vulnerability in Taiwan. Chapter 5 undertakes a case 
study of Taipei City by surveying its historic and current practices, and developing a 
chronology of various policies implemented by national and local governments to 
protect Taipei from flooding. Chapter 6 will assess the probability and vulnerability of 
the flooding scenarios occurring, and assess the costs of each scenario in Taipei. This 
research will develop three scenarios to gauge the vulnerabilities: 1. heavy rainfall (24 
hour duration/14 inches), 2. extreme weather rainfall (72 hour duration/47 inches) and 
3. typhoon conditions (48 hour duration/24 inches) in Taipei. This chapter will 
identify the extent of flooding damage overall, hotspots, property values, population, 
transportation and critical facilities such as hospitals and schools in each scenario 
through flooding simulation. Chapter 7 develops Taipei’s resilience plans and policies 
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to address the vulnerabilities, and will discuss how to implement the proposed plan, 
exploring current legal structures and funding. This will encompass a review of the 
current governmental structures needing change to uncover the opportunities and 
barriers to achieving greater resilience in Taipei. Chapter 8 includes the conclusion, 
further research, and suggestions. 
 
Figure 1- 1 Organization of the dissertation 
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CHAPTER 2: RESILIENCE DISCOURSE, DEBATE, AND PRACTICE 
Stemming from the Latin word “resilire”, the original meaning of resilience 
was the ability of a substance or object to spring back. Equilibrium resilience focused 
on the ability of a system to return to its normal condition after a disturbance (Holling 
1973). However, the resilience debate is shifting from equilibrium resilience to 
adaptive, evolutionary, and social-ecological resilience. This results in shifting the 
very meaning of “resilience” from “bouncing back” to “bouncing forward” in the 
twenty-first century. Resilience discourse and debate also influence the rebuilding 
policy from back to normalcy to retreating from potential natural disasters. In a city’s 
practices, the urban resilience to flooding moves from the engineering strategy of 
blocking out floods to the land-use planning strategy of accommodating floods or 
retreating from flood risk. Rather than engineers, land-use or environmental planners 
will play a key role in urban resilience to flooding.  
However, in the planning field, resilience is still a new topic. There is a lack of 
studies in urban resilience. Few planning books use the word “resilience” or 
“rebuilding” in their titles. Notable are two pioneer books: Vale and Campanella 
(2005), The Resilient City, explain how modern cities recover from disasters, 
particularly after devastating earthquakes and city fires; Birch and Wachter (2006), 
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Rebuilding Urban Places after Disaster, written after Hurricane Katrina, describe 
how to rebuild, prepare for flood risk reduction, and make cities less vulnerable. Also, 
over the past two decades, very few articles in the Journal of Planning Education and 
Research (JPER) or the Journal of the American Planning Association (JAPA) discuss 
urban resilience. Most articles were published after Hurricane Katrina devastated New 
Orleans in 2005. In 2010, a new international journal in disaster resilience was 
established, the International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment 
(IJDRBE). Urban resilience research is still a new planning topic in the twenty-first 
century. International organizations and policies promote urban resilience. Notable is 
the United Nations’ Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of 
Nations and Communities to Disasters (known as HFA). HFA puts emphasis on the 
importance of city planning to achieve resilience and reduce disaster risks. HFA’s 
“Making Cities Resilient Campaign”, launched in 2010, has provoked cities and local 
governments to play a role in applying land-use planning in disaster risk reduction. 
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2.1 Resilience discourse and debate 
Resilience is gaining influence. Resilience originally meant the ability of a 
system to return to its original condition after a disturbance. Now there are different 
concepts regarding resilience: adaptive resilience, evolutionary resilience, and 
social-ecological resilience (Pickett 2004; Davoudi 2012; Goldstein 2012). One major 
debate regarding resilience has been the contrast between “bouncing back” and 
“bouncing forward”. Initially, in the 1970s, bouncing back dominated the argument, 
where Holling (1973) defines “engineering resilience as the ability of a system to 
return to an equilibrium or steady-state after a disturbance”. The idea of engineering 
resilience is to return to normalcy, and to return as soon as possible. The strength and 
speed of bouncing back after a disturbance are the main concerns. The faster that a 
system bounces back, the more resilient it is.  
However, Vale and Campanella (2005) argue that “a city is not a rubber ball. 
Defining resilience as bouncing back to normalcy is not suitable for cities”. Highfield 
et al. (2014) describe “resilience implies not only the ability to bounce back after 
being hit, but also the ability to absorb the forces of nature without suffering damage 
and loss”. With this concept, the speed and strength of bouncing back is not the 
priority of resilience. The concept of engineering resilience in the 1970s has shifted 
into boarder terms, including evolutionary and social-ecological resilience. As 
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Davoudi (2012) points out “evolutionary resilience emphasizes inherent uncertainty 
and discontinuities, and insight into the dynamic interplay of persistence, adaptability 
and transformability”. Resilience is also the ability to adapt to adverse events and to 
absorb the shock without causing huge losses. Teigão et al. (2011) indicate that 
“resilient systems are more adaptable to change, are more able to learn and are less 
vulnerable to disturbance and external shocks”. Moreover, Goldstein (2012) discusses 
social-ecological resilience, explaining that resilience involves “an adaptive system 
associated with self-organization, the capacity to integrate learning and adaption, and 
an ability to restore system function”.  
In summary, engineering resilience, focusing on return time, recovery, and 
bouncing back, has shifted to evolutionary, adaptive, and social-ecological resilience, 
emphasizing bouncing forward and robust function with adaptive capacity and 
self-organization to disturbances (see Table 2-1). Adaptive resilience for “bouncing 
forward” has become a core value of resilience. The more adaptive, persistent, and 
transformable their system, the more resilient a city is. Urban resilience is a city that 
is adjustable, adaptive, and flexible to evolve in the face of uncertainty or disasters. 
Enhanced resilience also allows better anticipation of disasters and better planning to 
reduce disaster losses (The National Academy of Sciences 2012). 
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Table 2- 1 Summary of the “bouncing back” vs. “bouncing forward” debate 
Aspect Bouncing back Bouncing forward 
Period In the 1970s In the 2000s 
Core value 
Return to normalcy; bounce 
back quickly; recovery time 
matters; engineering resilience; 
resistance 
Adapt, evolve, change, and 
transform gradually into another 
condition; prepare for change; 
adaptive resilience; retreat 
Definition 
The ability of a system to return 
to an equilibrium condition after 
disturbance 
The ability of a system to adjust 
and adapt in the face of 
changing conditions 
Characteristic 
Traditional, rigid, and 
conservative 
Adjustable, adaptive, and 
flexible  
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2.2 Resilience planning: a new focus in the planning field 
Although diverse concepts of resilience were proposed after the 1970s, some 
questions in the planning field remain uncertain. What is resilience planning? Can 
resilience be planned? How is resilience implemented? How is resilience measured? 
Resilience planning is still quite a new topic with lack of practice and implementation. 
In city planning, resilience was not an emphasis until the sustainable development 
movement and devastating natural disasters occurred in the twenty-first century. The 
concept of sustainability helps resilience planning, but sustainability and resilience are 
different. Sustainable development mainly focuses on equity and efficiency of 
resource use.
1
 However, resilience planning concentrates mostly on the adaptive 
strategies after disasters or preventive policies for disaster risk reduction. Although 
sustainability and resilience are different in meaning, scope, and practice, they have a 
relationship of integrative dependence. As Yuzva and Zimmermann stress “a 
sustainable city must be a resilient city”. Increasing resilience also increases the 
sustainability of a community (Association of Bay Area Governments 2013).  
 
                                                      
1  According to the World Commission on Environment and Development’s (the Brundtland 
Commission) report Our Common Future (1987), sustainable development’s definition is 
“Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”. 
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2.2.1 The research and institution of urban resilience  
Literature reviews indicate the lack of articles regarding urban resilience and 
resilience planning. Few books and articles have promoted resilience planning since 
2000. For instance, Vale and Campanella (2005), The Resilient City, explain how 
modern cities recover from disasters, particularly after devastating earthquakes and 
city fires; Birch and Wachter (2006), Rebuilding Urban Places after Disaster, written 
after Hurricane Katrina, describes how to rebuild, prepare for disaster risk reduction, 
and make cities less vulnerable by different levels of government in partnership with 
the private sector and public will. Regarding journal articles, this study finds no 
article pertaining to urban resilience and resilience planning in the Journal of 
Planning Education and Research (JPER) in 1995-2014. The Journal of the American 
Planning Association (JAPA) from 1999 to 2009 has published only one article with 
urban resilience in the title: Campanella (2006) “Urban Resilience and the Recovery 
of New Orleans”. This article argues that urban resilience involves much more than 
rebuilding. He describes “urban resilience is largely a function of resilient and 
resourceful citizens as well as a strong citizen involvement at the grassroots level” 
(Campanella 2006). 
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However, there are other articles related to urban resilience, such as rebuilding, 
post-disaster planning, and natural hazard mitigation planning. There are 10 articles 
with a title related to these topics in the JPER during the past twenty years, mostly 
published after 2005. For instance, Berke et al. (2009) “Integrating Hazard Mitigation 
into New Urban and Conventional Developments”; Birch (2009) “Response to 
“Post-Disaster Planning in New Orleans: It Isn't as Simple as It Seems”; Mueller et al. 
(2011) “Looking for Home after Katrina: Postdisaster Housing Policy and 
Low-Income Survivors”; Berke et al. (2014) “Impacts of Federal and State Hazard 
Mitigation Policies on Local Land Use Policy”; Highfield et al. (2014) “Mitigation 
Planning: Why Hazard Exposure, Structural Vulnerability, and Social Vulnerability 
Matter”. Hence, the research of urban resilience and resilience planning is still a new 
focus in the planning field starting in the 2000s. In the Journal of the American 
Planning Association (JAPA), there are 6 articles with a title of natural disaster, 
rebuilding, resilience, or recovery. Before 2005, there are only 2 articles related to 
rebuilding: Olshansky (2001) “Land Use Planning for Seismic Safety: The Los 
Angeles County Experience, 1971–1994” and Nelson et al. (2002) “Plan Quality and 
Mitigating Damage from Natural Disasters: A Case Study of the Northridge 
Earthquake with Planning Policy Considerations”. Both articles adopt a case study on 
earthquakes and mitigation planning. After devastating Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
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there are more articles discussing urban resilience. For example, there are 2 out of 9 
articles in the JAPA’s Spring 2006 discussing urban resilience: Campanella (2006) 
“Urban Resilience and the Recovery of New Orleans” and Olshansky (2006) “Longer 
View: Planning After Hurricane Katrina”. Campanella argues that urban resilience 
involves much more than rebuilding. Learning from the experience of population 
replacement of urban renewal since the 1960s, he puts more emphasis on people than 
on buildings. He stresses that urban resilience is largely a function of resilience and 
resourceful citizens as well as citizen involvement. Olshansky argues that 
post-disaster recovery is all about urban planning. The application of planning 
knowledge and process in data, communication, participation along with funding and 
coordination among the different levels of government will lead to urban resilience.  
In addition to the JAPA and the JPER, a new journal focused on resilience was 
released in 2010, the International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built 
Environment (IJDRBE). There are more articles discussing urban resilience. In 
particular, the IJDRBE’s Issue 1 of 2013: “Special Issue: Making Cities Resilient”. 
Many articles discuss rebuilding experiences and disaster risk reduction, mainly 
developing countries’ case studies. The IJDRBE has been an important journal for 
promoting urban resilience research since 2010.  
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In addition to articles regarding urban resilience, international organizations and 
policies can help to understand the concept of resilience planning. Notable is the 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). The 
UNISDR indicates that “a resilient city can be planned by a more proactive role in 
applying land-use planning in natural disasters and hazard mitigation”. In general, 
there are three major international policies for urban resilience: 1. Framework for 
Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters 
(known as HFA
2
) and the Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (known 
as HFA2); 2. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): the eleventh goal is to make 
cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; and 3. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. In sum, the HFA, SDGs, and IPCC have 
provoked cities to play a proactive role in applying land-use planning strategies in 
disaster risk reduction (see Table 2-2). Mitchell et al. (2014) argue that “integrating 
these three frameworks of HFA, SDGs, and IPCC will provide a unique opportunity 
to deliver a coherent strategy and implementation plan to reduce disaster risk”. They 
also propose a global target of reducing 50% of deaths and 20% of economic losses 
from all disasters by 2030 (Mitchell et al. 2014).  
                                                      
2
 In January 2005, 168 Governments adopted a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural 
hazards at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan.  
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Table 2- 2 International policies regarding urban resilience 
International 
policies 
Framework for 
Action 2005-2015: 
Building the 
Resilience of Nations 
and Communities to 
Disasters (HFA) 
United Nations’ 
Sustainable 
Development Goals 
(SDGs) 
Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) 
Year 2005 2012 2014 
Goals 
•Promote a strategic 
and systematic 
approach to reduce 
vulnerabilities and 
risks to hazards 
•Involve 
community-level 
participation  
•Target the most 
vulnerable 
populations,  
•Integrate climate 
change adaptation, 
development and 
disaster risk 
reduction,  
•Strengthen 
capacity-building of 
financing, risk 
assessment, and 
preparedness 
•The eleventh goal is 
to make cities and 
human settlements 
inclusive, safe, 
resilient and 
sustainable 
•Target 2030 to 
reduce the number 
of deaths and the 
number of affected 
people and decrease 
by a certain percent 
of the economic 
losses relative to 
GDP caused by 
disasters, including 
water-related 
disasters  
•Focus on protecting 
the poor and people 
in vulnerable 
situations 
•Manage future risks 
and building 
resilience 
•Initiate effective risk 
reduction and 
adaptation strategies  
•Consider the 
dynamics of 
vulnerability and 
exposure and their 
linkages with 
socioeconomic 
processes, 
sustainable 
development, and 
climate change 
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The HFA puts emphasis on the importance of city planning to achieve resilience 
and reduce risks. The HFA’s “Making Cities Resilient Campaign”, launched in 2010, 
has provoked local governments to play a role in urban resilience. The HFA2 suggests 
that urban resilience focuses on community-level involvement, targeting the most 
vulnerable populations, integrating climate change adaptation, strengthening 
capacity-building of financing, risk assessment, and preparedness, and promoting 
political will and leadership. Additionally, the UNISDR recommends some steps to 
make cities resilient: 1. create and fund well-defined coordinated organizational 
structures; 2. prepare risk assessments, develop and enforce risk-compliant building 
codes and land-use planning tools; 3. strengthen critical infrastructure and upgrade 
key facilities; 4. protect ecosystems and natural buffers; 5. test early-warning systems 
and emergency management capacities; 6. sponsor education and training programs 
on disaster risk reduction (UNISDR 2013). At the end of 2014, the United Nations 
released two reports: Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: Zero Draft 
(known as Zero Draft) and Suggested Elements for the Post-2015 Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction. The two reports provide suggestions for local governments 
to implement a resilience plan, including: periodically estimate the probability of 
disaster risks to the population and to economic and fiscal assets; ensure that national 
and local plans prevent the creation of new risks, reduce existing risks and strengthen 
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resilience; guide the public sector in addressing disaster risk; regulate and provide 
incentives for actions by households, communities, businesses and individuals; review 
existing financial and fiscal instruments; and stimulate the development of disaster 
risk management (United Nations 2014). In March 2015, the Third United Nations 
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction was held in Sendai, Japan. This 
conference stresses that disaster risk reduction inherently involves forward planning. 
Investments in disaster risk reduction and urban resilience can advance both 
sustainable development and climate action. This conference also stresses that help 
must be given the poorest and most vulnerable people and countries to manage 
disaster risk. The Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction over the next 15 years will require strong commitment and political 
leadership. Several targets are to be achieved in this framework: a reduction of 
disaster mortality, affected people, economic losses, and critical infrastructure; an 
increase in the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction 
strategies by 2020; enhanced international cooperation; and increased access to 
multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments 
(UNISDR 2015). 
The SDGs’ eleventh goal is to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable. This goal is aimed to significantly reduce deaths, affected 
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people, and economic losses caused by flood-related disasters by 2030. The goal 
concentrates on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations. Additionally, 
this goal aims to increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and 
implementing integrated policies towards resilience to disasters (United Nations 
2013). The IPCC’s report on Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability considers how the impact and risk related to climate change can be 
reduced through adaptation and mitigation. Effective risk reduction and adaptation 
strategies must consider the dynamics of vulnerability and exposure. This report 
indicates that some low-lying developing countries and small island states are 
expected to face very severe impacts. These low-lying areas must take actions to 
address risks and impacts. 
In addition to international policies, there are international organizations 
promoting urban resilience: the United Nations’ International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR), the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and 
Recovery (GFDRR), the OECD’s Risk Management Division under the Directorate 
for Public Governance and Territorial Development, the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), the European Flood Directive (FD), Global 
Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), Asian Disaster Reduction Center 
(ADRC), and Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), presented in Table 2-3. 
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The World Bank mainly concentrates on the Asian nations’ case studies. The World 
Bank (2013) report Building Urban Resilience: Principles, Tools, and Practice 
stresses that resilience planning needs to be the focus for cities.
3
 This report indicates 
that increasing population growth, urbanization and property development in urban 
vulnerable areas will be the major factor of increased damages and losses from 
disasters in the next decades. In East Asia, the urban population is expected to double 
between 1994 and 2025 (Jha and Brecht 2011). Most cities, with their concentration 
of assets, located along the coastline, in floodplains, or along seismic rifts, are 
vulnerable to disasters. Rapid and unplanned urbanization in combination with poorly 
constructed settlements and degraded ecosystems put more people and more assets in 
harm’s way (The World Bank 2013). Building urban resilience relies on investment 
decisions that prioritize spending on activities that offer alternatives that perform well 
in different scenarios. The goal is also to formulate a strategy in which flexible and 
low-regret measures can be cost-effective even when risks are uncertain. Integrating 
risk-based approaches into urban governance and planning processes do matter in 
implementing policies of urban resilience.  
In Europe, two projects regarding urban flood resilience are underway: the EU’s 
Collaborative Research on Flood Resilience in Urban Areas (CORFU) and Flood 
                                                      
3 By 2050, the United Nations expects 80% of the world’s population living in urban areas (United 
Nations 2009). 
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Resilience City (FRC). The CORFU project aims to map the potential floods, 
vulnerability of the assets and humans at risk, and to take adequate and coordinated 
measures to reduce flood risk. CORFU has ongoing case studies in Asia and Europe, 
including in Barcelona (Spain), Beijing (China), Dhaka (Bangladesh), Hamburg 
(Germany), Mumbai (India), Nice (France), Taipei (Taiwan), Incheon (South Korea), 
and Seoul (South Korea). The FRC project is to assess the likelihood and 
consequences of current and future flooding, and the costs and benefits of different 
treatment options. There are eight ongoing case studies in Europe: Bradford (UK), 
Brussels and Leuven (Belgium), Dublin (Ireland), Mainz (Germany), Nijmegen 
(Netherlands), Orleans (France), Paris (France). In Asia, there are two disaster 
reduction centers, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) established in 
Bangkok in 1986, and the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC), which was 
established in Kobe in response to the 1995 Kobe earthquake in order to promote 
international cooperation and collaboration for disaster risk reduction among 30 Asian 
countries. These international institutions have promoted the research and policy 
implementation of urban resilience in the world.   
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Table 2- 3 International organizations regarding urban resilience and disaster risk 
reduction 
International 
organizations 
and projects 
Background and task 
United 
Nations 
(UNISDR) 
 Established UNISDR (International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction) in 1999  
 UNISDR, the UN office for disaster risk reduction, is also the focal 
point in the UN system for the coordination of disaster risk 
reduction and the implementation of the HFA 
 UNISDR reflects a major shift from the traditional emphasis on 
disaster response to disaster reduction, and in effect seeks to 
promote a culture of prevention 
World Bank 
(GFDRR) 
 Established GFDRR (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and 
Recovery) in 2006 
 GFDRR as a cooperative effort of the World Bank and the UNISDR 
 GFDRR has evolved in size and strategic focus, and is establishing 
a solid foundation for scaling up its operations for both ex-ante 
support to vulnerable developing countries and ex-post assistance 
for sustainable recovery and risk reduction in post-disaster 
situations 
 GFDRR is to help developing countries reduce their vulnerability to 
natural hazards and adapt to climate change 
OECD 
(Risk 
Management)  
 A risk management division under the Directorate for Public 
Governance and Territorial Development of OECD 
 Risk management analyzes the latest public policies, tools and 
practices of governments to address major risks. Through the 
sharing of country experiences, analyses are developed to draw-out 
criteria for the effective governance of large scale hazards and 
threats 
 The OECD reviews risk management policies in countries as a part 
of its work on effective governance policies for risk management  
 Lessons learned from OECD’s country experiences can be used to 
develop criteria for managing large-scale hazards and threats. 
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International 
organizations 
and projects 
Background and task 
European 
Commission 
(Joint 
Research 
Centre)  
 European Commission’s Joint Research Centre established the 
concept and methodology of the composite Index For Risk 
Management (INFORM) in 2012 as a convergence of interests of 
UN agencies, donors, NGOs and research institutions to establish a 
common evidence-base for global humanitarian risk analysis 
 The INFORM model adopts some features of the models described 
three dimensions of risk: hazards & exposure, vulnerability, and 
lack of coping capacity dimensions 
CRED 
 
EM-DAT (the 
international 
disaster 
database) 
 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) has 
been maintaining an emergency events database, EM-DAT 
 EM-DAT was created with the initial support of the WHO and the 
Belgian Government. CRED’s EM-DAT is also supported by 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)  
 CRED has a long history of standardized data compilation, 
validation, and analysis  
 CRED provides free and open access to its data through its website. 
One of CRED’s core data products is the EM-DAT, the 
International Disaster Database. 
European 
Flood 
Directive (FD) 
and EU’s 
CORFU 
project  
 The European Flood Directive (FD) was proposed by the European 
Commission in 2006 to reduce and manage the flood risk. 
 EU’s 7
th
 Framework Program for Research and Technological 
Development (FP7) project: a collaborative research on flood 
resilience in urban areas (CORFU), ongoing case studies include: 
Barcelona, Beijing, Dhaka, Hamburg, Mumbai, Nice, Taipei, 
Incheon, and Seoul  
 CORFU is to map the potential floods, vulnerability of the assets 
and humans at risk, and to take adequate and coordinated measures 
to reduce flood risk 
Flood 
Resilience 
City (FRC, 
EU-funded 
project) 
 FRC has enabled responsible public authorities in eight cities in 
North West Europe to better cope with floods in urban areas  
 Ongoing eight case studies, including: Bradford, Brussels and 
Leuven, Dublin, Mainz, Nijmegen, Orleans, and Paris 
 FRC is assessing the likelihood and consequences of current and 
future flooding, and the costs and benefits of different treatment 
options 
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International 
organizations 
and projects 
Background and task 
Global 
Disaster Alert 
and 
Coordination 
System 
(GDACS)  
 Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) is a 
cooperation framework under the United Nations umbrella 
 GDACS includes disaster managers and disaster information 
systems worldwide and aims at filling the information and 
coordination gap in the first phase after major disasters 
 GDACS provides real-time access to web‐based disaster 
information systems and related coordination tools 
Asian Disaster 
Preparedness 
Center 
(ADPC) 
 Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) was established in 
Bangkok, Thailand, in 1986 
 ADPC has country offices in Bangladesh, Lao PDR and Myanmar. 
ADPC deploys disaster risk management (DRM) information and 
systems to reduce local, national and regional risk across 
Asia-Pacific.  
 ADPC has a team of approximately hundred experts from 19 
countries. ADPC creates a department of Resilient Cities and Urban 
Risk Management to assists cities and communities in managing 
and mitigating urban disaster risks.  
Asian Disaster 
Reduction 
Center 
(ADRC) 
 Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) was established in Kobe, 
Hyogo prefecture, in 1998, in response to the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake.  
 ADRC is to promote international cooperation and collaboration for 
the reduction of natural disasters in the Asian region. ADRC has 30 
member countries and works to enhance disaster resilience. ADRC 
also addresses this issue from a global perspective in cooperation 
with a variety of United Nations’ agencies including UNISDR. 
2.2.2 The goal, content, and strategy of urban resilience  
The goal of resilience planning is to reduce risks through planning. Grove (2014) 
indicates resilience planning “ushers in new approaches to place-based and 
community-based disaster management programming based on adaptive 
co-management strategies”. Hence, a proactive role in local planning is needed. Cutter 
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et al. (2013) argue for “moving from reactive to proactive disaster policies”. Moreover, 
an integrated, multidisciplinary, and adaptive approach is also essential. Rodin (2014) 
describes the five characteristics of resilience policy: awareness, diversity, integration, 
self-regulation, and adaptiveness. She indicates that “in adaptive resilience, the 
capacity to adjust to changing circumstance by developing new plans and taking new 
actions, modifying behaviors is urgent to achieve resilience”. Nonetheless, sometimes 
localities’ inability to act, adapt, and adjust decisively has put cities in vulnerable 
situations. The higher levels of government have to direct or mandate local 
governments to develop a coordinated resilience planning process and plans in 
disaster risk reduction and integration of resources and functions for urban resilience.  
The strategy of resilience planning are two types in general: traditional 
engineering strategy and land-use planning strategy. The previous resilience discourse 
indicates that the latter is more effective and efficient than the former. Deyle and 
Butler (2013) identify 3 strategies for urban resilience on coastal hazards reduction: 
protest, accommodate, and avoid/ retreat (see Table 2-4). The Association of Bay Area 
Governments (2013) also describes some tools for resilience planning, including: 
general plans and specific plans; zoning tools such as overlay districts, 
nonconforming use regulations, special use permits; buyouts and financial incentives 
for where to build or not build. Olshansky (2009) observes that acquisition of 
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flood-prone properties and permanent conversion of those properties to open space 
has become a leading federal strategy for solving serious flood problems since the 
1993 floods in the Midwest of the U.SA. Further, Burby et al. (2006) point out that 
resilience planning includes “preventive, protection, and emergency policies”. They 
indicate a preventive policy to limit the exposure of new development; property 
protection policy to retrofit buildings; and emergency services policy to reduce 
damages (Burby et al. 2006). They emphasize that urban planners should play a key 
role in preventive policies to reduce the exposure to disasters. However, with these 
diverse strategies of prevention, protection, and retreat, the main problem is that local 
governments often put a low priority on taking action unless the higher government 
mandates it. Because of the pro-growth and pro-development of local governments, 
resilient planning to reduce disaster risk is often ignored. For instance, in the U.S.A., 
local governments are not likely to pursue such measures vigorously without being 
forced to do so through mandates imposed by state governments (Burby et al. 2006). 
However, some state governments incentivize municipal scenario planning processes 
for urban resilience. Take New York State for instance, the NYS 2100 Commission 
(2012) suggests that the state can incentivize municipal scenario planning processes 
for evaluating risk to human, environmental, and economic assets from coastal storms 
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and sea-level rise. Hence, resilience policies also need a top-down method as well as 
mandates and support from higher levels of government.  
Table 2- 4 The content and strategy of resilience planning 
Resilience planning Content and strategy 
Core ideas 
 An alternative plan format, a policy plan, rather a 
conventional plan 
 Risk-based land use planning, instead of traditional 
development ignoring the hazard characteristics of land 
Scope 
A regional approach for resilience planning; Long-term 
regional resilience strategies must be developed 
Planning process 
 Integrating risk-based land use planning approach into 
urban governance and process 
 Scenario planning process: providing the information, 
selecting complementary land use and hazard-mitigation 
measures, and formalizing a long-term adaptation strategy 
to effectively manage impacts 
Prevention strategy  
Preventive policies and actions, such as conservation zoning, 
to limit the exposure of new development to losses from 
hazards 
Accommodation strategy 
 Elevate structures  
 Erosion-based setback  
 Room for the water 
Protection strategy 
 Shore armoring; beach nourishment 
 Property protection policies and actions, such as building 
standards and assistance to property to owners to retrofit 
buildings to increase their resilience to hazards 
 Structural protection policies and actions such as flood 
control works to provide area-wide protection from 
hazards 
Retreat/avoid strategy 
 Prohibit development plus transfer of development rights 
 Prohibit development plus acquisition 
 Post-disaster down-zoning planning with a tool of transfer 
of development rights  
 Post-disaster plus acquisition 
 Rolling easements, initiated by U.S.A.’s EPA Climate 
Ready Estuaries Program, which allow nature to take its 
course  
Green infrastructure 
strategy 
 A broader adoption of green infrastructure can minimize 
local problems with flooding, contamination or erosion. 
 Acquisition of flood-prone properties and permanent 
conversion of those properties to open space. 
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In addition to resilience planning policies with cooperation among different 
levels of governments, a regional approach and integration is needed for urban 
resilience. Different cases show the importance. In New Orleans’ experience, Birch 
and Wachter (2006) argue for a multidisciplinary approach for rebuilding after 
Hurricane Katrina. They point out that “the absence of an integrated approach has 
resulted in the pattern of ever increasing disasters and the need for cooperation across 
multiple levels of government”. The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG 
2013) also observes that there is no regional coordinating body currently in operation 
to facilitate decision-making in the aftermath of a major disaster. The ABAG indicates 
that “regional governance structures for coordination are well-established for disaster 
response”. Hence, the ABAG created the Regional Resilience Initiative to build 
resilience through collaborative planning and jurisdictional collaboration (Association 
of Bay Area Governments 2013). In New York’s rebuilding after Hurricane Sandy, the 
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force (2013) stressed “the long-term plan for 
rebuilding is ensuring a regionally coordinated resilient approach to infrastructure 
investment because natural disasters do not respect political boundaries”. Thus, 
rebuilding plans cannot be limited by jurisdictional boundary. Klinenberg and Ovink 
(2013) note this in the project Rebuild by Design which encourages plans on the 
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regional scale, rather than the municipal or state level because many of the risks 
related to extreme weather events require cooperating across political boundaries.  
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2.3 Planning practices in flood resilience 
The UNISDR (2013) observed that the number of climate-related disasters, 
floods and storms, has soared significantly around the world since the 1980s.
4
 As 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) indicate, the 21
st
 century has been termed as 
“at war with the weather”. Floods become more frequent and severely damaging 
because of rapid urbanization and extreme weather conditions.
5
 Djordjević et al. 
(2011) indicate, “increased frequency and intensity of floods, combined with trends in 
growing urban population, have led to the need for increased and internationally 
coordinated policies”. In Asia, flooding is the most frequent natural disaster. The 
urban poor live in more environmentally vulnerable areas in Asia’s developing 
countries (The World Bank 2001; 2013; Sinh et al. 2012; Thomas et al. 2013). For 
example, both Vietnam and the Philippines have more than 40% of their urban 
populations living in informal settlements, where floods cause significant damages 
(The World Bank 2013). At the same time, in the developed countries, urbanization 
has brought higher vulnerability and damage from flooding. In U.K., Howe and White 
(2010) indicate that “building on floodplains, the planning system not attaching 
                                                      
4 There are 3,455 floods and 2,689 storms in 1980-2011, an average of approximately 200 floods and 
storms annually over the last three decades.  
5
 Rainfall intensity will increase in tropical and high-latitude regions that experience overall increases 
in precipitation (IPCC 2007). 
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enough weight to flooding issues, the pro-growth government, and the out-of-date 
Victorian drainage system” are the main reasons of flooding damages. Swan (2010) 
also notes that the increased urbanization has induced severe flooding problems. In 
the Netherlands, Aerts et al. (2009) explain that “flood risks have increased over the 
last 50 years by a factor of 7 due to urbanization in Randstad. Flood risk will increase 
because residents and businesses continue to settle in vulnerable locations in 
Randstad”. Therefore, in both developing and developed countries, urbanization is 
causing change to the natural environment and threatens urban resilience. Several 
practices being used to encourage urban flood resilience are: the engineering/structure 
strategy, the non-engineering/non-structure strategy, the land-use and environmental 
planning strategy, and the retreat planning. 
2.3.1 Engineering/structure strategy against flooding 
Most countries adopted the engineering/structure strategy to reduce flood risk 
during the past century. This includes building costly dikes, dams, storm-surge 
barriers and dunes. In the U.S.A., flood risk reduction has been dominated by the 
engineering strategy since the Mississippi River flooded in 1927. The Flood Control 
Act of 1930 supported national structural flood control works (Brody et al. 2007, 
2009). It is estimated that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has spent 
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more than $100 billion for structural projects since the 1940s (Stein et al. 2000). An 
annual average of approximately $2 billion was spent on flood control structures. 
However, these costly structural flood control projects often bring a false sense of 
security and result in encouraging new developments in and around floodplains. Once 
a flood event exceeds the capacity of the structure, it causes significant damage and 
economic loss. For instance, after the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, the city of 
Galveston, Texas built a seawall, 3 miles long and 17 feet high in 1902 to resist storm 
surges up to 15 feet high. However, seawalls cannot guarantee safety from a future 
storm. In 2008 Hurricane Ike’s storm surge and large waves came over the seawall in 
Galveston. Severe losses occurred. Approximately 75% of all homes in Galveston 
were damaged or destroyed.  
Another U.S.A. example was the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 where the 
flood proved that levee-dependence was an incontrovertibly failure. Prior to the flood, 
the Mississippi River Commission held the position that levees were the appropriate 
strategies for preventing floods. Powers (2006) describes that the 1927 flood altered 
the underlying theory regarding humanity’s relationship with nature from one of 
domination to one of accommodation. Additionally, the Great Flood of 1993 tore 
through more than a thousand levees, causing almost $20 billion of damage. In 
general, the average annual flood damage in the U.S.A. was estimated to have 
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climbed steadily to $4 billion (Stein et al. 2000). The USACE’s annual $2 billion 
investment on flood control structures can not reduce the increased annual flood 
damage of $4 billion. In other words, although nationwide structural projects for 
controlling water were completed in the U.S.A., urban flood resilience has not yet 
been achieved. 
A similar situation occurred in the Netherlands, a nation with 65% of GDP 
produced below sea level. The well-known flood protection system, 53 dike rings, 
along the main rivers and coastal areas is the highest standard of flood protection 
facilities in the world. For example, Randstad, the economic heart of the Netherlands, 
is designed to resist a storm that is estimated to occur once in every 10,000 years (a 
probability of 0.01% annually). However, Wiering and Immink (2005) argue that the 
engineering strategy to reduce flood risk creates a “flood control paradox” (see Figure 
2-1). The paradox is that strengthening dikes encourages more intensive land use. 
After a flood, dikes will be strengthened again. Then, higher density of land 
development occurs. Another flood will occur, and damages will be much more 
serious. This “flood control paradox” actually is a vicious cycle, and the measures to 
reinforce the dikes do not take away the cause of the problem, but create new risks 
(Wiering and Immink 2005). The Netherlands’ dike ring protection structures were 
built with the highest standard after the devastating flood of 1953. However, severe 
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floods still devastate Netherlands, such as the floods of 1993 and 1995. This explains 
why the highest level of flood protection system in the Netherlands can not guarantee 
absolute safety (Kolen et al. 2010).  
 
Figure 2- 1 The flood control paradox in the Netherlands 
Source: Wiering and Immink 2005 
In the U.K., engineering structures to reduce flood risks are subsidized by central 
government, and continue to be the primary flood mitigation strategy 
(Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 1988). The costly facilities and repeated floods have 
made governments rethink the urban flood resilience policy. Studies indicate that 
“more money for flood defense would not be a permanent solution in the U.K.” 
(Howe and White 2010). The costly engineering structures can not guarantee safety or 
reduce flood damages efficiently and effectively. For instance, many flooding 
problems continue to threaten London after the completion of the Thames Barrier in 
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1982,
6
 the world’s largest movable flood barriers. According to the Great London 
Authority (2002), the Thames tidal floodplain would have a 0.1% annual risk of 
flooding (a probability of 0.1% annually, or a flood in every 1,000 years), which 
amounts to a flood risk to property at a value of approximately $120 billion. After 
numerous flood defense facilities in the U.K., floods occur in different locations, 
shifting the flood waters downstream (Howe and White 2010). Hence, flooding does 
not stop, but changes locations. In addition, the damage is worse when the defenses 
are eventually breached. 
2.3.2 Non-engineering/non-structure strategy  
There are two types of non-structural strategies for urban flood resilience: the 
financial strategy and the planning strategy. The financial strategy includes rental 
incentives and insurance incentives. An example in Asia is Mumbai’s rent control 
policy resulting in the lack of proper housing maintenance and severe damages from 
flooding. Stecko and Barber (2007) indicate that “many apartment buildings are 
subject to rent control which prohibits landlords from increasing rents in Mumbai. 
The rent control has constrained the willingness and ability of landlords to maintain 
                                                      
6 According to U.K. Environment Agency, Thames Bar spans 520 meters across the River, and it 
protects 125 square kilometers of central London from flooding. Main gates stand as high as a 5- story 
building. The construction cost is approximately $796 million (535 million GBP) in 1982. This cost is 
estimated at $2 billion (1.4 billion GBP) at today’s prices. 
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rental accommodations, leading to inadequate housing”. More and more buildings are 
dilapidated and crumbling due to the lack of proper maintenance (Stecko and Barber 
2007). When a natural disaster occurs, the damage is severe. Thus, providing a 
financial incentive for landlords to increase rental in Mumbai would improve building 
maintenance and strengthen urban flood resilience. The financial incentive could 
allow landlords to spend part of rent income for purchasing flood insurance.  
Another financial strategy is flood insurance. Among flood insurance programs, 
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is most widely implemented in the 
U.S.A. and has been adopted by other countries. The NFIP was established in 1968 
under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as an attempt to reduce 
flood losses. The NFIP provides insurance to those living in vulnerable areas as long 
as local jurisdictions adopt some minimum level of protection. FEMA creates the 
community’s flood map and the flood insurance rate map (FIRM)
7
 to evaluate 
potential flood risk. In addition, FEMA’s community rating system (CRS), adopted in 
the early 1990’s, encourages communities to go beyond the NFIP’s minimum 
standards for floodplain management by providing discounts of up to 45% on flood 
insurance premiums for residents of participating communities. However, there are 
some problems with NFIP, including increasing debt, out-of-date information on flood 
                                                      
7 According to FEMA, more recent flood map products include digital FIRMs, which are created using 
digital methods and can be incorporated into a community's Geographic Information System (GIS). 
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maps, and the encouragement of new developments in floodplains. Huber (2012) 
states that “The NFIP insures approximately 5.6 million American homeowners and 
has $1 trillion in assets. The premiums collected have not been sufficient to cover 
losses, resulting in a current debt to the U.S.A. Treasury of more than $18 billion”. He 
suggests adjusting premiums, improving flood mitigation measures, and preparing for 
the catastrophic risk of events like Hurricane Katrina (Huber 2012). In addition, 
out-of-date information on flood maps from FEMA affects which homeowners should 
purchase flood insurance. After Hurricane Sandy devastated New York City in 2012, 
New York City’s report, A Stronger, More Resilient New York (2013), indicates that 
more than 50% of all buildings in the area flooded by Hurricane Sandy were outside 
of FEMA’s 100-year floodplain map created in 1983. Another criticism is that the 
effectiveness of the NFIP encouraged floodplain development and generated 
repetitive losses with high financial costs (Brody et al. 2009). Discounting insurance 
premiums by the CRS system makes it less expensive for people to live in a 100-year 
floodplain, resulting in development in the most vulnerable areas to flooding (Brody 
et al. 2007). Furthermore, the lack of public awareness of floods remains. In the case 
of Hurricane Sandy, less than 50 percent of residential buildings in the pre-Sandy 
100-year floodplain had flood insurance (The City of New York 2013). Therefore, the 
effort of flood risk awareness and communication needs to be more emphasized. 
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Non-engineering strategy such as NFIP, provide financial incentives for homeowners 
to reduce their flood risks and losses. However, the incentive shouldn’t increase the 
vulnerability of people living close to or in floodplains. Besides, flood insurance 
transfers risk and reduces homeowners’ losses, but flooding risk doesn’t disappear or 
ebb. Hence, another non-engineering strategy, land-use or environmental planning, 
becomes necessary to reduce vulnerability. 
2.3.3 Land-use and environmental planning strategy 
In the last century, flood risk reduction around the world primarily relied on 
engineering structures. However, historic floods indicate that flood resilience can not 
be achieved completely without land-use and environmental planning strategies. 
However, conventional land-use planning often ignores the hazard characteristics of 
the land. How to enhance risk-based land-use and environmental planning will play a 
role in reducing flood risk. Jha et al. (2013) emphasize “risk-based land-use planning”, 
explaining that “integrating the risk-based land use planning approach into urban 
governance and process can help to make more sustainable ways to increase resilience” 
(Jha et al. 2013). However, flood risk reduction or water resource management is 
often not integrated with land-use planning. Woltjer and Al (2007) indicate “most 
water management decisions in the Netherlands are made without reference to spatial 
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planning”.
8
 The Luino et al. (2012) case study in Italy also indicates that 
“flood-prone areas have been conducted for years without considering land use” and 
that “urban development has not been controlled by careful land management that 
considers natural threats”. Nonetheless, after the failure of the engineering strategy 
and the costly price of not integrating water management and land-use planning in 
reducing flood risks, the land-use and environmental planning strategy becomes more 
imminent. Hawkins (2013) stresses the importance of the connection between local 
comprehensive planning and disaster management. When members of organizations 
become more engaged in exchanging information among organizations within their 
planning network, they are more likely to have a favorable perception of the 
comprehensive plan in improving disaster resilience (Hawkins 2013). 
In Europe, the European Commission’s Flood Directive (2007)
9
 indicates that 
“flood risk management plans should focus on prevention, protection and 
preparedness, with a view to giving rivers more space”. The European Commission’s 
Water Framework Directive
10
 promotes a “river-basin approach” and “refers 
                                                      
8
 Woltjer and Al (2007) suggest the water impact assessment (WIA) in municipal land use plans is a 
strategy for linking water management and spatial planning. 
9
 The European Flood Directive (FD) was proposed by the European Commission in 2006 to reduce 
and manage the flood risk. 
10 The European Water Framework Directive (WFD) was established in 2000 as a policy platform in 
both quantitative water issues (cross-border flood management, water-supply management, and 
groundwater control) and qualitative aspects.  
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explicitly to interrelations between water management and land use”. Flood 
management in Europe is shifting from building dikes (separating water from land use) 
to “space for the river” by land-use and environmental planning. Moreover, 
expanding the floodplain is a necessary planning strategy. Bye and Horner (1998) 
indicate “the defense flooding of a 1 in 100 year severity may only provide defense 
against floods of up to 1 in 30 year severity in the future” because of frequent extreme 
conditions and the global warming scenario. Woltjer and Al (2007) suggest “enlarging 
the floodplain area available to accommodate Rhine River waters during floods by 
converting land from urban and agricultural uses to a land use called water area." 
Hence, floodplains needs to be adjusted and expanded to accommodate water, and 
then reduce flood risk. Damages would also be decreased by allowing less 
development density in or adjacent to floodplains.  
In addition to planning more space for the river to increase urban flood resilience, 
research indicates that wetland planning, polder and retention areas, and permeable 
surface design matter in reducing flood risks. The disappearance of wetlands and the 
increase in impervious surfaces due to rapid urbanization have increased the runoff 
and flood risk around the world. Research indicates that wetlands have a significant 
effect on flood risk reduction, and explains that basins with 5% lake and wetland area 
may have 40% to 60% lower flood peaks than comparable basins without such 
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hydrologic features (Novitski 1985). Brody et al. (2007) also studied the relationship 
of alteration of naturally occurring wetlands and flood damage through analyzing 383 
flood events across 54 coastal counties in Florida from 1997 to 2001, and found that 
the alteration of naturally occurring wetlands significantly increases the property 
damage caused by floods. They also found that “56% of all wetland alteration permits 
in research samples were located in 100-year floodplains” (Brody et al. 2007). This 
means more wetlands were converted into new developments in floodplains in Florida. 
The disappearance of a large amount of wetlands as well as the occurrence of new 
developments in floodplains cause a higher vulnerability to floods. Brody and Gunn 
(2013) note that the percent of wetland loss matters in floods after examining 
environmental factors contributing to resilience along the Gulf of Mexico coast. 
Another example was Hurricane Katrina, as Dean (2006) indicates that the wetlands 
east of the Mississippi River lost 25% of their land area, but after Katrina, people 
finally understood the value of wetlands as a form of protection from hurricanes. 
Costanza et al. (2008) studied 34 major hurricanes in the U.S.A. since 1980, and 
found that “coastal wetlands reduce the damaging effects of hurricanes on coastal 
communities”. They estimated that a loss of 1 hectare of wetland corresponded to an 
average $33,000 increase in storm damage. Costanza et al. (2008) describe the coastal 
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wetlands function as “horizontal levees for storm protection”, and their restoration 
and preservation is an extremely cost-effective strategy (Costanza et al. 2008).  
Polder systems and retention area planning also can reduce flood risks. 
Engkagul’s Thailand case study indicates that planning for polder systems and 
retention areas would help reduce flood risk in larger areas (Engkagul 1993). Further, 
it is estimated that a 10–20% increase of impervious surface within a drainage basin 
corresponds to doubling the runoff (Arnold and Gibbons 1996). The impermeable 
surface causes higher flood risk because of the increased runoff. Reducing the 
impervious surface would reduce flood risks. Therefore, land-use and environmental 
planning concentrating on wetland areas, water retention areas, and permeable surface 
design will provide a strategy for reducing flood risks. Woltjer and Al (2007) suggest 
a 10% area in land use plans be for measures such as ponds and streams for 
emergency conveyance and storage of rain water, and permeable surfaces and 
grass-covered roofs to hold rain and allow soil infiltration.   
Some case studies indicate that a significant flood risk comes from drainage 
flooding. Notable is the London case study. The Great London Authority (2002) 
evaluated London flood risks and identified three main types of flood risk: tidal, river, 
and drainage flooding. The result shows that “the most immediate and significant 
flood risk to London comes from drainage flooding” (Great London Authority 2002). 
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Hence, integrating drainage systems with land-use planning provides another planning 
strategy to create robust flood resilience. In the U.K., the Environment Agency (EA)
11
 
is actively promoting the use of sustainable urban drainage systems (SUDS, see 
Figure 2-2) to reduce levels of surface runoff. As Swan (2010) indicates “the SUDS 
approach, including green roofs, soak-aways, swales, infiltration basins and ponds, is 
intended to replace and/or augment an existing (combined or separate) drainage 
system within a developed catchment” (Swan 2010). The use of SUDS within a 
‘planning-based’ approach, seeks to progressively impose green-field runoff 
restrictions to all new planning proposals (Swan 2010). Hence, SUDS can reduce the 
flood risk through retaining the flood volume temporarily and releasing it slowly at a 
lower flow-rate (Butler and Davies 2011). Howe and White (2010) also indicate that 
SUDS can help to attenuate water flow and prevent surface run-off, which can reduce 
flood risk. Swan (2010) stresses that urban planning has a key role to play in 
delivering more integrated and sustainable urban drainage systems in further urban 
regeneration over the next 50 years. He suggests that urban planning progressively 
retrofitting sustainable drainage to existing urban catchments needs to be more widely 
recognized. This will result in the reduction of flood risks and damages. 
                                                      
11
 Environment Agency (EA) is one of the thirty-six agencies belong to the U.K. Cabinet’s Department 
for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 
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Figure 2-2 Sustainable urban drainage systems in U.K. to prevent flood risk 
Source: The British Geological Survey 
Another land-use and environmental planning policy, urban growth management, 
directing developments and populations away from floodplains, could reduce flood 
risks and damages. The U.S.A. case study in Florida indicates that urban growth 
management is an appropriate policy to reduce damages from hurricane flooding. 
Chapin et al. (2006) indicate that one of the main concerns of Florida’s Growth 
Management Act in 1985 was to reduce damages from hurricane flooding. Since 1990, 
comprehensive plans require coastal communities to include policies that limit 
development in and direct populations away from coastal high hazard areas (CHHAs). 
Chapin et al. (2006) indicate “the more stringent policies for directing population 
concentrations away from CHHAs were associated with lower post-plan growth rates 
and growth densities”. Hence, urban growth management to directing development 
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away from floodplains and reducing its growth rate or density could provide a good 
strategy to reduce flood risks and vulnerability. 
2.3.4 Retreat and evacuation planning 
Some research of urban resilience stresses retreat and evacuation to reduce flood 
damage and its impact. A strategic retreat from hazardous coastal areas and 
alternatives, such as voluntary property buyouts, relocations, and land swaps for less 
risky areas should be explored to reduce flood risks and damages (Stein et al. 2000). 
Deyle and Butler (2013) also suggest a retreat model for flood risk reduction. Some 
strategies such as prohibiting development as well as the transfer of development 
rights (TDR), land acquisition, and down-zoning can be implemented. Additionally, 
an efficient evacuation plan is needed to reduce damages once severe floods do come. 
However, Kolen et al. (2010) indicate that one major issue is people’s ability and 
willingness to evacuate. A plan needs to address the issue of people who do not or can 
not evacuate the area. In the U.S.A.’s case after Hurricane Katrina, it has been 
estimated that between 100,000 and 300,000 people did not or could not be evacuated 
from New Orleans. A large number of them were the city’s poor populations, with 
112,000 people not having access to personal vehicles (Wolshon 2006). Hence, 
helping the urban poor to evacuate demands the cooperation of government and 
non-profit organizations. Another factor is traffic capacity. Traffic management 
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reduces the time required for evacuation. A Netherlands case study shows that “at 
least 20% of the people are still in the flooding area after 24 hours” (Kolen et al. 
2010). Insufficient traffic capacity prevents the evacuation goal of 24 hours for coastal 
areas. In the U.S.A.’s experience after Hurricane Katrina, transportation infrastructure 
in New Orleans wasn’t designed to accommodate the evacuation-level demand, and 
the traffic exit capacity is roughly 67%, meaning that if the evacuation goes smoothly, 
the roads outside of New Orleans will only be able to take two-thirds of the people in 
24 hours (Wolshon 2006). One-third of the people are in flooding areas. Hence, 
efficient traffic management becomes an important part of retreat and evacuation 
planning to reduce flood damage. 
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES OF REBUILD, RETREAT, AND RESILIENCE 
This chapter reviews historic catastrophes since the 17
th
 century. The 
chronology of catastrophes indicates that the 21
st
 century can be termed the “new era 
of catastrophes” (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). Few cities are immune to 
natural disasters. However, some cities show more resilience. How can a city have the 
ability to bounce forward, higher, and stronger after a flood or other catastrophe? 
Case studies of rebuilding, retreating, and displaying resilience after a natural disaster 
reveal that strong political support incorporated with non-government organizations 
(NGOs), cooperation among the different levels of government, higher social capital 
and higher GDP per capita, and an emphasis on social resilience and justice all help to 
achieve successful rebuilding and resilience. In addition, this chapter also analyzes 
urban flood resilience and strategies of flood risk reduction in five global cities: New 
York City, London, Tokyo, Randstad, and Shanghai. Most research of global cities 
concentrates on economic activity, capitalization, professional occupations, human 
capital, financial institutions, and producer services (Sassen 1991). Few studies focus 
on analyzing environmental vulnerability and flood resilience among these five global 
cities. 
New York City began developing a citywide resilience plan after Hurricane 
Sandy in 2012 to prevent damage in the future. While Hurricane Sandy caused 
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approximately $19 billion in losses in New York City, the projection of a storm like 
Sandy with the rising sea level by the 2050s will cause an estimated $90 billion, 
almost five times as much (The City of New York 2013). New York City also projects 
that in 2050 the flooding areas of each neighborhood
1
 with an expected loss of $30 
million will be five times greater than actual loss they experienced in 2012 from 
Hurricane Sandy. By the 2050s a hurricane could leave approximately 25% of New 
York City with severe economic losses.  
In London, 15% of the land is located in flood-prone areas, and many new 
housing developments were built in or adjacent to these floodplains after the 1980s. 
London promotes an urban sustainable drainage system, increasing the capacity of its 
drainage system and river restoration, to reduce its risks. Tokyo has the least 
flood-prone area, approximately 10%, among these global cities. Tokyo’s model of 
underground reservoirs, diversion systems, and channels reduced its flooding. 
Randstad is well prepared for flood risk reduction by land-use and environmental 
planning although it has 40% of its land areas in flood-prone areas, a relatively high 
proportion.   
                                                      
1 Each neighborhood is defined by the zip code in New York City. There are a total of 176 zip codes in 
New York City (41 zip codes in Manhattan, 37 in Brooklyn, 61 in Queens, 25 in the Bronx, and 12 on 
Staten Island) 
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In Shanghai, approximately 50% of its land is in flood-prone areas. Shanghai 
has the highest vulnerability to floods of coastal cities when compared with Dhaka, 
Manila, Calcutta, Buenos Aires, Casablanca, Marseille, Osaka, and Rotterdam (Balica 
et al. 2011). However, Shanghai is still less prepared in land-use and environmental 
planning for urban resilience. Shanghai mainly focuses on massive levees or other 
flood control facilities with an inadequate protection standard for a flood once in 
every 200 years. In 2010, Shanghai began to develop its flood risk map by using GIS 
to map the flood-prone areas for different scenarios. The results indicate that more 
than 50% of Shanghai is in flood-prone areas, the highest flooding depth would be 22 
feet. The land-use planning strategy has seldom been considered in Shanghai for 
urban resilience. In addition, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission 
(2015) indicates that “a high GDP per capita has a positive effect on the government’s 
effort to increase the resilience of the society”. Among case studies of New York City, 
London, Tokyo, Randstad, and Shanghai, Shanghai has the lowest GDP per capita, 
which also means that it has less effect on the government’s effort to increase urban 
resilience.   
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3.1 Historic review on natural disasters 
Natural disasters include earthquakes, floods, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons, 
tidal waves, droughts, and volcano eruptions. During the past century, floods, storms, 
and earthquakes in particular have caused an immense amount of damages and 
fatalities around the world (see Figure 3-1 and Table 3-1). However, natural disasters 
can also provide opportunities for adaption and resilience. Many cities were rebuilt 
with improved living conditions both for survivors and for future generations. “Cities 
which have experienced catastrophic disasters have persisted and even flourished” 
(Vale and Campanella 2005; Ramroth 2007). Notable examples include the 1906 San 
Francisco earthquake, the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the 1953 North Sea flood in 
Randstad, the 2007 London flood, and 2012’s Hurricane Sandy in New York City. 
With adequate planning and policies, cities can become better able to reduce loss by 
using adaptive rebuilding strategies. “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure”. A city’s disaster preparation, mitigation, adaption, and resilience plan can 
reduce risk, vulnerability, and damage to achieve a sustainable, safer, and more 
resilient city. 
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Figure 3- 1 Natural disaster timeline since the 17
th
 century 
Table 3- 1 Severe natural disasters around the world in the past  
Year Disaster Damage 
1666  
Great Fire of London  
U.K. 
Medieval London is destroyed. The 5-day Great 
Fire destroyed approximately 80% of the city. 
Over 13,000 houses and 87 churches were 
destroyed, and 65,000 Londoners were left 
homeless.  
1737 Calcutta Cyclone 
India 
Killed 300,000 to 350,000 individuals. 
1755 Lisbon Earthquake 
Portugal 
Magnitude in the range 8.5-9.0; killed 10,000 to 
100,000 people. 
1839 Coringa Cyclone  
India 
The port was destroyed (some 20,000 vessels 
were lost) and 300,000 people were killed. 
1871 Chicago Fire  
U.S.A. 
The fire killed up to 300 people, destroyed 
roughly 3.3 square miles, and left more than 
100,000 residents homeless. 
1887 Yellow River Flood 
China 
Killed between 900,000 and 2,000,000 people. 
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Year Disaster Damage 
1900 Galveston Hurricane  
U.S.A. 
Roughly 8,000 people were killed by this 
Category 4 hurricane, though some estimates put 
the death toll as high as 12,000. The city were 
destroyed as far as five blocks inland by a storm 
surge up to 15 feet high.  
1906 San Francisco 
Earthquake 
U.S.A. 
About 3,000 people died and over 80% of the 
city was destroyed. 
1923 Great Tokyo 
Earthquake 
Japan 
Estimated casualties totaled about 142,800 
deaths, including about 40,000 who went missing 
and were presumed dead. 
1927 Great Mississippi 
Flood 
U.S.A. 
More than 23,000 square miles of land was 
submerged. The flood caused over $400 million 
in damages and killed 246 people in seven states. 
1928 Lake Okeechobee 
Hurricane 
U.S.A. 
Roughly 2,500 were killed, but it is possible that 
the number was as high as 3,000. 
1931 Central China Floods 
China 
Caused between 800,000 and 4,000,000 deaths. 
1953 North Sea Flood 
Netherlands, Belgium, 
U.K. 
Killed 2,251 people in the Netherlands and 
eastern England. 
1970 Bhola Cyclone 
Bangladesh 
Up to 500,000 people lost their lives in the storm. 
1976 Tanshan 
Earthquake 
China 
The number of deaths initially reported by the 
Chinese government was 655,000. 
1989 Loma Prieta 
Earthquake 
U.S.A. 
63 deaths and 3,757 injuries in the affected areas. 
1993 Great Midwest Flood 
U.S.A. 
The 1993 flood even surpassed the 1927 flood, at 
the time the largest flood ever recorded on the 
Mississippi. Approximately 100,000 homes were 
destroyed. The floods cost 32 lives officially as 
well as an estimated $15-20 billion in damages. 
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Year Disaster Damage 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
U.S.A. 
The death toll was 57, with more than 5,000 
injured. In addition, earthquake-caused property 
damage was estimated to be more than $20 
billion. 
1995 Kobe Earthquake 
Japan 
Approximately 6,434 people lost their lives. It 
caused approximately $100 billion in damage, 
2.5% of Japan's GDP at the time. 
1999 Jiji Earthquake 
Taiwan 
2,415 people were killed, 11,305 injured, and 
US$10 billion damage. 
2003 European Heat Wave 
France, Portugal, 
Netherlands, Spain, 
Italy, Germany.  
European death toll at 70,000. 
2004 India Ocean 
Earthquake 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka 
The third largest earthquake recorded in history, 
registering a moment magnitude of 9.1-9.3. The 
huge tsunamis triggered by this earthquake killed 
at least 229,000 people. 
 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
U.S.A. 
A total of 1,200 direct deaths. This resulted in an 
inundation of 80 percent of New Orleans with 
water depths up to 20 feet. Estimated damage of 
$108 billion.  
2005 Mumbai Flood 
India 
Killed about 5,000 people. 
2007 England Flood 
U.K. 
Total economic costs of the summer 2007 floods 
are estimated at about £3.2 billion in 2007 prices. 
2008 Cyclone Nargis 
Myanmar 
84,500 people were killed and 53,800 went 
missing. The UN estimates 2.4 million people 
were affected. 
2008 Sichuan Earthquake 
China 
The 7.9 magnitude earthquake in Sichuan 
Province, China. Over 61,150 deaths. 
2009 Typhoon Morakot 
Taiwan 
681 people dead and 18 missing, roughly 
$3.3 billion USD in damages. 
2010 Chile Earthquake 
Chile 
The 8.8 magnitude earthquake and tsunami 
caused to 525 deaths.  
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Year Disaster Damage 
2010 Haiti Earthquake 
Haiti 
Death toll estimates range from 100,000 to about 
160,000. Estimated that 250,000 residences and 
30,000 commercial buildings had collapsed or 
were severely damaged. 
2010 Pakistan Floods 
Pakistan 
Directly affected about 20 million people, mostly 
by displacement, destruction of crops, 
infrastructure, property and livelihood, with a 
death toll of close to 2,000. 
2011 The Great East Japan 
Earthquake,  
Japan 
Also known as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and 
tsunami, registering a moment magnitude of 9.0. 
It caused to 15,889 deaths; 6,152 injured; and 
2,609 were still missing as of 2014. 
2012 Hurricane Sandy 
U.S.A. 
Estimated damage of $65 billion. 650,000 houses 
were either damaged or destroyed.  
2013 Typhoon Haiyan 
Philippines 
It is the deadliest Philippine typhoon on record, 
killing at least 6,300 people. 
Among these natural disasters, the United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR 2013) observed that the number of climate-related 
disasters around the world has soared since the 1980s. In particular, the number of 
floods and storms has increased to an annual average of approximately 200 events, as 
is illustrated in Figure 3-2. Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) describe the 
situation since 2001 as “a new era of catastrophes”. As can be seen from the review of 
natural disasters in the last four centuries presented in Figure 3-1 and Table 3-1, the 
occurrence of disasters increased dramatically in the late 20
th
 century. Many natural 
disasters occurred after the 1970s, especially in Asia and North America. Europe also 
suffered more than one hundred major floods between 1998 and 2004. Even with the 
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highest standard of flood protection in the Netherlands, when the Danube and Elbe 
rivers overflowed their banks in 2002, there were 700 fatalities and 250,000 people 
left homeless. The extent of the damage stood at around $27 billion (The Minister of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2007).  
 
Figure 3- 2 Increased floods and storms (light and dark blue) since the 1980s 
Source: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2013 
Over the past 50 years, total rainfall has increased by 7 percent globally, much 
of which is due to the increased frequency of heavy downpours (Huber and Gulledge 
2011). Different countries and different cities have different levels of flood 
vulnerability. Generally, the developing countries are less prepared for floods, both 
for human loss and property damage. For example, the developing countries represent 
11% of the population exposed to hazards but account for 53% of the casualties. On 
the other hand, the developed countries represent 15% of human exposure to hazards, 
but account for only 1.8% of all victims (Prduzzi et al. 2009). Since the 1970s many 
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policy makers, planning experts, and citizens have therefore been faced with the 
problem of how to rebuild a city and improve its disaster resilience. No city or 
country is immune to natural disasters in the 21
st
 century (Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan 2009), particularly the East Asia, South Asia, and North American (see 
Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4). These regions have the most frequent occurrences of 
natural disasters, and the highest rates of deaths and economic losses resulting from 
these natural disasters. However, many Asian countries have not yet prepared well for 
the war with weather, for climate change, and for natural disasters in a world 
experiencing the fast-growing urbanization, which often leads to a huge number of 
deaths and damages when a disaster does occur. How and what planners can do to 
reduce the impact of natural disasters is an important consideration. Similarly, how 
governments prepare and plan for a resilient city is a priority for many policy makers. 
Resilience planning can provide a means for strengthening the planning agenda for 
safer, sustainable, and more resilient cities. 
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Figure 3- 3 Projection of cyclone hotspots by 2025, especially in the East Asia and 
North America 
Source: United Nations 2012 
 
 
  
Figure 3- 4 Projection of flooding hotspots by 2025, especially in the East Asia, South 
Asia, and North America 
Source: United Nations 2012 
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3.2 Lessons learned from rebuilding experiences 
This section analyzes rebuilding cases around the world to understand how 
cities can perform better in rebuilding, and how to increase urban resilience. Major 
natural catastrophes of the twenty-first century include Asia’s Indian Ocean 
Earthquake and Tsunami of 2004, the U.S.A.’s Hurricane Katrina of 2005, and 
Japan’s Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. This section presents lessons learned 
from these rebuilding experiences. Related to the previously discussed resilience 
discourse, adaptive resilience provides a city with the ability and capacity to change, 
adapt, and transform after a catastrophe. A successful rebuilding goal is to bounce 
forward gradually to a different, better condition, rather than just bouncing-back to 
normalcy. The evolution of disaster resilience opens up new opportunities for 
development and improvement, for “doing it better”, but also for change and 
innovation by “doing it differently” (Aldunce et al. 2014).  
However, people often expect to rebuild and bounce back to normalcy quickly. 
For example, with the rebuilding of Aceh, Indonesia after the Indian Ocean 
Earthquake and Tsunami of 2004, the Acehnese people expected to return to 
normalcy in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe. This did not happen. But, as 
time progressed, government and the people learned to adapt their environment to 
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reduce risks, provide a better quality of life, achieve sustainable livelihoods, and a 
secure and peaceful city (Clarke et al. 2010). Aech’s bottom-up system helps to 
increase the ability to rebuild. Another example is Sri Lanka’s rebuilding after the 
Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami of 2004. Sri Lanka promoted the cooperation 
of governments and non-government organizations (NGOs) in the rebuilding process. 
A community’s ability to recover from a disaster is contingent on the level of social 
trust among individuals and institutions. A resilient community requires trusting 
relationships among its members, including the elected officials, planners, public 
managers, industry, and general population (Ozawa 2012). Sri Lanka’s bottom-up 
system with trust and cooperation promotes resilience in the process of rebuilding. 
Additionally, Sri Lanka’s central government welcomed the NGOs and international 
relief aid after the disaster. Flexible institutions help rebuild quickly. Daniels and 
Steinberg (2006) indicate that “Sri Lanka’s national government served as a facilitator 
in helping NGOs get on the ground quickly and in making land available for the 
NGOs to build temporary and permanent housing. Additionally, permanent housing 
followed closely behind the temporary housing. Residents felt a sense of security, 
ownership, and community”. Hence, in this rebuilding case, the cooperation of the 
public sector, international organizations, NGOs, communities, and the bottom-up 
system do matter in rebuilding differently and resiliently.  
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Moreover, the social aspect of resilience is especially important in rebuilding. 
In the rebuilding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina of 2005, social resilience 
should have been the focus as a large number of residents were in the lower 
socio-economic status. As Edwards (2010) explains, “the challenge recognized for the 
first time was the large number of people unable to provide proof of residency 
because they did not have utility bills in their names, or any other form of 
identification with an address”. Many people had no driver license. In addition, 
property records were sparse in areas where homes are worth less than $75,000 and 
not taxed. Therefore, people could not prove ownership to get Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) assistance for repairs and rebuilding. Hence, the social 
aspect has to be considered in rebuilding and with the resilience approach. Social 
resilience must be viewed as a part of rebuilding. However, Brown (2014) explains 
that “there is still relatively little analysis on social resilience, and there are continuing 
tensions between normative and analytical stances on resilience”. These 
characteristics are mirrored in policy discourses and local level actions on resilience. 
In the future, rebuilding policies should think deeply about social resilience, which 
will help to bounce forward to a better condition.  
Further, strong political support is a most important factor in rebuilding. Vale 
and Campanella (2005) indicate that “narratives of resilience are a political necessity 
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and disasters reveal the resilience of governments”. Because of the absence of state 
planning and hazard mitigation requirements in the U.S.A., many localities ignore 
hazards in planning for and regulating urban development. In other words, the 
government’s minor role in resilience could result in the failure of adaptive resilience. 
The U.K.’s experience shows that the government favors the developers to the 
detriment of the local communities. The result is that 27% of new housing is located 
in flood hazard areas (Bosher et al. 2007). Andrew (2014) argues that if public 
agencies and local communities in the U.K. can work and plan together, then 
proactive steps can be taken to build resilience that assists in both the response and 
recovery stage of major incidents to minimize the direct impact of floods. Hence, 
learned from Hurricane Katrina, social aspects and a proactive government role 
should be promoted in rebuilding and resilience.   
In Japan, triggered by a multi-disaster with an earthquake, tsunami, and 
nuclear explosion, coordination among different levels of governments was the key to 
rebuilding after the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. Japan established the 
Reconstruction Agency (RA) immediately in February 2012, with a duration of 10 
years, headed by the Prime Minister. This Agency is placed one rank higher than 
other ministries, and has better coordination among different levels of governments. It 
can integrate and coordinate all relevant functions of the individual ministries for the 
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recovery and reconstruction from the disaster (Suzuki and Kaneko 2013). Japan also 
engaged in proactive disaster risk management, legislation, enforcement, and 
promoting cooperation among different levels of governments, multiple stakeholders, 
and NGOs (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014). Gill et al. (2013) note that since these 
coastal communities have been declared uninhabitable, return will never be possible. 
The challenge for local authorities was to construct permanent housing of decent 
quality and at an affordable price with low-interest loans to help victims buy them. 
There has been a great deal of discussion in Japan on where people may live and work 
in the future. Many recovery plans will remove people from their ancestral homes and 
move them inland to higher elevations which are believed to be safer and more 
resilient to floods and earthquakes. These rebuilding strategies call for turning large 
coastal areas into natural barriers or buffer zones. Some neighborhoods would become 
parks and green spaces, such as tsunami protection parks and disaster prevention 
greening areas. These coastal communities will be banned from rebuilding in the 
danger zone and forced to move elsewhere (Wilhelm & Delaney 2013). Relocation 
and retreat became primary rebuilding strategies in Japan after the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
Moreover, Japan provided an example in the reform of land use adjustment, 
the creation of a special zone system (SZS). Suzuki and Kaneko (2013) book Japan’s 
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Disaster Governance explains that the SZS was introduced to facilitate reconstruction 
by taking into account all of the unique needs and special circumstances in each local 
government afflicted by the earthquake. Under this system, the government decides 
basic guidelines for the special zones for reconstruction at the cabinet level. There are 
about 227 municipalities and 11 prefecture governments afflicted by the earthquake 
that are required to prepare these plans: Reconstruction Acceleration Plan (RAP); 
Land Restructuring Plan (LRP); and Reconstruction Grant Projects Plan (RGPP). 
RAP is a proposal of special measures and arrangements involving deregulation, 
reduced procedures, and tax incentives to accelerate the reconstruction undertakings. 
LRP is a proposal for special arrangements involving various approvals and 
procedures for land restructuring and conversion. The conditions of land 
restructure-related permits by governments can be relaxed, and create “one-stop” 
approval procedures for land restructuring. RGPP is for securing various subsides, 40 
grant projects at different ministries, to implement. In addition, there are 58 new laws 
enacted as of August 2012 to cope with the rescue, recovery, and reconstruction after 
the earthquake (Suzuki and Kaneko 2013). Japan’s rebuilding after the Great East 
Japan Earthquake demonstrated the importance of coordination of different levels of 
government, proactive and flexible plans, and the reform of land-use planning and 
related regulations.   
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3.3 Flood resilience policy and practice in the global city  
Very few studies of global cities analyze environmental vulnerability or 
disaster resilience. Because floods and storms around the world have soared since the 
1980s, this section analyzes global cities’ disaster resilience to flooding: New York 
City, London, Tokyo, Randstad, and Shanghai. These global cities are not included in 
EU’s collaborative research on flood resilience in urban areas (CORFU) and flood 
resilience city (FRC).
2
 Hence, case studies of those global cities will assist cities 
world-wide to prepare for the future. Results indicate that a hurricane could leave 
approximately 25% of New York City with severe economic losses by 2050. In 
London, 15% of the land is located in flood-prone areas. In Tokyo, 10% of its land in 
flood-prone areas, the lowest proportion among the listed global cities. Randstad has 
40% of its land areas in flood-prone areas, but Randstad is also well prepared for 
flood risk reduction by land-use and environmental planning. In Shanghai, 
approximately 50% of its land is in flood-prone areas. Shanghai is the most vulnerable 
to floods of the coastal cities. Shanghai is still not well prepared in land-use and 
environment planning for urban flood resilience.  
                                                      
2CORFU’s ongoing 9 case studies, including: Barcelona (Spain), Beijing (China), Dhaka (Bangladesh), 
Hamburg (Germany), Mumbai (India), Nice (France), Taipei (Taiwan), Incheon (South Korea), and 
Seoul (South Korea).  
FRC’s ongoing 8 case studies, including: Bradford (UK), Brussels and Leuven (Belgium), Dublin 
(Ireland), Mainz (Germany), Nijmegen (Netherlands), Orleans (France), Paris (France). 
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3.3.1 A resilience plan in New York City  
Every neighborhood in New York City, defined by a zip code, is experiencing 
the economic losses after Hurricane Sandy in 2012 (see Figure 3-5). New York City 
also projects that in 2050 the flooding areas of each neighborhood
3
 with an expected 
loss of $30 million will be five times greater than the actual loss they experienced in 
2012 from Hurricane Sandy. By the 2050s, the number of neighborhoods facing 
severe economic losses will account for approximately 25% of all neighborhoods in 
New York City (The City of New York 2013). The Regional Plan Association 
projects an estimated 2.2 million people in the New York-New Jersey-Connecticut 
region will be at high risk of flooding from sea level rise and storm surge by 2050. 
Critical facilities will face inundation in the next few decades, including 59% of the 
region’s power generating capacity, 21% of public housing and four out of the 
region’s six airports (Regional Plan Association 2015).  
                                                      
3 Each neighborhood is defined by the zip code in New York City. There are a total of 176 zip codes in 
New York City (41 zip codes in Manhattan, 37 in Brooklyn, 61 in Queens, 25 in the Bronx, and 12 on 
Staten Island) 
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Figure 3- 5 Flooding in New York City caused by Hurricane Sandy in 2012  
Source: The City of New York 2013 
In New York City, devastating Hurricane Sandy caused 43 deaths, $19 billion in 
damage, destroyed 90,000 buildings in the inundated zone, left 2 million people 
without power, 11 million travelers affected daily, and 1.1 million children unable to 
attend school for at least a week. The cooperation of the federal, state, and local 
governments aimed to achieve resilience. The U.S.A. Federal Government report 
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy (2013) was to establish guidelines for the 
investment of $50 billion in Federal funds, made available for recovery and set the 
region on the path to being built back more resilient and stronger. The New York 
State Government report Recommendations to Improve the Strength and Resilience of 
the Empire State’s Infrastructure (2013) concentrated on regional coastal resilience. 
Resilience strategies integrate restoration and enhancement of natural systems, hard 
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structures, and land use controls to achieve multiple benefits. Another report NYS 
2100 Commission recommended the inclusion of natural mitigation methods as well 
as traditional engineering solutions. Finding and implementing natural and green 
methods for protection creates a crucial complement both to existing and new 
structural defenses. A broader adoption of green infrastructure can minimize local 
problems with flooding.  
New York City Government report Climate Risk Information 2013: Observations, 
Climate Change Projections, and Maps (2013) provides new climate change 
projections and future coastal flood risk maps for New York City. This climate risk 
information is designed to assist with community rebuilding plans, and help to 
increase resilience of communities. There are two important parts: climate projections 
and future coastal flood risk maps. This report also gives average climate change 
projections for the year 2050. The temperature projection for New York City is an 
increase of 4.0°F to 5.5°F. The precipitation projection is an increase of 5% to 10%. A 
sea level rise of 11 to 24 inches is projected. Additionally, because of FEMA’s 
out-of-date floodplain map from 1983, the general population is not aware of flood 
risk and the need for flood insurance. When Hurricane Sandy hit New York City, it 
was estimated that more than 50% of all properties flooded by Hurricane Sandy were 
outside of FEMA’s 100-year floodplain. Even among those in the floodplain, less than 
 
74 
50% of residential buildings in the pre-Sandy 100-year floodplain had flood insurance 
(The City of New York 2013). However, Huber and Gulledge (2011) also indicate that 
“what used to be a 500-year flood event may become a 100-year or 10-year event, so 
that most people will experience such events within their lifetimes”. Aerts et al. (2009) 
predict that “sea level rise alone in New York City may cause the current 1 in 100 year 
flood to occur approximately four times more often than by the end of the century. 
Moreover, by then, the current 1 in 500 year flood event may occur approximately 
once every 200 years” (Aerts et al. (2009). FEMA and New York City are updating 
their flood risk maps within the 100- and 500-year flood zones. These up-of-date 
flood risk maps should help to make people aware of their flood risks and thus have 
better risk communication and resilience planning strategies.  
The purpose of another New York City report A Stronger, More Resilient New 
York (2013) is to: 1. analyze the impact of Hurricane Sandy on the city’s buildings, 
infrastructure, and people; 2. assess the risks the city faces from climate change in the 
2020s and 2050s; 3. outline ambitious and comprehensive, yet achievable strategies 
for increasing resilience citywide. This report examines the economic losses: $19 
billion in 2012; $35 billion by the 2020s; and $90 billion by the 2050s (see Figure 
3-6). By the 2050s, with rising sea levels and more intense storms, a once-in-70-year 
loss event would cause an estimated $90 billion of damage, or almost five times the 
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asset damage and economic loss caused by Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Furthermore, 
the expected annual losses in New York City of $1.7 billion today will grow to $4.4 
billion in current dollars by the 2050s (The City of New York 2013). 
 
Figure 3- 6 The possible cost of $90 billion of a flooding in New York City by 2050  
Source: The City of New York 2013 
Expected losses will be concentrated in more areas of the city than were 
impacted during Hurricane Sandy, such as the East and South Shores of Staten Island, 
Southern Brooklyn, South Queens, the Brooklyn-Queens Waterfront, and Southern 
Manhattan (see Figure 3-7). The total flooding areas with the neighborhood 
experiencing losses of $30 million account for 5% of its land in New York City in 
2012. New York City also projects that in 2050 the total flooding areas and damages 
will be five times greater than actual loss they experienced in 2012 from Hurricane 
Sandy. By the 2050s a hurricane could leave approximately 25% of New York City 
with severe economic losses (see Figure 3-8). 
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Figure 3- 7 Future flood simulation for New York City by 2020 and 2050  
Source: The City of New York 2013 
 
Figure 3- 8 New York City’s flood damage simulation by 2050 
Source: The City of New York 2013 
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In order to address flood damage, New York City Government had to develop a 
resilient plan for citywide hard and soft infrastructure, coastal protection, insurance, 
utilities, transportation, parks, water, and revise building codes. Besides, the City 
Government also developed five community rebuilding and resilience plans: the 
Brooklyn-Queens Waterfront; the East and South Shores of Staten Island; South 
Queens; Southern Brooklyn; Southern Manhattan. Although New York City has a 
good resilience plan, how to pay for rebuilding will be an issue. The resilience plan 
consists of 250 initiatives which will cost nearly $20 billion, including a ten-year plan 
of Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency of $14 billion. There is a funding 
gap estimated to be approximately $4.5 billion. However, from New York City’s 
experience, it is clear what strategies are important in resilience planning: 1. engaging 
in climate change projection and disaster assessment; 2. examining fiscal losses and 
cost-benefit analysis; 3. developing space scenario planning; 4. developing 
community rebuilding and resiliency plans; 5. identifying and funding key initiatives.  
Further, the Regional Plan Association’s Fourth Regional Plan is undertaking to 
address the region’s natural disasters and to strengthen regional resilience. According 
to the Regional Plan Association (2015), the Fourth Regional Plan will take a 
comprehensive and long term look at the role of resilience in the region’s 
development. There are five broad categories of spatial resilience strategies: resist, 
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rebuild, restore, retain, and retreat (see Table 3-2). The fifth “R”, retreat, must 
inevitably be singled out from the other four. Retreat is not an engineered solution. 
Retreat is also often the last tool chosen from the resilience toolbox. However, there 
are many areas in the region where engineered strategies are expensive or cannot 
address the particular risks of communities. “Retreat strategies will have to be 
implemented in some places, and ignoring retreat as an option entirely will limit the 
opportunities to successfully implement a resilience plan” (Regional Plan Association 
2015). 
Table 3- 2 Resilience strategies of the 5Rs: rebuild, resist, retain, restore, and retreat 
Project/Policy/Proposal Rebuild Resist Retain Restore Retreat 
Bay Barriers  X    
Coastal Barriers, Hard  X    
Coastal Barriers, Soft  X  X  
Buyout Programs     X 
Rolling Easements     X X 
Building Retrofit, Zoning X     
Resist, Delay, Store, 
Discharge 
 X X X  
Wetlands Restoration     X  
Green Infrastructure X  X   
Living Shorelines   X X  
Source: Regional Plan Association 2015 
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3.3.2 London’s flooding vulnerability and risk reduction practice 
There are three main flood risks facing London: tidal surges, river water, and 
surface water. The largest concentrations of risk are around rivers, especially the 
Thames River, where flooding is often the result of heavy rainfall (Greater London 
Authority 2002). Notable was the flooding of autumn, 2000, inundating England and 
Wales, where the Association of British insurers estimated that the cost to insurers 
was approximately $2 billion (or £1.3 billion).
4
 London’s rapid growth, floodplain 
development, land-use modifications, the increase of impermeable surfaces, and an 
intensification of rainfall led to an increasing flood risk. The population grew from 
6.8 million in 1986 to 8.4 million as of 2014 in Greater London (U.K. National 
Statistics), which gave it higher exposure to floods. More and more people and 
properties are vulnerable to flooding, leading to increased damages. The value of 
property at risk is approximately $120 billion (or £80 billion), resulting from the 
Thames tidal floodplain with a probability of 0.1% annual risk of flooding (Great 
                                                      
4
 The flood levels in many places were the highest on record. In many locations there had been no 
previous record of flooding. 10,000 properties were flooded at over 700 locations and there was 
widespread disruption to road and rail services. The total costs are of the order of £1 billion (The 
Environment Agency) 
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London Authority 2002). Fifteen percent of London is located in flood risk areas 
where flooding is probable (see Figure 3-9, Great London Authority 2009).
5
   
 
Figure 3- 9 Approximately 15% of London is located in flood-prone areas 
Source: Great London Authority 2009; 2012 
The Greater London Authority (2012) also notes that up to 680,000 properties, 
approximately 19% of housing is at risk of surface water flooding in a rainstorm with 
an annual probability of 0.5%. There is a 20% probability of a home being flooded in 
a 40 years span. There are 24,000 properties which are at significant risk of river 
flooding (London Assembly Environment Committee 2014). When analyzing the 
different locations of housing built in different periods, the result indicates that the 
newer housing was built in the more flood-prone areas around the Thames River, 
particularly after the 1980s (see Figure 3-10).
6
 This has resulted in a higher 
vulnerability in London.  
                                                      
5 Greater London Authority (2012) estimates that over half a million people are at risk of flooding in 
London from tidal and fluvial sources. 70% of those at risk are at risk of tidal flooding, 29 % are at risk 
of fluvial flooding, and 1% are at risk of flooding from both sources. 
6 Greater London Authority (2014) report Housing in London 2014: The evidence base for the Mayor’s 
Housing Strategy. 
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Figure 3- 10 A large amount of housing built in/after the 1980s around flood-prone 
areas in London  
Source: Great London Authority 2014 
The Thames Barrier, the world’s largest movable flood barriers, began to operate 
to protect London from flooding in 1982. However, this encourages housing 
development closer to the river because people assumed the Barrier could stop 
flooding. However, Wiering and Immink (2005) indicate the flooding control facilities 
creates a “flood control paradox” or “flood vicious cycle”, strengthening dikes or 
barriers encouraged more intensive land use. When a flood event does happen, more 
damage occurs. Then, barriers or dikes will be strengthened again, which results in 
more developments. Thus, a large amount of housing developments in London after 
the 1980s are located in the flood-prone areas. In addition to the Thames Barrier, 
London’s policy to prevent flooding in the future primarily focuses on increasing the 
capacity of drainage systems and of river restoration. London will create more space 
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for flood waters to be held in the upstream river catchment and soak back into the 
ground. London Assembly Environment Committee (2014) indicates that allowing 
low-lying areas to flood safely at times of high water flow should protect homes, 
roads and businesses. Hence, engineering structures and barriers, improvement of the 
drainage system, and river restoration are major strategies to reduce flood risk in 
London. 
3.3.3 Tokyo’s flooding vulnerability and risk reduction practice 
Tokyo is the most populous urban agglomeration in Asia, with a population of 
over 37 million as of 2014. The Greater Tokyo Area is home to approximately 26% of 
Japan’s total population (The World Bank 2009). Extensive urbanization in Tokyo has 
reduced the water storage capacity of the land, causing rapid runoff into rivers during 
rainfall events. Due to its highly concentrated population and assets, Tokyo suffers 
from severe damages once flooding occurs. Furthermore, the eastern delta region has 
1.5 million people living under the high-tide level, making it necessary to implement 
measures against storm surges. Tokyo’s most severe flooding was caused in 1958 by 
the Kano River Typhoon. The 76 millimeters (or 3 inches) rainfall within an hour 
broke the record. The 1958 flooding caused more than 200 deaths and damaged half a 
million houses within the inundation areas of 82 square miles, approximately 10% of 
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the total area of Tokyo (see Figure 3-11). This was the largest submerged area and 
largest proportion of land area in flooding from 1910 to 2014. 
 
Figure 3- 11 Tokyo’s most severe flood, 10% of the total land was inundated in Tokyo 
Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
In order to reduce the 10% of Tokyo in a flood-prone area, the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government is engaged in river improvement projects so as to enable 
the rivers to safely drain a flood of an hourly rainfall of 50 millimeters (or 2 inches) by 
expanding the river width or digging down into the riverbed. Additionally, numerable 
flood control programs were constructed after the 1980s. Notable are two projects: the 
Kanda River underground regulating reservoir (1988-2008) and the metropolitan area 
outer underground discharge channel (also known as G-Cans Project from 1992-2009). 
The Kanda River underground regulating reservoir was completed in 2008 at a cost of 
approximately $0.8 billion ($100 billion Japan Yen). This is the largest flood control 
reservoir in Tokyo with a 12.5 meter inner diameter and 4,500 meters in length with a 
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storage capacity of 540,000 cubic meters. It utilizes the underground space to prevent 
flooding of the Kanda River, where many buildings stand adjacent to the river on both 
sides.  
The second major project in flood risk reduction, the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
Outer Underground Discharge Channel (known as G-Cans Project), is the world's 
largest underground flood water diversion facility (see Figure 3-12). This project aims 
to protect the city of Tokyo itself from floods during heavy rainfall and typhoons. It 
was completed in 2009 after 17 years of construction, at a cost of approximately $2 
billion. The facility is capable of withstanding a flood of once in every 200 years. The 
project includes five huge silos, a 6.3 kilometers connecting tunnel, a storage tank and 
78 pumps. The five concrete containment silos are 65 meters deep and 32 meters in 
diameter. They are located within certain limits from the rivers. The five silos act as 
flow regulators. The silos are connected to a 10.6 meters diameter tunnel. The tunnel 
is constructed 50 meters underground, passing through the silos. The tunnel sends the 
water to the storage tank when the silos reach their capacity. The water storage tank is 
25.4 meters high and 177 meters long. It is supported by 59 pillars which are 20 
meters tall and weigh 500 tons. 
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Figure 3- 12 Underground discharge channels in Tokyo 
Source: Trends in Japan 2013 
3.3.4 Randstad and the Netherlands’s experience 
With about half the population at flooding risk, the Netherlands built a complex 
system of dams, dikes, and movable floodwalls. The policies and practices of flood 
protection are highly centralized in the Netherlands. The Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment (MIE)
7
 is in charge of effective water management to protect against 
flooding. Two primary Directorate-Generals are the most important: the 
Directorate-General for Spatial Development and Water Affairs (DGRW) and the 
Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat). The 
DGRW of the MIE coordinates policies of spatial and water resource planning. The 
                                                      
7The Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (MIE) was created in 2010 following the merger of 
the former Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and Environment. The MIE includes 7 authorities: Directorate-General for Mobility 
and Transport (DGB), Directorate-General for Spatial Development and Water Affairs (DGRW), 
Directorate-General for the Environment and International Affairs (DGMI), Rijkswaterstaat, Human 
Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT), Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), 
and Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (KNMI). 
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Rijkswaterstaat, an executive agency of the MIE, is responsible for protecting the 
Netherlands against flooding. The Netherlands has been managing flood risks since 
the twentieth century. There are approximately 9 million people residing below sea 
level; some areas lie at 7 meters below mean sea level, making them the lowest areas 
in Europe (Aerts et al. 2009). OECD (2014) indicates that the Netherlands is a country 
where 55% of the territory is below sea level or flood prone. Approximately 65% of 
the Netherlands’ GDP is produced below sea level (see Figure 3-13). Over the last 100 
years, more than 10,000 hectares of land have been elevated to several meters above 
sea level using fill materials. However, flooding has threatened the Netherlands 
throughout history (Aerts et al. 2009). Effective protection of this low-lying land is 
important. Many low-lying parts have been reclaimed from former lakes, referred to 
as polders, and are protected by 53 levee rings along the main rivers and coastal areas 
(Aerts et al. 2009).  
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Figure 3- 13 Most of Randstad, the area between Rotterdam and Amsterdam, lies 
below sea level (in light blue areas) 
Source: Aerts et al. (2009) 
Hence, the construction, reconstruction, and the strength of these levee rings has 
become the most important strategy for flooding resilience in the Netherlands. Kolen 
et al. (2010) note that the Netherlands has focused primarily on flood prevention, 
resulting in a flood defense system with the highest safety standards in the world. For 
example, the protection system, levees and barriers, around the Randstad
8
 and the 
economic heart of the Netherlands is designed to resist a storm that is estimated to 
occur once in every 10,000 years (a possibility of 0.01% annually). This is the highest 
standard of structural defenses in the world, compared with New York City’s one 
flood in every 100 years (a possibility of 1% annually) before Hurricane Sandy, 
                                                      
8 Randstad is the Netherlands’ most densely populated conurbation (urban agglomeration), including 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and the Hague. The population is more than 7 million, accounting for 
44% of the national population. 
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London’s Thames Barrier for once in every 1,000 (a possibility of 0.1% annually), 
and Shanghai’s ongoing system with once in every 200 years (a possibility of 0.5% 
annually). 
However, even the highest standard of flood control structures can not guarantee 
“zero flooding”. In the history of floods in the Netherlands, the 1953 flood was the 
most severe, and caused 400,000 hectares to flood, 40,000 buildings were damaged, 
more than 1,800 people killed, and 70,000 people had to be evacuated. Woltjer and Al 
(2007) note that after the flooding from the violent North Sea storm in 1953 killed 
nearly 2,000 people, the Netherlands undertook a vast engineering program called 
Deltawerken, the Delta Plan, which included building a system of dams, barriers, and 
higher dikes. The Delta Plan was formulated in 1954 and was complete in 1997. 
During the four decades, massive structures were built to prevent flooding. An 
example would be the construction of large closure dams across the mouths of the 
four main coastal inlets southwest of the Netherlands. Also, increasing the strength 
and raising the height of the dikes and dunes along the rest of the coast and along the 
coastal inlets was completed. The four types of flood safety standards under Dutch 
national law,
9
 the 1996 Flood Defense Act, are based on one flood once in 1,250 
                                                      
9
 In 1996 the government incorporates these standards in the Flood Defenses Act, which applies to the 
coast, estuaries, rivers and the transitional zones (The Dutch government 2008). 
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years, 2,000 years, 4,000 years, and 10,000 years (see Figure 3-14).
10
 The highest 
level of resistance to flooding is the protection system constructed in the 1990s. For 
the river region, the standards are based on an exceeding frequency of one flood in 
1,250 years. For the transitional zones between the rivers and the coast, the standard is 
on an exceeding frequency of one in 2,000 or 4,000 years. The coastal area is once in 
every 10,000 years.  
 
Figure 3- 14 Dike protection from floods with the frequency of one flood in 1,250 to 
10,000 years 
Source: Kolen et al. 2010 
The Netherlands’ traditional technical approach towards water management aims 
to ensure safety and protect land by blocking out water. Aerts et al. (2009) indicate 
that the Dutch flood protection system consists of 10,550 miles of levees (1,800 miles 
designated as primary levees and 8,750 miles as secondary levees), 300 structures 
                                                      
10
 Since 1978, the level of flood protection has been set in legislation at that once in 1,250 years flood 
risk level for riverine flooding. 
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such as sluices and bridges, shortening coastline to reduce the length of the levees 
exposed to the sea by approximately 400 to 450 miles. The Dutch flood protection 
system is one of the most extensive engineering undertakings in the world. However, 
despite the highest level of protection, absolute safety cannot be guaranteed. Climate 
change, economic growth, the increase in the population and new insights into the 
probability of flooding and the probable consequences of dike failure are forcing the 
Dutch government to rethink their policies of blocking out water. After heavy floods 
in 1993 and 1995, the Dutch government began to realize that the traditional defense 
and dike were no longer sufficient. Wiering and Immink (2005) indicate that floods in 
1993 and 1995 were due to excess local rainfall, and have accelerated the current 
developments of water management discourse between the existing “battle against 
water” discourse versus the new discourse of “accommodating water”. However, a 
new approach to rebuild, retreat, or resilience to flooding is necessary after floods in 
the 1990s following the failure of the highest level of structural protection systems.  
In 2001, the Dutch government initiated a project of Flood Risks and Safety in 
the Netherlands (Floris) to analyze and simulate flooding in the 16 out of 53 dike 
rings with conservative assumptions and a worst-case scenario. This means that 
flooding risks may possibly be overestimated and that the probability of flooding is 
greater relative to the situation than if the uncertainty had not been taken into account. 
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The results show that more that 40% of land areas are in flood-prone areas with a 
depth from 0 to 6.5 meters (see Figure 3-15).
11
 Additionally, the flooding depth in the 
coastal region of North and South Holland is much higher than the polders behind this 
coastal area. This means that a city like the Hague is much less vulnerable than 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam.  
 
Figure 3- 15 Flood-prone areas in the Netherlands, 40% of total land in hotspots  
Source: The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (MTPWM) 2005  
Furthermore, the Dutch Cabinet outlined a radically different water management 
approach in 2000. Using a strategy referred to as “retain, store and drain”, the policy 
makers break with the traditional approach which is to “pump and drain as fast as 
possible”. This new approach will help to ensure that water problems are not simply 
                                                      
11 There are 13 different levels of flooding depth from 0 to 6.5 meters.  
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passed on to lower-lying areas of the Netherlands. The Dutch government began to 
rely more on planning than on the engineering structures for urban resilience to 
flooding of the 21st century. City and regional planning plays a key role in flood 
prevention. For example, this project spent approximately $2.5 billion (or 2.3 billion 
euro) from 2007 to 2015 to lower and broaden floodplains, to create river diversions 
and temporary water storage areas, and to restore marshy riverine landscapes (see 
Figure 3-16). By 2015, the branches of the Rhine River will cope with a discharge 
capacity of 16,000 cubic meters of water per second without flooding. The new 
planning method, Spatial Planning Key Decision: Room for the River, for urban 
resilience to flooding coordinates land-use, environmental planning, and water 
management to make cities resilient in the Netherlands.
12
 Dikes will only be 
improved where other measures are either inappropriate or unaffordable (The Minister 
of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2007). Hence, Dutch flood 
prevention is shifted from rebuilding or dike reinforcement to river relief, retreat and 
resilience.  
                                                      
12 Woltjer and Al (2007) indicate that water management and spatial planning are inherently 
disconnected. Most decisions regarding water are made without reference to spatial planning. 
Conversely, decisions about the location of new housing areas, business parks, or highways are also 
made with little consideration of their effects on water systems. 
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Figure 3- 16 Planning more room for rivers to accommodate water in the Netherlands 
Source: The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (MTPWM) 2007 
3.3.5 Shanghai’s flooding vulnerability and risk reduction practice 
China’s economic development has made Shanghai, its largest city by population 
with 23 million people, a global financial center. However, Shanghai is located in 
low-lying areas at an average of thirteen feet above sea level, and at the mouth of the 
Yangtze River.
13
 The Huangpu River flows through the heart of Shanghai. Because 
                                                      
13 The Yangtze River, known as Long River in Chinese, is the third longest river in the world, with a 
length of over 3,900 miles. Its watershed drains 20% of China’s total land area. 30% of China’s 
population lives within this watershed, and the river is the country’s commercial spine. The Yangtze 
also carries a huge amount of sediment each year, over 600 million tons of mud and silt are discharged 
at the mouth of this tidally-dominated delta to the East China Sea. 
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of Shanghai’s topology, land subsidence problem, and sea level rise threat, Shanghai 
is more vulnerable to flooding. Shanghai’s recent floods were mainly caused by 
typhoons. For example, Typhoon Winnie of 1997 brought the highest recorded water 
level, 5.72 meters higher than the normal water level. This typhoon caused the deaths 
of 3,500 people and economic losses of $3.2 billion in total. Another typhoon, 
Typhoon Haikui of 2012, affected approximately 3.2 million residents, inundated up 
to 2,900 houses, and suspended the operation of 30,000 businesses. Typhoon Haikui 
eventually forced Shanghai to raise its highest-level alert and prepare for flooding (Li 
2005). 
Shanghai has the highest vulnerability to floods among coastal cities. Balica et al. 
(2011) analyze nine large coastal cities’ flood vulnerability index (0~1), based on 
exposure, susceptibility and resilience to coastal flooding. Results show that Shanghai 
has the highest flood vulnerability index, meaning that Shanghai is the most 
vulnerable city in comparison with these coastal cities: Buenos Aires, Calcutta, 
Casablanca, Dhaka, Manila, Marseille, Osaka, and Rotterdam (see Figure 3-17). 
Regarding Shanghai, Balica et al. find that “the prosperous Chinese metropolis was 
more vulnerable than poorer cities such as Dhaka”. Additionally, they indicate that 
Rotterdam and Osaka were the least vulnerable to floods, and the poorest cities, most 
exposed socially and with weak institutional organizations, have a very low resilience 
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to floods (Balica et al. 2011). However, Cai (2012) notes that Shanghai officials 
express skepticism about the result. Shanghai’s flood control authority indicates that 
“the city is capable of resisting typhoons and floods, rejecting claims that it is the 
most vulnerable city” (Shanghai Municipal Government 2012). Shanghai Flood 
Control Headquarter explains that 523 kilometers of coastal levees have been built 
according to the city’s flood control standard, designed to withstand a 
once-in-200-year flood. Additionally, the evacuation plan is the priority, the city’s 
ability to quickly evacuate people in coastal areas during extreme weather conditions. 
For instance, when Typhoon Haikui of 2012 came, Shanghai evacuated 374,000 
people from their makeshift houses in coastal areas, or construction new sites within 
one and a half days (Shanghai Municipal Government 2012). 
 
Figure 3- 17 Shanghai, the highest flood vulnerability index among coastal cities  
Source: Balica et al. 2011 
Since the 2010s, Shanghai has developed its flood risk map by using the merged 
topographic and bathymetric GIS datasets to map the flood-prone areas with different 
 
96 
scenarios, once in 250-year, 500-year, and 1000-year floods. The map indicates that 
approximately 50% of Shanghai would be in flood-prone areas, the highest flooding 
depth would be 6.7 meters (see Figure 3-18). The Yin et al. (2013) study also indicates 
that in the absence of adaptation measures, storm flooding will cause up to 40% more 
inundation, particularly upstream of Huangpu River (see Figure 3-19). Thus, 
Shanghai could possibly have the largest proportion of any city located in flood-prone 
areas among the other mentioned global cities.  
 
Figure 3- 18 More than 50% of Shanghai is located in flood-prone areas  
Source: Seavitt 2013 
 
Figure 3- 19 Inundation areas and depths in different scenarios in Shanghai by 2050 
Source: Yin et al. 2013 
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CHAPTER 4: TAIWAN VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
Asian nations have inadequate risk and vulnerability information, weak transition 
from policies and legislation into actions, insufficient budget allocations for disaster 
risk reduction, and insufficient implementation capacities (UNISDR 2013). Asia is the 
highest loss region, accounting for 70% of the world’s losses in 2011. Additionally, 
the insured losses in Asia account for only 17% of its losses in comparison with 
America’s 51% (Munich RE 2012). Taiwan, is an Asian country with successful 
economic development,
1
 but is also an environmentally vulnerable country. Major 
natural disasters include cyclones, typhoons, floods, earthquakes, and landslides. 
Taiwan was hit with 3.6 typhoons each year from 1898 to 2010, resulting in annual 
economic losses of $667 million (NAPHM 2011). The economic losses are expected 
to increase accordingly because the typhoons have doubled since the 1970s. 
According to the World Bank (2005), Taiwan, ranked as the country most exposed to 
multiple hazards, has 73.1% of its population, or 16.8 million people exposed and 
living in vulnerable areas. On the World Bank’s list of the top 10 countries exposed to 
multiple hazards, Taiwan has double the percentage of its population exposed to 
                                                      
1Taiwan has had successful economic development between the early 1960s and 1990s with high 
annual GDP growth rate in excess of 6% sustained over a 30-year period (Sarel 1996; IMF 1997). The 
GDP per capita has been increasing from $432 in 1970 to $21,141 in 2013 (IMF), and is expected to 
target above $30,000 in 2016. 
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natural disasters as does the Philippines with 36.4%; approximately 5 times that of 
Japan’s 15.3%; and 15 times that of Vietnam’s 5.1%. 
This chapter first studies natural disasters in Asia, explaining the context of 
natural disasters in general in Asia. Second, this research creates a natural disaster 
density indicator (NDDI) to conduct a comparative study among seven countries from 
1985 to 2014, including Taiwan, Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the 
Netherlands. The international comparison will help to understand Taiwan’s damages 
from natural disasters. The results indicate that Taiwan had the highest density of 
natural disaster occurrence and the highest density of death toll rate among these 
seven countries over the past three decades. China had the highest density of affected 
people from natural disasters, 362 people affected per km² in 1985 to 2014. This is 
100 times that of the U.K. and U.S.A.’s 3 affected people per km². Regarding 
economic loss from natural disasters, Japan had the highest density of economic 
losses, $1.158 million in losses per km² in 1985 to 2014. Taiwan’s $0.65 million 
losses was about half of that in Japan. In Europe, France has the lowest number of 
natural disasters and economic losses per km² in comparison with the Netherlands and 
U.K. 
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4.1 Natural Disasters in Asia 
Storms, floods, and earthquakes are the three major natural disasters in Asia. 
Asian countries have suffered from natural disasters for the past century. From the 
EM-DAT’s database from 1900 to 2014, the results indicate that the Philippines, India, 
China, and Indonesia are the countries with the most frequent disasters (see Table 4-1). 
China has the largest death toll, with 6.6 million people dying from floods (see Table 
4-2). Each catastrophic event could possibly cause more than a thousand deaths. For 
instance, the China Floods of 1931 was estimated to have caused up to 3.7 million 
deaths. Peduzzi et al. (2009) also discover that “least developed countries represent 
11% of the population exposed to hazards but account for 53% of casualties. On the 
other hand, the most developed countries represent 15% of human exposure to 
hazards, but account for only 1.8% of all victims”. In the Philippines and Vietnam, 
more than 40% of the urban poor population live in informal settlements with the 
highest flood risk (The World Bank 2013). Also, Thailand’s car manufacturing plants 
were located on floodplains. Flooding caused serious damage to the car industry’s 
global supply chains in 2011, and GDP in Thailand fell by 9% in the last three months 
of 2011 compared with the same quarter in 2010 (Wahlström 2015).  
In Japan, a developed country, natural disasters did not cause as many deaths as 
in China, India, Philippines or Bangladesh. However, Japan is the country with the 
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greatest amount of economic loss and damage from natural disasters, especially due to 
earthquakes (see Table 4-3). Wahlström (2015) indicates GDP declined in Japan in 
2011 after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, which generated direct 
losses of over $200 billion. Hence, Asian countries have suffered greatly from natural 
disasters during the past century. Natural disaster statistics in Asian also indicate that 
disasters have increased dramatically since the 1980s, particularly floods (see Figure 
4-1). 
Table 4- 1 Countries with most frequent natural disasters in Asia 
Country Natural disaster  
Occurrence  
(5,190 disasters in total 
from 1900 to 2014) 
Philippines Storm 316 
India Flood 254 
China Storm 241 
China Flood 237 
Indonesia Flood 167 
Bangladesh Storm 167 
India Storm 165 
Japan Storm 157 
China Earthquake 143 
Philippines Flood 136 
Source: EM-DAT 
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Table 4-2 Countries with largest amount of deaths caused by natural disasters in Asia 
Country Natural disaster  
Death toll (persons) 
(26 million deaths in total 
from 1900 to 2014) 
China Flood 6.6 million 
India Epidemic 4.5 million 
India Drought 4.2 million 
China Drought 3.5 million 
Bangladesh Drought 1.9 million 
China Epidemic 1.56 million 
China Earthquake 0.9 million 
Bangladesh Storm 0.6 million 
China Epidemic 0.4 million 
Indonesia Earthquake 0.2 million 
Source: EM-DAT 
 
 
Table 4- 3 Countries with largest damage from natural disasters in Asia 
Country Natural disaster  
Damage (US dollars) 
($1.2 trillion in total from 
1900 to 2014) 
Japan Earthquake 360 billion  
China Flood 201 billion  
China Earthquake 105 billion  
China Storm 64 billion  
Japan Storm 57 billion  
Thailand Flood 45 billion  
India Flood 37 billion  
China Drought 26 billion  
Turkey Earthquake 24 billion  
China Extreme temperature 21 billion  
Source: EM-DAT 
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Figure 4- 1 The trend of natural disasters in Asia since the 1980s 
Source: Munich RE 2012 
Research has found that every dollar invested into disaster preparedness would 
save $4 to $7 dollars in post-disaster damages (Multihazard Mitigation Council 2005; 
United Nations Development Programme, UNDP 2012; The National Academy of 
Sciences 2012). However, Asia is not well enough prepared or invested in prevention 
for natural disasters. The UNISDR (2013) observed issues in Asia: 1. weak transition 
from policies and legislation into actions; 2. inadequate risk and vulnerability 
information; 3. insufficient budget allocations for disaster risk reduction; 4. 
insufficient implementation capacities. Additionally, most properties are not covered 
by insurance. According to Munich RE (2012), there were overall world losses of 
$380 billion in 2011, 70% of all losses were in Asia. However, the insured losses 
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accounted for only 17% in comparison with America’s 51% of losses being insured. 
In European countries, a significant proportion of economic losses are insured. For 
example, in the July 2013 hailstorms in Germany and France, an estimated $3.8 
billion of the total losses of $4.8 billion were insured, almost 80% (Swiss Re 2014; 
United Nations 2015). In Asian countries, the high exposure to natural disasters and 
extreme damage as well as being less prepared and having less insured property has 
made it more vulnerable.   
Urban development in Asia has also made it more vulnerable to natural disasters. 
This is due to the high urban density, mega-city development, the fast urban growth 
with inadequate infrastructure, the urban poor living in slums, and the lack of critical 
infrastructure. Some mega-cities in the coastal area could be more vulnerable to 
natural disasters when considering climate change and sea level rise. These coastal 
mega-cities include Tokyo (population of approximately 37 million), Shanghai 
(population of approximately 20 million), Mumbai (population of approximately 19 
million), Manila (population of approximately 12 million), Osaka-Kobe (population 
of approximately 11 million), Guangzhou (population of approximately 11 million), 
Shenzhen (population of approximately 11 million), Jakarta (population of 
approximately 10 million), and each needs to strengthen its natural disaster policy to 
achieve urban resilience. Moreover, Asia is a region that has the fastest growing 
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urbanization in the world. Asian cities are experiencing annual urbanization rate of 2 
to 3 percent. The urbanization is estimated to increase from today’s 45% to 65% in 
2050. Mitchell (1999) also indicates, “Natural disaster potential of the biggest cities is 
expanding at a pace which far exceeds the rate of urbanization”. Fast urbanization and 
high population density in Asian cities cause increased disasters and damages.  
There is a significant association between the increase in natural disasters and 
population exposure, represented by population densities (Thomas et al. 2013). Most 
population growth is in the developing countries that are disproportionately affected 
by natural disasters. Because of the rapid urban growth, a great number of the 
population live in squatter settlements, which are generally more prone to the impacts 
of natural disaster in Asia. For example, cities in China, India, Indonesia, and 
Bangladesh demonstrate these impacts. In Vietnam and the Philippines, the urban 
poor, more than 40% percent of the urban population, live in informal settlements, 
where floods associated with sea-level rise and storm surges carry significant risks for 
the urban poor (The World Bank 2013). Sinh et al. (2012) also indicate that the 
vulnerability of urban systems and communities to climate change can be extremely 
high in Asian cities, particularly for the poor and other marginalized groups residing 
in these cities. In the developed countries of Asia, increasing exposure of wealth in 
existing hazardous locations is a primary driver of escalating disaster losses. For 
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example, cities in Japan experienced a huge amount of loss from natural disasters 
after the Kobe earthquake of 1995 and the earthquake and tsunami of 2011. In general, 
damages from natural disasters will increase in correlation with increasing 
urbanization, risk, exposure, and vulnerability in Asia (see Table 4-4).  
Table 4- 4 Asia’s context and its characteristics of vulnerability to natural disasters 
Natural disaster Exposure Vulnerability Damage Preparedness 
Insured 
property 
Level High High High Low Low 
Characteristics 
Highly 
frequent 
tropical 
storms, floods, 
and 
earthquakes; 
high level of 
exposure 
Rapid 
urbanization; 
mega-cities; 
high 
population 
density; high 
settlement 
concentration 
 
High proportion 
of urban poor 
living in 
vulnerable 
environment; 
high vulnerable 
for the low 
socio-economic 
status people 
Low level of 
resilience 
adaption; less 
engagement in 
environmental 
and resilience 
policy; low 
adaptive 
capacity; low 
hazard 
mitigation 
policy 
Low 
awareness and 
perception of 
risks; low 
accessibility 
and 
affordability 
for risk 
diversification 
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4.2 Taiwan vulnerability analysis 
Taiwan has been successful with economic development between the early 1960s 
and 1990s with a high annual GDP growth rate in excess of 6% sustained over a 
30-year period (Sarel 1996; IMF 1997). In 2010 Taiwan still had a double-digit annual 
GDP growth rate. The GDP per capita has been increasing from $432 in 1970 to 
$21,141 in 2013 according to the International Monetary Fund, and is expected to 
target above $30,000 in 2016. According to Taiwan’s Central Bank, as of September 
2014, the foreign exchange reserve was $420.7 billion, making Taiwan the 7
th
 in the 
world in reserves capacity. In addition, Taiwan ranks 14
th
 in the Global 
Competitiveness Report released in 2014 by the Geneva-based World Economic 
Forum. Therefore, Taiwan has performed well economically with its effective 
economic planning and policy during the past four decades. However, economic 
development can be profoundly hampered by natural disasters. Examples around the 
world have proven this. Hurricane Sandy devastated the Northeast region of U.S.A. in 
2012.
2
 The direct economic losses were estimated at between $78 and $97 billion. 
This storm event damaged 3% of total GDP in the Northeast region of U.S.A. 
(Regional Plan Association; The World Bank; Kunz et al. 2013). Hence, sustainable 
economic development requires environmental resilience.  
                                                      
2 According to the Regional Plan Association, the Northeast region is a powerhouse of economic 
output, producing 20% of the nation's GDP. Based on this, this region has approximately GDP of 
$3,232 billon in 2012.  
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Taiwan is an environmentally vulnerable Asian nation. Taiwan ranked as the 
country most exposed to multiple hazards with 73.1% of the population or 16.8 
million exposed to and living in vulnerable areas (The World Bank 2005). Taiwan is 
at the top of the World Bank’s 10 countries most exposed to multiple hazards. Taiwan 
has double the percentage of its population exposed to natural disasters compared to 
the Philippines’ 36.4%; about 5 times that of Japan’ s 15.3%; and 15 times that of 
Vietnam’s 5.1% (see Figure 4-2). 
 
Figure 4- 2 Taiwan is at the top of the World Bank’s 10 countries most exposed to 
multiple hazards 
Source: The World Bank 2005 
Taiwan is exposed to cyclones, typhoons, floods, earthquakes, and landslides 
(see Figure 4-3). According to the Taiwan Central Weather, an average of 3.6 
typhoons have hit Taiwan every year from 1898 to 2010. This has resulted in $667 
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million of economic losses annually (NAPHM 2011). However, typhoons have 
increased since the 1970s. On average 6 typhoons have hit Taiwan every year from 
1975 to 2014. The economic losses are expected to increase by double, reaching at 
least $1 billion. Also, the number of earthquakes being felt annually is approximately 
500 (Taiwan’s Central Weather Bureau). Typhoons, floods and earthquakes impact 
Taiwan profoundly.  
 
Figure 4- 3 Taiwan natural disaster risk map 
Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Regional Office for Asia 
and the Pacific (OCHA ROAP) 2007  
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4.2.1 A comparative study in Taiwan and six other countries by creating a natural 
disaster density indicator (NDDI)  
In order to analyze Taiwan’s vulnerability and damages from natural disasters, 
this research creates the natural disaster density indicator (NDDI) based on the 
EM-DAT dataset to conduct a comparative study among seven countries from 1985 to 
2014, including Taiwan, Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands. The 
NDDI model explains Taiwan’s vulnerability and actual damages from natural 
disasters in comparison with six other countries.  
Other disaster risk index models have been developed by the United Nations and 
the U.S.A. In the United Nations’ disaster risk index (DRI) model and U.S.A.’s 
existing models, identifying a country’s disaster risk primarily focuses on these key 
factors: hazard frequency, exposure of population, vulnerability, and consequences. In 
the United Nations’ DRI model, hazard frequency, exposure, vulnerability and risk are 
the major components (risk=hazard frequency*expected population 
exposed*vulnerability). However, some variables are not easily calculated. For 
example, the variable of vulnerability is based on socio-political-economical context 
of a country, it is a non-dimensional number between 0–1 (Peduzzi 2009). Thus, 
identifying human vulnerability is a problem in the DRI model. Other models used to 
evaluate risk and resilience have been promoted in the U.S.A. in the twenty-first 
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century, including: Coastal Resilience Index (CRI), Argonne National Laboratory 
Resilience Index (ANLRI), Social Vulnerability Index (SVI), Baseline Resilience 
Indicator for Communities (BRIC), Community Disaster Resilience Index (CDRI). 
The CRI model is a community-based or bottom-up approach to developing an index 
of low, medium, and high resilience ratings to storm events through self-assessment 
and a questionnaire survey. However, the CRI model relies heavily on the 
communities’ subjective opinions and evaluations. The ANLRI model is a top-down 
and hierarchical approach by experts to collect data of critical infrastructures, do 
interviews, and justify weights to create a resilience index that ranges from 0 (lowest 
resilience) to 100 (highest resilience). Nonetheless, how to determine adequate 
weights is an issue. The SVI model attempts to measure the susceptibility of a 
population to harm from a natural disaster, and examines the characteristics that 
influence their resilience. This model concentrates on measuring the inequalities and 
varieties of socio-economic status in disaster impacts. The BRIC model attempts to 
measure community resilience based on social, economic, institutional, infrastructural, 
ecological, and community components. To evaluate community resilience, the CDRI 
model uses four phases of a disaster management cycle (preparedness, response, 
recover, and mitigation) and the combination of these with a community’s five capital 
assets (social, economic, physical, human, and natural resources) (The National 
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Academy of Sciences 2012). Both the BRIC and CDRI models need comprehensive 
datasets to evaluate resilience. They are both costly and time-consuming in data 
collection and analysis.   
This research’s NDDI model is a simplified and appropriate model based on the 
historic analysis of natural disaster damages in different countries. The NDDI model 
helps to identify a country’s vulnerability and damage. The NDDI model is suitable to 
do international comparison. In order to conduct an international comparison, this 
research collects countries’ reported natural disaster data from the EM-DAT, the 
international disaster database, during the past three decades (1985-2014). This study 
compares natural disasters in Taiwan to other counties in Asia, North America and 
Europe, including Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands. These 
countries are chosen because all of them have a large population, high economic 
growth, and frequent occurrence of natural disasters. The reported damages from the 
EM-DAT can be lower than reports from other organizations. For example, the United 
Nations report, The Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2015), 
indicates that in 2012, EM-DAT reported economic losses of $157 billion, an estimate 
that is lower than those published by Swiss Re ($186 billion), Munich Re ($160 
billion) and Aon ($200 billion). Nonetheless, the EM-DAT database has been adopted 
worldwide by international organizations, including the UNISDR.  
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This research’s results of country comparisons indicate that China and U.S.A. 
both had the highest number of natural disasters, with more than 20 disasters each 
year. The death toll of 4,934 persons each year in China is about 15 times that of 
U.S.A.’s 349 persons per year. The natural disaster occurrence of 108 in France is 
only one-fifth that of U.S.A.’s 677, but the French death toll of 21,563 persons is 
about 1.5 times that of U.S.A.’s 10,476 persons. In summary, China had the highest 
occurrence rate and death toll; the U.S.A. and Japan had the highest occurrence rate 
but a lower death toll; France had a lower occurrence rate but higher death toll; U.K. 
had the lowest occurrence rate and lowest death toll (see Table 4-5). 
Table 4- 5 Taiwan’s natural disasters in comparison with Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., 
France, and the Netherlands 
Natural 
disasters in 
1985-2014 
Taiwan Japan China U.S.A. U.K. France Netherlands 
Occurrence 70 158 658 677 74 108 30 
Death toll 3,747 27,961 148,027 10,476 1,471 21,563 2,016 
People 
affected 
3,799,228 3,679,603 3,043,299,378 27,429,994 702,563 4,096,733 265,321 
Economic 
damage ($ in 
thousands) 
20,457,390 422,299,400 409,943,750 715,208,660 32,731,180 38,657,200 4,530,700 
Source: EM-DAT  
Different countries have different amounts of territory and population sizes. 
There is no surprise that the raw number killed by disasters in China, India, or U.S.A. 
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would be on the top of the list. On the contrary, if the comparison of the percentage of 
population killed by disasters is used, then the small islands and less populated 
countries will always be ranked first (Peduzzi 2009). Hence, in order to enable 
relevant comparisons among different countries, this research’s NDDI model adjusts 
historic raw data to produce an adequate comparative study. The NDDI model 
attempts to analyze the disaster damage per square kilometer among different 
countries.  
The results of the NDDI model indicate that Taiwan had the highest number both 
in occurrence rate and death toll among the seven examined countries in the past three 
decades (see Figure 4-4 and 4-5). The occurrence rate of the NDDI model during the 
past three decades in Taiwan is 0.002 per km² or 2 natural disasters within 1,000 km² 
land area. This is 5 times that of Japan’s 0.0004, and 10 times that of France’s 0.0002. 
The death toll of the NDDI model during the past three decades in Taiwan is 0.1 per 
km² or 100 deaths within 1,000 km² land area. This is 100 times that of U.S.A.’s 0.001, 
and is 10 times that of China’s 0.01.  
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Figure 4- 4 Natural disaster occurrence in the NDDI model in 1985-2014 
 
 
Figure 4- 5 Death toll in the NDDI model in 1985-2014 
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China has the highest affected population density, 362 people affected per km² in 
1985-2014. This is 3.5 times that of Taiwan’s 104 affected people per km²; 36 times 
that of Japan’s 10 affected people km²; and 100 times that of the UK and U.S.A.’s 3 
affected people per km² (see Figure 4-6). In terms of economic loss from natural 
disasters, Japan has the highest density of economic losses in the NDDI model, 
$1.158 million losses per km² in 1985-2014 (see Figure 4-7). Taiwan’s $0.65 million 
losses is about half of that in Japan. However, Taiwan’s is 15 times that of China’s 
$43,950 losses; 9 times that of France’s $70,599; and 8 times that of U.S.A.’s $78,186 
losses.  
 
Figure 4- 6 Affected people in the NDDI model in 1985-2014 
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Figure 4- 7 Economic damage (US Dollars) in the NDDI model in 1985-2014 
In Europe, the Netherlands has the highest density of occurrence, death toll, and 
affected people. The U.K. has the highest density of economic losses. On the contrary, 
France has the lowest number of natural disasters and the lowest economic losses in 
the NDDI model in comparison to the Netherlands and U.K. France has less flooding 
damage, one destructive flood in Paris in 1910. However, according to OECD (2014) 
estimation, a Seine flood in the Ile-de-France region could affect 5 million people. 
The economic impact from such a catastrophe has been estimated up to $33 billion in 
damage, together with a significant reduction of 0.1 to 3% of total GDP (OECD 
2014). 
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In summary, in the NDDI model, China has the highest amount of affected 
people; Japan has the highest economic losses; Taiwan has the most frequent natural 
disasters and highest death toll. In Europe, the Netherlands has the most frequent 
natural disasters, highest death toll, and largest number of affected people, but the 
highest density of economic losses is in the U.K., presented in Table 4-6. 
Table 4- 6 An international comparison by the natural disaster density indicator 
(NDDI) 
Natural 
disaster 
density 
inicator 
1985-2014 
Taiwan Japan China U.S.A. U.K. France Netherlands 
Occurrence 
per km² 
0.002 0.00043 0.00007 0.000074 0.000306 0.0002 0.0009 
Death toll 
per km² 
0.1 0.07 0.01 0.001 0.006 0.039 0.06 
People 
affected 
per km² 
104 10 362 3 3 7 8 
Economic 
damage ($) 
per km² 
565,230 1,158,571 43,950 78,186 135,292 70,599 134,362 
Note: Land area of a country is based on the World Bank: Taiwan (36,193 km²), Japan (364,500 km²), 
China (9,327,489 km²), U.S.A. (9,147,420 km²), U.K. (241,930 km²), France (547,561 km²), 
Netherlands (33,720 km²) 
Source: EM-DAT; the World Bank. 
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4.2.2 Taiwan’s rebuilding experience 
Taiwan’s recent natural disasters included the Jiji earthquake of 1999, Typhoon 
Nari of 2001, and Typhoon Morakot of 2009. The Jiji earthquake, 7.3 on the Richter 
scale, devastated central Taiwan, caused approximately 2,500 deaths and $10 billion 
in damage. Typhoon Nari of 2001 flooded the Taipei City subways, and service was 
suspended for months. Typhoon Morakot of 2009 swept away villages in southern 
Taiwan, caused 681 deaths (most were Taiwanese aboriginal people in the mountains) 
and $3.3 billion in damage. Different rebuilding policies and strategies were adopted 
in Taiwan after each of these catastrophes.  
The Jiji earthquake of 1999 and Typhoon Morakot of 2009 demonstrated the 
difference between the policy of rebuilding to normalcy and adaptive resilience. After 
the Jiji earthquake of 1999, the Taiwan central government chose to rebuild quickly to 
normalcy. In the rebuilding process, the Taiwanese government responded quickly 
and emergency rescue operations worked well in providing medical care, temporary 
shelter, and relief after the earthquake. Governments quickly rebuilt schools and 
hospitals back in the same or adjacent location. They were rebuilt using better 
earthquake-resistant designs by strengthening their structures. In general, this is an 
example of using the engineering resilience strategy. Taiwan central government 
considered little of retreating from the existing fault risk areas. For example, 293 
 
119 
public schools collapsed in central Taiwan, 70% of them located in Taichung City. 
They were rebuilt within 4 years, replaced by stronger structures, but still located in 
the same earthquake-prone areas. Moreover, people also preferred to rebuild their 
homes in the same location because of the community network, their job location, and 
their lifestyle. Another example was a 12-story residential building, known as 
Tungsing, which collapsed in Taipei City, and caused 87 deaths. Eventually, it was 
completely rebuilt on the same site in 2009. During the 10th anniversary of the Jiji 
earthquake, people celebrated Tungsing’s rebuilding and viewed the new building as 
an earthquake-resistant structure. However, rebuilding in the same risk-prone location 
without retreat and adaptive resilience strategies from the risk should be considered as 
far less resilient in the long-term. 
Typhoon Morakot of 2009 devastated southern Taiwan, mainly Kaohsiung City. 
This was the deadliest typhoon in Taiwan’s disaster history. The record-breaking 
heavy rain, 93 inches (2,361 mm) within 48 hours, caused mudslides that destroyed 
many towns. A mountain village, Xiaolin, was buried and suffered more than 500 
deaths. Many villages were swept away or flooded severely. After this disaster, 
Taiwan’s central government began to rethink rebuilding in a safer location, moving 
toward resilience after the repeated damage caused by natural disasters. The rural 
areas adopted a policy of relocation. After a comprehensive survey of environmental 
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vulnerability, Taiwan’s central government decided to relocate communities from 
rural areas to safer places for rebuilding. The government adopted an eminent domain 
policy for the pre-disaster private properties and lands that were devastated by this 
disaster. Private properties were compensated according to market prices of those 
properties. The pre-disaster private properties and lands were left for open spaces. 
Families whose homes were damaged by Typhoon Morakot to the extent that the 
structures had become uninhabitable were eligible to take part in the comprehensive 
resettlement plan. There were 2,493 people who applied for resettlement. However, 
building new communities and the creation of new jobs and lifestyles was difficult. 
The public sector invested in infrastructure while the private sector and NGOs 
invested in these communities to provide job opportunities, particularly in organic 
agriculture, in an innovative handcraft industry, and aboriginal culture products. The 
rebuilding process ensured that retreating from the landslide-prone areas would 
provide a safer place for people to live. Rebuilding accompanied by new job 
opportunities would secure a new life for the affected aboriginal people in Taiwan. 
4.2.3 Organization, coordination, and policy in rebuilding and resilience 
There are some drawbacks in Taiwan’s recent rebuilding experiences. First, there 
was no organization or mechanism of disaster risk reduction before the devastating Jiji 
earthquake in 1999. In 2000, the Taiwan Congress passed the first fundamental law 
 
121 
regulating disaster management, the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (DPPA). 
The DPPA regulates disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery in an 
all-hazard approach. A three-level government hierarchical management system was 
established: central, municipal (county and city), and township. Because of the 
centralized disaster management system, local governments in general have been 
passive in disaster prevention and preparedness. In Taiwan’s central government, the 
Executive Headquarter,
3
 the highest-ranking executive government, has more 
authority, resources, and responsibility for disaster response and recovery. The 
Executive Headquarter’s Central Disaster Prevention and Protection Council 
(hereinafter referred to as “Council”) was established in 2000 to define the basic 
guidelines, to authorize plans and policies of the central regulating authorities, to 
supervise and evaluate the performance of disaster prevention and protection of the 
central administration, municipalities, and county governments. The Taiwanese 
Premier chairs the Council. The Vice Premier is vice chairperson. There are 32 
members, including the Cabinet’s 25 ministers and 7 academic professors in civil 
engineering and meteorology. However, there are no city or regional planning experts.  
Another task force was established in 2010, the Executive Headquarter’s Central 
Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission (hereinafter referred to as 
                                                      
3 In Taiwan, the official entity of this highest-ranking executive government is the Executive Yuan 
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“Commission”) to implement the Council’s decisions. The Vice Premier chairs the 
Commission. The Minister of Interior is the deputy Commissioner and Chief 
Executive Officer. There are 20 deputy ministers as members. However, the Executive 
Headquarter’ s Council and Commission task force is to provide guidelines, policies, 
and delegated authority for disasters. The Executive Headquarter’s permanent office, 
the Office of Disaster Management, was established in 2012. The purpose of this 
office is to implement policies and decisions from the Council and Commission. This 
office is also the highest executive division. The office also plays a role in 
coordinating the different authorities. However, this office is still newly established. 
The function, mission, and effectiveness remain uncertain. Additionally, coordination 
has to be improved between the different levels of government.  
At present, Taiwan’s National Fire Agency (NFA), under the Ministry of the 
Interior, is the agency for disaster rescue and response. Taiwan’s NFA plays a role 
similar to that of the U.S.A.’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
However, the NFA focuses more on the disaster rescue, in particular in fire disasters, 
rather than disaster prevention and preparedness. The NFA is in the third level of 
Taiwan’s central executive government, and is lacking authority for coordination with 
other higher level ministries. Therefore, when a severe natural disaster occurs, the 
Executive Headquarter often establishes a single post-disaster commission to respond. 
 
123 
For example, the Typhoon Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Commission was 
established to respond, recover, and reconstruct after Typhoon Morakot in 2009. 
However, the post-disaster commission needs to have an established relationship with 
the Executive Headquarter’s ministries, which are central authorities in floods, 
earthquakes, and other hazards, in order to cooperate, communicate, and coordinate 
for disaster respond, protection, and prevention.   
Further, little integration of natural disaster management and spatial planning 
exists. Natural disaster prevention is not closely connected with spatial planning. The 
Executive Headquarter’s National Development Council (previously known as 
Council of Economic Planning and Development until 2014) is responsible for 
national spatial guidelines, policies, and planning. Natural disaster risk reduction and 
prevention can not be achieved without integration with national spatial planning. At 
present, the National Development Council is responsible for national spatial policy. 
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for drafting the National Spatial 
Development Act. In the future, the national disaster preventive planning task force 
can be co-chaired by two ministers of the Interior and National Development Council 
to coordinate disaster management and spatial planning in Taiwan. Additionally, 
natural disaster focuses on technological- and engineering-oriented issues. For 
instance, the Executive Headquarter’s National Science Council is responsible for the 
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Professional Advisory Committee of Disaster Reduction. The National Science and 
Technology Center for Disaster Reduction (NCDR), a quasi-government organization, 
was created to implement technology-related research in 2003 under the supervision 
of the National Science Council.  
Today in Taiwan, disaster resilience is part of the country’s major policy plans. 
For example, one goal of the Four-Year (2013-2016) National Development Plan 
concentrates on green energy and carbon reduction, ecology, and disaster prevention 
and response. Moreover, in the Strategic Plan for National Spatial Development, one 
of the objectives is managing environmental hazard risk. This plan announced that the 
government must place emphasis on responding to global environmental changes, and 
promoting a safer environment; carrying out comprehensive governance of river 
basins, building green infrastructure, and enhancing disaster-prevention capabilities in 
urban and rural areas. Furthermore, in 2012, Taiwan began to implement the 
Adaptation Strategy to Climate Change. The main strategies for disasters include: 
surveying, evaluating, and identifying the high disaster risk areas; enhancing the 
integration of environmental monitoring and disaster warning systems; reviewing and 
evaluating the vulnerabilities and prevention capacities of current critical public 
construction facilities; carrying out comprehensive river basin management; 
strengthening capacities for responding to the impact of extreme climatic events. 
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However, these top-level plans do not play a proactive role in directing development 
towards disaster resilience because budgets, plans, and projects are implemented in a 
bottom-up way among different central and local agencies. In the future, these 
top-level plans related to disaster resilience should become spatial development 
guidelines to direct plans and projects in the central and local governments. Also, 
management for natural disaster prevention and response needs to be restructured and 
integrated with national spatial planning. Meanwhile, national spatial planning 
strategies should be based on assessment and vulnerability analysis of natural 
disasters. 
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4.3 Vulnerability in Taiwan’s five major cities 
Taiwan has five major cities, Taipei City (population of approximately 2.7 
million), New Taipei City (population of approximately 3.95 million, previously 
known as Taipei County), Kaohsiung City (population of approximately 2.77 million, 
merged with Kaohsiung County in 2010), Taichung City (population of approximately 
2.7 million, merged with Taichung County in 2010), and Tainan City (population of 
approximately 1.8 million, merged with Tainan County in 2010). These five major 
cities account for 61% of the total population of Taiwan (see Figure 4-8 and Figure 
4-9). Most people live in these five major cities in the western part of Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s overall urban areas account for only 13.16% of the country’s total land areas 
in 2013, but 80.37% of the total population of 23.37 million live in urban areas 
(National Development Council 2014). This has resulted in major cities having very 
high population density. For example, Taipei City, a 100% urbanized area, had a 
density of 9,884 persons per square kilometer in 2013. The increasing and 
highly-concentrated population in urban areas particularly require the reduction of 
risk and vulnerability and improving the prospect of resilience. 
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Figure 4- 8 Population in Taiwan’s five major cities 
 
Figure 4- 9 Taiwan’s five major cities as percentage of total population 
Each major city of Taiwan faces environmental vulnerability at different levels 
of risk. According to The United Nations report, World Urbanization Prospects: The 
2011 Revision (2012), Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Taichung were on the list of the top 10 
urban areas with a population of 750,000 or more inhabitants exposed to three or 
more natural hazards (see Table 4-7). Taipei is at high risk of cyclones, floods, 
landslides, and earthquakes. Kaohsiung is at high risk of cyclones, earthquakes, and 
landslides, but relatively less for floods. Taichung is at high risk of cyclones, 
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earthquakes, floods, but relatively less for landslides. In the past two decades, no 
major city of Taiwan has been immune to natural disasters. Taiwan’s major cities have 
been experiencing severe natural disasters. Notable cases include: Typhoon Herb of 
1996 roared across Taipei City and New Taipei City; the Jiji earthquake of 1999 
devastated Taichung City; Typhoon Nari of 2001 flooded Taipei City; Typhoon 
Morakot of 2009 swept away villages in Kaohsiung City. 
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Table 4- 7 Three cities of Taiwan on the list of the UN’s top 10 most exposed cities  
Ranking 
City 
Risk decile 
Cyclones Droughts Earthquakes Floods Landslides Volcanoes 
1 
Manila, 
Philippines 
8-10th 1st-4th 8-10th 8-10th No hazard No hazard 
2 
Santiago, 
Chile 
No hazard 8-10th 8-10th 8-10th No hazard No hazard 
3 
Taipei 8-10th No hazard 8-10th 8-10th 8-10th No hazard 
4 
Quito, 
Ecuador 
No hazard 8-10th 8-10th 8-10th 8-10th 8-10th 
5 
Davao, 
Philippines 
8-10th 1st-4th 8-10th 8-10th No hazard No hazard 
6 
Kaohsiung 8-10th 
No 
hazard 
8-10th 5-7th 8-10th No hazard 
7 
Taichung 8-10th No hazard 8-10th 8-10th 5-7th No hazard 
8 
Guwahati 
(Gauhati), 
India 
No hazard 8-10th 8-10th 8-10th No hazard No hazard 
9 
Managua, 
Nicaragua 
1st-4th 8-10th 8-10th 8-10th No hazard No hazard 
10 
Valparaíso, 
Chile 
No hazard 8-10th 8-10th 8-10th No hazard No hazard 
Note: a city with 750,000 or more inhabitants in 2011 to three or more natural hazards (8-10th deciles 
of natural disasters) 
Source: The United Nations (2012)  
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After these natural disasters, different cities developed different resilient policies 
and practices. Taipei focused on overall river improvement, flooding diversion, public 
sewer systems, and green infrastructure to reduce its flooding risk. Taichung 
strengthened buildings and structure design to reduce damage from earthquakes. 
Tainan and Kaohsiung adopted retreat from landslide risk areas and improved 
flooding diversion and sewer systems to reduce flooding risk, presented in Table 4-8. 
After disasters, local governments spent a huge amount of their budgets for natural 
disaster assistance in these five major cities. In terms of natural disaster assistance 
budget, the bigger the city is, the larger the natural disaster assistance budget needs to 
be, especially in the Taipei Twin Cities (see Figure 4-10). For example, Taipei City’s 
$17 million of natural disaster assistance in 2001 was needed due to floods caused by 
Typhoon Nari. New Taipei City’s $12 million of natural disaster assistance in 2004 
was due to Typhoon Aere’s destruction of river levees and the flooding in New Taipei 
City. In summary, the major cities of Taiwan are still vulnerable to natural disasters 
and need to promote urban resilience to reduce their risks, particularly in Taipei City, 
the capital city as well as the economic, political, and cultural center of Taiwan. 
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Table 4- 8 Severe natural disasters devastating Taiwan’s five major cities 
City Taipei City 
New  
Taipei City 
Taichung City Tainan City 
Kaohsiung 
City 
Population 
(million) 
2.7 3.95 2.7 1.8 2.77 
Percentage 
of total 
population 
12% 17% 12% 8% 12% 
Natural 
disaster 
Typhoon Nari 
Typhoon 
Herb 
Jiji 
Earthquake 
Typhoon 
Morakot 
Typhoon 
Morakot 
Year 2001 1996 1999 2009 2009 
Post-disaster 
resilience 
strategy 
Overall river 
improvement; 
flooding 
diversion; 
public 
sewage; green 
infrastructure 
River 
management; 
green 
infrastructure 
Schools and 
buildings 
improvement; 
strengthening 
buildings; 
earthquake-re
sistant 
buildings 
Retreat from 
risk and 
housing 
relocation 
Retreat from 
risk and 
housing 
relocation 
 
 
Figure 4- 10 Natural disaster assistance of local government expenditure in Taiwan’s 
five major cities 
Source: Taiwan’s Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 
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CHAPTER 5: A CHRONOLOGY OF POLICIES TO PREVENT FLOODING 
IN TAIPEI  
Taipei City is the capital as well as the economic, political, and cultural center of 
Taiwan. Floods caused extensive damage during the 1960s while Taipei was 
experiencing fast urbanization. This chapter first reviews the history of Taipei City’s 
development in order to help understand the relationship between urbanization and 
flooding. The topographic characteristics of the Taipei Basin and the increasingly 
extreme weather events, such as more rainfall occurring over shorter periods and 
increasingly more intense precipitation, have resulted in more floods. Moreover, 
urbanization has led to increased flooding since the 1960s. For instance, Taipei’s 
irrigation systems were converted into roads during the 1970s, which increased runoff 
and led to more floods. Additionally, highway and expressway construction through 
Taipei in the 1970s and 1980s removed some of the branches of the Keelung River. 
This resulted in less flood retention space and more stormwater runoff, which also 
caused more floods. Further, the lower reaches of the Keelung River were reshaped 
and replaced by a man-made river which was intended to reduce floods. Instead, the 
history of flooding in Taipei from 1991-2012 indicates that this area, known as Shezi 
Island of Taipei’s Shilin District, was the most flood-prone area. After the reshaping 
of the river, more development along the man-made river resulted in an even higher 
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potential for flood damages. 
This chapter also analyzes a chronology of steps implemented to prevent floods 
in Taipei. After the 1960s, Taiwan’s central government and Taipei city government 
implemented flood control projects, including floodways, levees, flood diversion 
systems, flood control gates and pump stations, and storm sewer systems. In the early 
1970s, Taiwan’s central government planned a new town, the Linkow New Town, to 
move people from Taipei’s area of high risk for flooding. The idea of Ebenezer 
Howard’s “Garden City” was realized in Taipei not only to accommodate population 
growth, but also to prevent flooding damage. However, the engineering strategy of 
using flood control facilities such as levees, dikes, flood control gates, and pumping 
stations created a “flood control paradox” (Wiering and Immink 2005). Strengthening 
levees encouraged more intensive land use and development which resulted in higher 
damage when floods did occur. Numerous levees and dikes, flood pumping stations, 
and gates have been built since the 1970s. High density development occurred along 
the flood-prone areas of Taipei’s major rivers after the completion of major flood 
control facilities in the 1990s. Flash floods, along with the failure of pumping stations 
along the Keelung River, caused by Typhoon Nari in 2001 flooded downtown Taipei. 
This study also finds that coordination problems between different governmental 
agencies hampered the effectiveness of flood prevention policies. For instance, a river 
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and its watershed management in Taipei is divided into at least three sections, and 
each section has three different central government agencies primarily in charge of 
river management, soil and forest conservation of watershed, and flood prevention 
policy. This has resulted in inefficiency and ineffectiveness.  
Starting in the 1970s, the construction of engineering structures has been the 
primary strategy for flood prevention, rather than land-use planning. Urban planning 
played less of a role in flood risk reduction than in the past. However, historic floods 
indicate that the existing hydraulic facilities were unable to provide adequate flood 
protection. Hence, a new method combining non-structural measures, land-use and 
environmental planning, along with retreat planning in order to reduce risk should be 
gradually adopted in Taipei. Land-use and environmental planning should play a 
proactive role in reducing Taipei’s flood risk and damage. 
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5.1 Brief history of Taipei City development 
There are three major development periods in Taipei City (See Table 5-1): 
China’s Qing Dynasty (1683-1895), the Japanese Colonial Period (1895-1945), and 
the Taiwan Retrocession (ongoing since 1945). During the period of China’s Qing 
Dynasty, the first governor of Taiwan
1
 developed Taipei as a political, military and 
commercial center by building railways connecting Taipei with other cities of Taiwan. 
In order to protect the city from invasion, walls and gates were constructed in 1884. 
Taipei city development was mainly concentrated on the area within these walls. The 
population was under 50,000 in 1895, and Taipei was still a small, underdeveloped 
city (see Figure 5- 1).   
 
Figure 5- 1 Taipei city development within walls in 1900 (left) and an underdeveloped 
city in 1901 (right)  
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica 
                                                      
1Taiwan was under China’s Qing Dynasty rule from 1683 to 1895, officially established as China’s 
province in 1887. Ming-Chuan Liu was the first governor of Taiwan. 
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Table 5- 1 Taipei city’s major historical phases and their legacies 
Major historic phases Legacy 
China’s Qing Dynasty  
(1683-1895)  
 A growth boundary within walls to protect 
invasion 
 Taipei railroad station development 
 Settlements in the west side along the Tamsui 
River 
 Taipei was still a small, underdeveloped city; 
the total population was under 50,000 as of 
1895 
The Japanese Colonial Period  
(1895-1945) 
 The walls of Taipei was torn down in order to 
expand city development  
 Taipei’s first city planning plan in 1905; a 
revised city planning plan of 1932 
 “City Beautiful Movement” in Taipei, planning 
for boulevards, parks, and sanitary systems 
 Taipei became the dominant political, 
economic, cultural center of Taiwan 
 The population increased to 335,397 in 1945 
The Taiwan Retrocession 
 (ongoing since 1945) 
 The first city plan developed by the KMT was 
in 1951 to accommodate 300,000 veterans and 
expand to the east, north, and south side 
 Taipei attracted enormous rural migrants from 
southern Taiwan in the 1970s because of 
economic bloom 
 Taipei polycentric development pattern since 
the 1980s 
 Population of Taipei grew from 1 million in 
1966
 
to 2.72 million in 1990 
 Taipei mass rapid transit system began 
operation in 1996. The daily ridership 
increased from 82,678 in 1996 to 2 million in 
2014 
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During the Japanese colonial period,
2
 Taipei became the dominant political, 
economic, and cultural center of Taiwan (Huang 2008). The Japanese government 
established the Governor-General Office of Taiwan in Taipei in 1895. The goal of the 
Japanese government was to develop Taipei into a modern city in order to 
demonstrate the strength of the Japanese. At the time, the Japanese were influenced by 
the western planning theory of the “City Beautiful Movement” in the early years of 
the twentieth century. Large urban parks, wide boulevards, a newly developed grid 
road system, and administrative buildings were planned and built in Taipei (Huang 
2008). Plans for urban development began to be issued in 1899. In 1905, Taipei’s first 
city plan was implemented to expand its boundary in order to accommodate the goal 
of 150,000 people living within 1,800 hectares (see Figure 5- 2).  
 
Figure 5- 2 Taipei’s first city plan in 1905 (left) and a revised plan in 1910 (right) 
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica  
                                                      
2
 Japanese occupied Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. 
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The construction of roads, parks, and sanitary systems was the primary focus of 
Taipei’s first city plan of 1905. The walls of Taipei built during China’s Qing Dynasty 
were torn down in 1905 and replaced by roads to expand development. Taipei city 
expansion went beyond the wall boundary to develop a new functional area of 
markets, schools, and shrines in today’s Xi-Men-Ting (Japanese West Gate District) 
and a new residential area outside the south gate. This transition also merged the three 
settlements of Man-Ka, Da-Dao-Cheng, and the Taipei walled-city into one modern 
city (Tzeng 2009, see Figure 5- 3). In addition, the building of the Governor-General 
Office of Taiwan
3
 was built during 1912-1919. Most of Taiwan’s high-ranking central 
government agencies were developed around this core area of Taipei, known as Bo-Ai 
special district. The population was 164,329 at the end of 1920. The population 
increased quickly in the 1930s. In the revised city plan of 1932 (see Figure 5- 4), the 
goal was to accommodate 600,000 people within 6,676 hectares. In 1945, the last year 
of the Japanese colonial period, the population increased to 335,397. During the five 
decades of the Japanese colonial period, the population grew approximately 
seven-fold. The city expanded to the east, north, and south to the borders of two major 
rivers, the Keelung River and Xindian River (see Figure 5- 5). 
 
                                                      
3 This building is now the Taiwan’s White House, the Presidential Hall.  
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Figure 5- 3 Taipei’s expansion beyond walls boundary in 1895 (left) and in 1920 
(right) 
Source: Tzeng (2009) 
 
  
Figure 5- 4 Taipei’s city plan in 1936 (left) and in 1939 (right), urban expansion began 
to the east, north, and south to the borders of major rivers 
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica  
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Figure 5- 5 Taipei city development in 1945, the last year of the Japanese Colonial 
Period  
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica  
 
The Japanese defeat in World War II in 1945 terminated the Japanese occupation 
of Taiwan, which was handed over to the Kuo-Min-Tang (KMT), the Nationalist Party 
led by General Chiang, and the ruling party of the Republic of China. Approximately 
300,000 Japanese departed from Taiwan, one-third of them from Taipei, (Huang 2008). 
Taipei was designated a provincial city after Taiwan’s retrocession in 1945. However, 
after the KMT lost control of Mainland China to the Communist Party in the Chinese 
Civil War in 1949,
4
 approximately two million political refugees relocated to Taiwan, 
with 300,000 of them settling in Taipei (Huang 2008). Taipei was declared the 
                                                      
4 The Chinese Civil War fought between forces loyal to the KMT’s (‘Kuo-Min-Tang’, Nationalist 
Party in Chinese) Republic of China and forces loyal to the Communist Party of China from 1927 to 
1949. 
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provisional capital of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) in 1949 and became the political 
and economic center of Taiwan in the 1950s. The first city plan developed by the 
KMT was in 1951 (see Figure 5- 6), based on the Japanese planning for parks, 
boulevards, and expansion to the east, north, and south side of Taipei to accommodate 
veterans following General Chiang. 
 
Figure 5- 6 Taipei’s city plan in 1951, the first plan in the Taiwan Retrocession Period  
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica  
In the 1960s, the KMT gave up the idea of returning to Mainland China, and the 
central government changed its national policies and adopted economic 
development-oriented strategies in Taiwan. In 1973, Taiwan’s Premier Ching-Kuo 
Chiang, a son of General Chiang, announced “Ten Projects for National Construction”, 
aiming to complete major infrastructure to pave the way for Taiwan’s industrialization 
(Huang 2008). As part of Taiwan’s industrialization and economic miracle from the 
1960s to the 1980s, most companies and headquarters were located in Taipei, which 
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became a gateway to the international market and was described as an interface city in 
the global economy (Huang 2008; Chou 2005; Hsu 2005). Because of the economic 
boom, Taipei also attracted an enormous number of rural migrants from southern 
Taiwan in the 1970s. Consequently, the population of Taipei grew from 1 million
5
 in 
1966 to 2 million in 1974, and reached its peak of 2.72 million in 1990. In addition, 
planning for Taiwan’ first mass rapid transit system, known as Taipei MRT or Taipei 
Metro, began in 1975 to solve the traffic congestion accompanying the economic 
growth of the 1970s. The initial network design was approved in 1986 and 
construction began in1988. The first line, 10.5-kilometers with 12 stations, began 
operation in 1996. In less than 20 years, the total length increased twelve times, from 
10 kilometers with 12 stations to 121 kilometers with 109 stations, and the daily 
ridership increased from 82,678 in 1996 to 2 million in 2014 (see Figure 5- 7). During 
this period, the transit-oriented development of Taipei MRT helped make Taipei a 
modern and convenient city. 
 
 
                                                      
5 Because the population of Taipei city broke through 1 million in 1966, Taiwan central government 
elevated Taipei’s status to special municipality in 1967, and made Jingmei, Muzha, Nangang, Neihu, 
Shilin, and Beitou townships subordinate to Taipei in 1968 (Taipei City Government 2014). 
 
143 
    
Figure 5- 7 Taipei mass-rapid transit system in 1986 (left) and in 2013 (right) 
Source: Taipei City Government 
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5.2 Urbanization as a result of potential floods in Taipei Basin 
The Taipei Basin (see Figure 5-8) belongs to the two administrative entities of 
Taipei and New Taipei City (previously known as Taipei County). Geologists believe 
that the Taipei Basin was once a large lake in ancient times and eventually formed a 
basin after long years of sedimentation. Development of the Taipei Twin Cities has 
been inseparable, especially now with the extension and development of traffic 
networks (Taipei City Government 2014). Taipei City, currently with a population of 
2.7 million and 100% of them living in urban areas, is the capital city as well as the 
cultural, economic, and political center of Taiwan. New Taipei City, with a population 
of 3.95 million and 94% of them living in urban areas, is the most populous and 
fastest-growing city in Taiwan (see Table 5-2 and Figure 5-9).  
Taipei Twin Cities grew fast. The population of the Twin Cities was only 2.3 
million in 1965. However, the total population tripled during the past four decades. 
Taipei Twin Cities, with 6.7 million people and continuing to grow, now accounts for 
30% of the total population in Taiwan. The GDP of the Taipei Twin Cities accounts 
for more than half of Taiwan’s GDP of $489 billion in 2013.
6
 The GDP per capita in 
Taipei City is approximately $48,400, more than double that of Taiwan’s GDP per 
capita $20,952. Taipei Twin Cities are also the economic core of Taiwan. However, 
                                                      
6 The GDP in Taipei metropolitan area is approximately $300 billion in 2012. 
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this fast development may cause environmental vulnerability. Case studies around the 
world have found that as a city becomes more urbanized, the city also becomes more 
prone to flooding due to reduced wetlands and infiltration, and increased impermeable 
areas and surface runoff (Brody et al. 2007; Swan 2010; Howe and White 2010; De 
Roo et al. 2001; Weng 2001). 
 
Figure 5- 8 Topography of Taipei Basin: Taipei (left) and New Taipei City (right) 
Source: Taipei City Emergency Operations Center; Taiwan Water Resources Agency 
 
 
146 
Table 5- 2 Population and urban development in Taipei Twin Cities 
Taipei 
Twin Cities 
Population 
(million) 
Land area 
(km²) 
Population 
density 
(persons/km²) 
Housing 
units 
Urban 
planned 
area as % 
of total 
area 
Population 
in urban 
planned 
area as % 
of total 
population 
Taipei City 2.68 271 9,884 935,535 100 100 
New Taipei 
City 
3.91 2,052 1,927 1,546,874 60 94 
Note:  
1 Taipei City’s population of 2,686,516; New Taipei City’s population of 3,954,929 as of the end of 
2013. 
2. Most housing units are condominiums in the Taipei Twin Cities  
Source: Taiwan National Development Council’s 2014 Urban and Regional Development Statistics; 
the Ministry of the Interior’s 2014 Housing Stock Statistics.  
 
Figure 5- 9 Population growth in Taipei Twin Cities from 1975 to 2014 
Source: Taiwan National Development Council’s 2014 Urban and Regional Development Statistics 
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5.2.1 The disappearance of irrigation water tunnels and rivers 
Since Taipei’s rapid urbanization and development, most of the farm lands have 
been converted into residential and commercial zones. Consequently, the 
impermeable land areas increased. As Swan (2010) indicates, increasing a catchment’s 
impermeable surface area will generally lead to higher levels of runoff and a 
subsequent increase in peak storm flows. In Taipei, the irrigation systems, with the 
combined functions of irrigation and flood control, were converted into roads after the 
1970s (see Figure 5-10). The resulting increased runoff also led to increased flooding. 
This situation also happened in other Asian countries. For instance, as Engkagul (1993) 
indicates, the disappearance of the irrigation system in the Chao Phraya Plain of 
Thailand caused severe floods because of the decrease in water storage areas. 
  
 
148 
   
 
Figure 5-10 The disappearance of Taipei’s irrigation systems, clockwise from top left: 
the original irrigation systems (in red); the vanished irrigation systems in 1962, and in 
1982  
Source: Kuo Hsi-Liu Foundation; Taipei Liugong Irrigation Association   
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In addition to the farms and irrigation systems being converted into development 
lands and roads, the displacement of rivers with a man-made river and highways in 
Taipei increased floods. The highway construction, Sun Yat-Sen Highway, through 
Taipei in the 1970s removed some of the branches of the Keelung River (see Figure 
5-11). This development resulted in less flood retention space and more stormwater 
runoff which caused more floods. Further, because of the frequent flooding along the 
curving downstream of the Keelung River, the lower reaches of the river were 
reshaped and replaced by a man-made river, with the length of 1,828 meters, width of 
150 meters, and depth of 5 meters. The reshaping of the river also resulted in more 
intensive and impermeable land developments in floodplains along the man-made 
river, which led to even more potential for flood damage. The reshaping of the river 
was intended to reduce floods. However, the history of flooding in Taipei from 
1991-2012 indicates that this area, also known as Shezi Island of Taipei’s Shilin 
district, was a most flood-prone area (see Figure 5-12). 
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Figure 5- 11 From a river to a man-made water tunnel and highway, clockwise from 
top left: the Keelung River in 1956; a man-made river in 1965; the vanished river, 
existing highway, and intensive urban development in floodplains after reshaping and 
removing parts of the river in the 1990s (aerial photograph was taken in 2013) 
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica  
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Figure 5- 12 Taipei city expansion adjacent to rivers and floodplains, clockwise from 
top left: aerial photographs of urban development in 1985, and 2003 (in red areas); 
locations of floods (in blue areas) from 1991 to 2012 
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica; 
Taipei City Government 
5.2.2 Extreme weather and rainfall threaten Taipei more frequently 
Taipei’s topographic characteristics also make it more vulnerable. Taipei is 
situated at the center of the Taipei Basin in Northern Taiwan. Geologists believe that 
the Taipei Basin was once a large lake in ancient times and eventually formed a basin 
after long years of sedimentation (Taipei City Government 2014). Nowadays, there 
 
152 
are four main rivers in the Taipei Basin: Tamsui River, Keelung River, Dahan River, 
and Xindian River. Tamsui River is formed by the confluence of the Keelung River 
from the northeastern side, the Xindian River from the southeastern side, and the 
Dahan River from the south. The topographic characteristics of the floodplain and the 
growing frequency of extreme weather events, such as more rainfall occurring over 
shorter periods and increasing precipitation intensity, have resulted in Taipei 
becoming increasingly threatened by typhoons and floods (Chang et al. 2013). The 
extreme rainfall associated with tropical cyclones is expected to increase by up to a 
third, reaching 2 to 3.15 inches (or 50 to 80 millimeters) per hour, indicating a higher 
level of flood risk in South East Asia (The World Bank 2013).  
During a thirty-five year period 1971-2006, eleven severe typhoons caused 
flooding problems in Taipei, presented in Table 5-3. These floods mainly resulted 
from the overflowing of the Keelung River and the failure of the drainage system. The 
highest flooding reached 8.5 meters caused by Typhoon Nari in 2001. The amount of 
the 24-hour duration rainfall and damage have increased during the past three decades. 
Hence, Taipei has experienced fast-growing urbanization as well as increased 
vulnerability to flooding. If the current trends of global climate change are to continue 
unchecked, Taipei could be completely flooded by the end of the 21
st
 century. Wang 
(2009, 2013) predicts that more than 50% of the Taipei area will be flooded and 
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suggested the relocation of the capital city and evacuation of at least one-third of the 
population to safer places (Wang 2009; 2013).   
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Table 5- 3 Severe flood events caused by typhoons in Taipei 
Flood 
events 
caused by 
typhoons 
Rainfall 
(millimete
rs within 
24 hours) 
Flooded 
area 
(hectare) 
Highest 
flood 
depth (m) 
Spatial distributions and 
characteristics 
1971 Bess 150-200 6,500 3.4 Flooded areas were mainly in 
downstream areas where the 
Tamsui and Keelung Rivers 
converge and with low flood 
protection. The flood occurred in 
area of low development. These 
events caused damage and loss to 
agriculture and affecting flood 
prices. The flood type is river 
overflow and inundation by the 
sea.  
1972 Betty 200-300 7,053 3 
1977 Vera 150-200 1,998 1.6 
1978 Ora 200-300 2,602 2.2 
1987 Lynn 500-700 3,332 7.5 
Location of flooded areas changed 
from low flood protection area to 
mid-stream. The flooded areas 
with medium development. The 
total flooded areas declined, but 
the urban areas flooded increased. 
The flood was caused by river 
overflow and drainage failure.  
1996 Herb 200-300 1,000 1.2 These flooding events were 
located in the high density areas of 
Taipei. The damage and losses 
were huge and affected all major 
urban activities such as 
transportation and commerce. 
These floods were due to drainage 
failure and river overflow.  
1997 
Winnie 
150-200 - 1.1 
1998 Zeb 400-500 291 7.5 
1998 Babs 200-300 286 3.8 
2000 
Xangsane 
400-500 441 7.5 
2001 Nari 500-600 6,640 8.5 
Source: Chang et al. 2013; Typhoons Affecting Taiwan 2010 
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5.3 A Chronology of policies implemented to protect Taipei from flooding 
This section surveys current practices, developing a chronology of various steps 
implemented by national and local governments to protect Taipei from flooding. 
Flooding is a major threat to Taipei because Taipei is developed in a basin, a river 
mouth, and low-lying topography in a coastal zone. Flood inundation along riversides 
caused by the heavy precipitation that is associated with rainstorms and typhoons 
frequently occurs in lowlands and floodplains (Shih et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2006; 
Hsieh et al. 2006 ; Pan et al. 2012). Typhoons often flood Taipei. According to Taiwan 
Central Weather Bureau, 75% of heavy rainfall events, caused by typhoons from 1975 
to 2014, resulted in drainage failure and river overflowing. In order to reduce flood 
risk, some projects have been done by the Taiwan central government. However, 
some coordination problems remain among various agencies. For instance, Taiwan’s 
Soil and Water Conservation Bureau, the Water Resource Agency, and the 
Construction and Planning Agency manage different sections of each river and its 
watershed. Coordination problems for flood prevention and control exist among these 
central governmental agencies and local governments (see Table 5-4). Over the past 
four decades, a lack of resilience policy in flooding prevention has remained. The 
engineering strategy for flood prevention prevailed over the retreat and land-use 
planning strategy for reducing the risk of flooding (see Figure 5-13 and 5-14).  
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Table 5- 4 Various polices implemented by national and local governments to protect 
from flooding 
Central and 
local 
governments 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Affairs 
Ministry of 
the Interior 
Council of 
Agriculture 
Taipei City 
Government 
New Taipei 
City 
Government 
Agency or 
Department 
Water 
Resource 
Agency 
Construction 
and Planning 
Agency 
Soil and 
Water 
Conservation 
Bureau 
Department of 
Urban 
Development 
Urban and 
Rural 
Development 
Department 
Central and 
local 
governments 
Central  Central  Central  Local Local 
Flood 
prevention 
Taipei flood 
control and 
river 
management 
Taipei storm 
sewer 
construction 
Taipei 
watershed 
management 
and erosion 
control of 
sleep land in 
the upstream 
Ecological 
environmental 
planning; 
waterfront 
planning; 
conservation 
of floodplain 
Creating a 
green city; 
city of rivers; 
expanding 
riverside 
parks and 
green spaces 
Project Riverside 
levees; 
strengthening 
of rivers; 
flood 
diversion 
system 
Storm sewer Upstream 
watershed 
conservation 
Riverside 
park and open 
space 
planning 
Riverside 
park and open 
space 
planning 
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Figure 5- 13 A chronology of policies implemented to protect Taipei from flooding 
 
 
 
Figure 5- 14 From fortification to retreat, the lack of land-use planning remains 
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5.3.1 The risk awareness of floods in the 1960s  
Taipei has experienced the fastest urbanization and development since the 1960s. 
However, the devastating floods caused by typhoons has occurred during the same 
period. In 1962, more than 41 square miles (10,712 hectares) in Taipei were flooded 
by a typhoon event. In 1963, more than 56 square miles (14,588 hectares) in Taipei 
were flooded by Typhoon Gloria (see Figure 5- 15). These devastating floods resulted 
in raised awareness of flood risk, and made the Taiwanese central government aware 
of Taipei’s flood risk. In order to balance the fast urbanization with prevention from 
flood damage, two strategies were adopted: moving people from floods to Linkou 
New Town and building a man-made floodway to divert floods. The latter was more 
emphasized initially. Building a floodway was adopted for flood risk reduction. Dikes, 
flood prevention gates, pumping stations, and storm sewer systems are the major 
elements for reducing the flood risk in Taipei. However, these structural measures and 
hard infrastructure have their limitations when floods exceed the design standards. 
The rapid urbanization without sufficient floodplain management resulted in highly 
developed and densely populated zones along riverbanks. The existing hydraulic 
facilities were thus unable to provide adequate flood protection (Shih et al. 2014). 
Land-use planning and retreat from risk needed to be gradually adopted (Huang 1989; 
Chang et al. 2013; Wang 2003).   
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Figure 5- 15 Taipei flooded areas (orange) caused by typhoons, clockwise from top 
left: Typhoon Amy in 1962 (approximately 41 square miles); Typhoon Gloria in 1963 
(approximately 56 square miles); and Typhoon Bess in 1971 (approximately 26 square 
miles) 
Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau; Taiwan Water Resources Agency 
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5.3.2 The retreat planning in the early 1970s 
The retreat policy was adopted in the early 1970s in Taipei, most notably in the 
development of Linkou New Town. This was designed to move people from Taipei’s 
areas of flooding. The Linkou New Town plan was initiated in the late 1960s by the 
Urban and Housing Development Committee (UHDC)
7
 and the United Nations’ 
Advisor Group
8
 working together in Taipei to implement the idea of Ebenezer 
Howard’s “Garden City”. The policy of the Linkou New Town plan was to relocate 
population to outer Taipei to prevent flood damage and to accommodate its population 
growth. This major national project, with its planned goal of relocating 200,000 
people within 72 square miles (18,750 hectares), was implemented in the 1970s. The 
goal of the plan was not only to accommodate Taipei’s population growth, but also to 
reduce flooding risk and damage as well as the expense of costly flood control 
facilities. Hence, Linkou New Town in the late 1960s and early 1970s was a retreat 
model to prevent or reduce damages from flooding in Taipei (see Figure 5- 16). 
However, the lack of adequate facilities, public transportation, water supply, clear 
water, decent public schools, and cultural activities has discouraged people from 
                                                      
7 Previously UHDC is now the Department of National Spatial Planning and Development, National 
Development Council, Executive Yuan  
8 Unite Nations’ Advisor Group in urban planning and housing in Taiwan includes Mr. Donald. 
Monson, Mr. Karl J. Belser, Mr. Edmund T. Ames, Mrs. Astrid Monson, Mr. Samuel S. Zadik, and Mr. 
Eric R. Gold.  
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living in Linkou New Town. Additionally, the Taipei real estate market did not soar 
until the 1990s. Linkou New Town did not gain much comparative advantage in 
housing market in the 1970s. Moreover, the windy and cold weather also discouraged 
people from living there. Thus, the development of Linkou New Town in the 1970s 
was not viewed as a successful case to accommodate Taipei’s population.        
 
Figure 5- 16 Linkow New Town plan of retreat from Taipei’s flooding 
Source: Taipei City Government 
Since the 1970s, there is still a lack of a retreat and resilience policy in flooding 
prevention. The engineering strategy for flood prevention prevailed over the retreat 
and land-use planning strategy for reducing the risk of flooding (see Figure 5-14 and 
5-15). Furthermore, the existing hydraulic facilities were unable to provide adequate 
flood protection. A new strategy combining non-structural measures, land-use 
 
162 
planning, and retreat from risk needed to be more emphasized in Taipei (Huang 1989; 
Chang et al. 2013; Wang 2003; Sui 2011; Shih et al. 2014). 
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5.3.3 Numerous investments in engineering structures in the 1980s  
Due to the devastating floods in the 1960s and 1970s, constructing a man-made 
floodway was initiated and approved in 1979. The Erchung Floodway, which is 7.7 
kilometers long, 450-700 meters wide, was completed in 1984 to reduce Taipei flood 
risk (see Figure 5- 17). This man-made floodway helped to reduce flood areas along 
the Dahan River in New Taipei City. However, flooding did not stop; the water just 
went elsewhere. Although flooding around the Dahan River was reduced after the 
construction of the Erchung Floodway, the flooding was shifted and concentrated in 
different locations, mainly along the Keelung River. For example, the flooding areas, 
13 square miles, caused by Typhoon Lynn in 1987 were located along the Keelung 
River (see Figure 5- 18). 
 
Figure 5- 17 A man-made floodway to reduce Taipei flood risk in 1984 
Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency  
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Figure 5- 18 Floods along the Keelung River by Typhoon Lynn in 1987 (top), 
approximately 13 square miles, and Typhoon Xangsane in 2000 (lower) 
Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau; Taiwan Water Resources Agency 
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Taiwan’s Water Resources Agency is the major authority for the construction of 
Taipei flood control facilities. Taipei’s comprehensive flood control project began in 
1982, the biggest flood control measure in Taiwan (see Table 5-5). To present, five 
major flood control projects have been completed in Taipei including: Keelung River 
Overall Improvement Project; Yuansantze Flood Diversion Project; River and Sea 
Dikes Construction Projects; Taipei Area Flood Control Project; and Keelung River 
Control Project. In general, these flood control projects have adopted the 
200-year-flood frequency (a flood with the probability of 0.5% annually or once in 
every 200 years) as protection criteria. This has resulted in developing dikes as high 
as 9.5 meters along major river banks. In Taipei City, river levees have been extended 
from 31 kilometers in 1968 to 117 kilometers in 2013 (Taipei City Government 2014). 
Taipei’s flood control projects lasted from 1982 to 1996 with a total budget of 
approximately $3.49 billion. 
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Table 5- 5 Major flood control projects in Taipei since the 1980s 
Year 1982 ~ 1996 1998 ~ 2001 2002 ~2005 
Project 
Taipei Area Flood 
Control Project 
Keelung River Flood 
Control Early Stage 
Project 
Keelung River 
Overall 
Improvement Project 
Budget $3.49 billion $407 million 
$1.05 billion  
(including $250 
million for the 
Yuansantze Flood 
Diversion Project) 
Flood control criteria 200-year Flood 10-year Flood 200-year Flood 
Structure 
construction  
 
Construction of 
Dikes, pumping 
stations, water gates; 
straightening of 
channel curves; 
flood forecast 
system. 
River dredging; bank 
protection; dike & 
water gate 
constructions; 
reconstruction of 
pumping station 
bridges. 
 
Yuansantze flood 
diversion; 
construction of 
dikes, water gates 
and pumping 
stations; 
reconstruction of 
bank protection 
bridges; water & soil 
conservation; flood 
forecast and 
inundation alarm 
system 
establishment. 
Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency 
Since the 1980s, numerous dikes, pumping stations, and water gates have been 
constructed to prevent flooding, with huge public expenditures associated with this. 
The latest phase of the Taipei flood control project, Keelung River Flood Control and 
Overall Improvement Project, spent approximately $1.46 billion from 1998 to 2005 to 
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improve river dredging, bank protection, dike and water gate construction, and 
reconstruction of pumping station bridges. The scope of flood control facilities has 
increased dramatically during the past three decades. The total length of dikes was 
tripled from 1977 to 2006 to approximately 117 kilometers. There are only a few 
unprotected places remaining for the extension of dikes (see Figure 5- 19). 
 
Figure 5- 19 Flood control facilities (levees, pumping stations, gates) in Taipei  
Source: Taipei City Government  
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Since the 1980s, flood protection efforts have mainly focused on river levees and 
flood diversion systems (see Table 5-6). There are still huge public expenditures for 
engineered hard infrastructure to prevent floods. Rather than increasing adaptive 
capacity or retreating from flood risk, Taipei has done flood control projects and 
engineered infrastructure to diminish the flood risk. Numerable levees, flood pumping 
stations, and gates have been constructed since the 1970s. However, flash flooding 
with the failure of Yu-Chun pumping station along the Keelung River, caused by 
Typhoon Nari in 2001, flowed from a levee gap and flooded downtown Taipei. Many 
pumping stations were submerged and paralyzed by flooding water. The flooding 
areas were estimated at approximately 26 square miles. This flood was one of the 
most severe floods ever in Taipei (see Figure 5- 20). The lowlands along the Keelung 
River were almost entirely inundated. The Taipei rail transit system and the 
mass-rapid transit system were filled by the deluge. The hard infrastructure failed to 
control this major flood. Because of this flood, the Yuansantze flood diversion system, 
costing $250 million and starting in 2002, was constructed with a water tunnel 2.45 
kilometers long and two meters in diameter to let the overflow run through the tunnel 
into the ocean (see Figure 5- 201). This engineering system project was constructed in 
2005 to help mitigate flood risk in Taipei. 
 
 
169 
Table 5- 6 Major steps taken to prevent floods since the 1980s 
Flood protection Levee 
Storm Water 
Management 
Flood Diversion 
Starting year 1982 2000 2005 
Content 
River dike 
construction 
Storm sewer system 
construction 
Yuansantze flood 
diversion 
construction 
Measurement 
(as of 2013) 
116 kilometers 522 kilometers 
81% flood from 
upper Keelung River 
is diverted into the 
tunnel;  
1,310 cubic meters 
per second (CMS) 
Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency 
 
Figure 5- 20 The most severe flooding (purple) caused by Typhoon Nari in 2001, 
approximately 26 square miles 
Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency 
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Figure 5- 21 The Yuansantze underground flood diversion system: flood water in 
Keelung River runs through the underground tunnel directly into the ocean 
Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency 
 
  
 
171 
5.3.4 The improvement of storm sewer systems in the late 1990s  
Building storm sewer systems is another strategy used to address flood risk in 
Taipei (see Figure 5- 22 and Table 5-7). However, because storm sewer improvement 
is not obvious to the public, the political leaders delayed its implementation. Until 
1998, the percentage of completed storm sewers in Taiwan was less than 50%. It is 
estimated that every 1% of storm sewer improvement will cost approximately $67 
million. Taiwan’s Construction and Planning Agency has improved storm sewer 
systems as a strategy to reduce flood risks. In Taipei City, the goal is a total length of 
540 kilometers of storm sewers. Currently, Taipei City is at 96% completion. New 
Taipei City is at 79% completion (National Development Council 2014). 
 
Figure 5- 22 Storm sewer improvement in Taipei City 
Source: Taipei City Government 
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Table 5- 7 Improvement of storm sewer systems in Taipei Twin Cities 
Storm sewer improvement Taipei City New Taipei City 
Total planning area 
(hectare) 
26,182 58,326 
Planning length (km) 540 767 
Constructed length (km) 522 608 
Percentage of completion 
(%) 
96 79 
Source: Taiwan Construction and Planning Agency, as of the end of 2012 
The improvement of storm sewer systems has reduced the flood risk since the 
late 1990s. However, some storm sewer systems were designed to use the principle of 
gravity, allowing the water to flow from higher to lower places. Downtown Taipei is 
the low-lying area of the Taipei Basin. Hence, the effectiveness of storm sewer 
systems in downtown is diminished because of the gravity design and Taipei’s 
topology. Drainage depending on pumping stations at outlets of the storm sewer 
system has been implemented. Many pumping stations were built along the Keelung 
River and Tamsui River. Currently, there are 65 permanent and 21 provisional 
pumping stations in Taipei City (see Figure 5- 23). However, the design of the storm 
sewer system in Taipei was based on a 5-year flood frequency. The maximum 
capacity of full operation of the storm sewers is rainfall of 3 inches (or 78.8 
millimeters) per hour. The radius of the storm sewers ranges from 0.7 to 1.5 meters. 
When a severe typhoon hits, these storm sewers and pumping stations do not function 
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well. Since the inflow discharge is greater than the sewer capacity, inundation usually 
occurs (see Figure 5-24).  
 
Figure 5- 23 Storm sewer systems and pumping stations in downtown Taipei 
Source: Hsu et al. 2000 
 
Figure 5- 24 Taipei storm sewer with its pipe radius of 0.7-1.5 meters: discharge 
below sewer capacity (top) and greater than sewer capacity, function failure (lower) 
Source: Hsu et al. 2000 
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Notable historic floods in Taipei caused by typhoons, and then the failure of 
pumping stations, were caused by Typhoon Zeb of 1998 and Typhoon Nari of 2001. 
Typhoon Zeb made the storm sewer system and pumping station dysfunctional and 
resulted in serious inundation in Taipei. (Hsu 2000). Nari Typhoon also flooded Taipei, 
26 square miles inundated. Strengthening the early-warning system is another option 
to reduce damage. An automatic remote surveillance system has been used to 
strengthen the early-warning system of storm sewers. The early-warning system for 
flooding is improving in Taipei. However, there are still many pumping stations along 
the rivers without the automatic remote surveillance system. According to Taipei's 
Hydraulic Engineering Office, these 86 pumping stations were allocated into 6 zones 
to be managed in groups, with an automated monitoring system set up for each zone. 
The first automatic remote surveillance system was established in 2007. At present, 
there are still 26 stations along the Keelung River bank and 50 stations alongside the 
Tamsui River that have not been implemented completely. Storm sewer systems and 
pumping stations will help reduce flood risks when they are in full function. However, 
flash floods and the heavy rainfall caused by typhoons can still cause the systems to 
fail. In addition, storm sewer improvement and flood control improvement belong to 
two different central governmental agencies and the absence of full integration of 
these agencies still remains an issue. 
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5.3.5 Accommodation of flood by environmental planning strategy in the 2000s     
In addition to these structural measures used to prevent Taipei from flooding, 
some non-structural policies have been included since the 2000s. For instance, there is 
increasing green space in Taipei. Taipei promoted the adoption of green space to 
improve the quality of life and provide the city more permeable surfaces to retain 
water. It is estimated that each citizen in Taipei City shares a park or green field area 
of 5 square meters, a 6-time increase compared to 0.72 square meters in 1968. 
Currently, each resident shares an average of 51 square meters of green space 
including the parks, green fields, plazas, sport locations for children, athletic 
complexes, educational squares, riverside parks and scenic areas under the control of 
Taipei City Government, in addition to reserved areas and national parks (Taipei City 
Government 2014). However, it is increasingly difficult to plan more parks and green 
spaces because Taipei’s urban planning focused on meeting the demands of 
socioeconomic growth (Chang et al. 2013). Also, there is little space left for it in 
Taipei.  
In order to have a more comprehensive flood prevention policy, Taipei City has 
changed the strategy of flood control and fortification since the 2000s. Taipei’s 
Comprehensive Flood Control Project was initiated in 2003 to include conserving 
upstream water flow, minimizing mid-stream flooding, and controlling downstream 
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flooding. Hence, the policy of Taipei’s Comprehensive Flood Control Project mainly 
concentrates on its objective of launching a new water management mechanism for 
“retaining upstream water resources, minimizing midstream flood risks, and 
preventing downstream flooding” (Taipei City Government 2013). In addition, 
Taipei’s Hydraulic Engineering Office, under the Department of Public Works, began a 
plan of water control and environmental protection in 2001 to reduce flood risks. For 
example, the ecological and flood control of Dagoi Stream Park was implemented in 
Taipei’s rapidly urbanized district of Neihu.
9
 The combination of park development 
and flood mitigation planning is an example of an integrative strategy to reduce 
flooding. In addition, in 2005 the project’s committee gathered experts and officials 
from various government agencies to discuss working together on incorporating 
watershed conservation upstream, flood mitigation midstream, and flood defenses 
downstream into a comprehensive flood management system in Taipei City (Sui 
2011). Hence, since the 2000s, land-use and environmental planning has gradually 
become a major strategy for flood risk reduction in Taipei. The Comprehensive Water 
Control Management Commission was established under the Taipei City Government 
in 2006 as an integrative organization to coordinate with different departments for 
flood prevention and reduction. 
                                                      
9 Neihu means “Inner Lake” in Chinese. Nowadays, the Neihu Science Park is located here.  
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CHAPTER 6: FLOOD SIMULATION, VULNERABILITY, AND 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN TAIPEI 
Most research in flood simulation is done by mapping with the Geographic 
Information System (GIS) (Brody et al. 2007; Berke et al. 2009; Suriya and Mudgal 
2011; Luino et al. 2012; Lin et al. 2012; Hsu et al. 2013). Notable application is the 
U.S.A.’s Hazus flood model using GIS for estimating potential losses from riverine 
and coastal floods (FEMA 2013). The technology of GIS simulation performs better 
at identifying flooding locations, whereas the generalized regression model or disaster 
risk index doesn’t allow for this analysis. GIS also helps to map socio-economic, 
land-use, building, and facility datasets that can improve the analysis. In the case of 
Taipei, some research has used GIS to simulate flooding. Hsu’s simulation of the 
central area of Taipei indicates that if the rainfall reaches between 15 inches and 21 
inches (374 mm to 550 mm) within 24 hours, then the inundated area will cover from 
1% to 3% of the total area of Taipei. The damage is estimated at up to $388 million in 
the central area of Taipei (Hsu et al. 2013). Other research analyzes flood impact 
assessment under climate change scenarios in the central Taipei area. Hsu’s study 
concludes that the flooding area could cover up to 40% and the damage would be 
37.5% to 45% more due to the increased rainfall associated with climate change (Hsu 
et al. 2013). However, previous studies focus mainly on a limited central Taipei area, 
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rather than a city-wide simulation. Additionally, these studies lack scenarios and 
likelihood analysis in flooding vulnerability. Further, these studies don’t identify the 
impacts on population, land values, residential properties, and critical facilities 
through GIS mapping.  
This chapter includes flood simulation, physical vulnerability, and cost-benefit 
analysis in different scenarios and likelihoods in Taipei. It will analyze the impact on 
population, households, land values, residential properties, GDP, buildings, and 
infrastructure at different levels of flooding in Taipei. In order to do flooding 
simulation in three scenarios, this chapter collects datasets from Taiwan’s Water 
Resource Agency (WRA), the central government authority for responding to floods. 
This agency established the latest flood GIS maps in 2010. These flood maps consider 
a variety of factors, particularly flood locations, the spatial and time distribution of 
rainfall, the normal function of reservoirs, flood control faculties, and levees, and 
average tide patterns. Most researchers, organizations, and authorities studying floods 
use these datasets for flood analysis. For example, Taiwan’s National Science and 
Technology Center for Disaster Reduction (NCDR)
10
 is also based on the WRA’s 
datasets for academic research and policy-making. Hence, this chapter concentrates 
on flood simulation and vulnerability analysis using a similar method of GIS mapping 
                                                      
10 A quasi-government organization responds to disaster risk reduction under the Taiwan’s Ministry of 
Science and Technology.  
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in Taipei.  
First, this chapter simulates Taipei City’s flooding in different scenarios: 1. heavy 
rainfall (24 hour duration/14 inches or 350 millimeters). 2. extreme weather rainfall 
(72 hour duration/47 inches or 1,200 millimeters) and 3. typhoon conditions (48 hour 
duration/24 inches or 600 millimeters). Second, in order to analyze the impacts in 
flood-prone areas, this study collects datasets and GIS-based maps (known as shape 
files) in socio-economic, land value, land use plan, building, and critical facilities in 
the 12 districts of Taipei. These datasets come from Taipei City Government (TCG), 
Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the National Development Council (NDC), 
and the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS). Third, 
this study also collects typhoon and rainfall datasets for 1975-2014 from the Typhoon 
DataBase in Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB) because 75% of heavy rainfall 
events (24 hour duration/14 inches) are caused by typhoons. This dataset helps to 
calculate the likelihood of a typhoon and the possibility of different rainfall scenarios 
in analyzing Taipei’s vulnerability. 
This chapter concludes that Taipei’s flood-prone areas account for approximately 
41% of its total land area, which is higher than that of Tokyo’s 10%, London’s 15%, 
and New York City’s 25%, but lower than Shanghai’s 50% (see Chapter 3). Among 
Taipei’s flood-prone areas, it is estimated that 10% would be flooded above 0.5 meter 
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in an extreme weather scenario. The vulnerable population is estimated at 200,000 
people, or 7% of the total population. Eight percent of the total households, or 83,000 
households, and 10% of the buildable land are vulnerable to flooding depths above 
0.5 meter. The GDP impact will be more than $28 billion, accounting for 8% of Taipei 
City’s GDP. More than $67 billion worth of property is vulnerable. Moreover, the 
future flood locations will be different than with historic floods. Many flooding 
hotspots will be located in downtown Taipei, where the higher population density, 
higher land and property values, and more intense critical facilities are located. It is 
estimated that approximately 26% of residential zoned properties are located in flood 
hotspots in the extreme weather scenario. This implies that neither land-use plans nor 
housing development policy have considered vulnerability to flooding. When it looks 
at one severe flood hotspot of 1.2 square miles in Zhongshan district, it is estimated 
that commercial zones account for 25.78% of the flood-prone areas with a flood depth 
between 2 and 3 meters compared with residential zones’ 26.7%. The high proportion 
of commercial zones in the city that are located in flood-prone areas shows the need 
to reduce risk in the future. Further, there is no tendency toward different household 
income levels living in different levels of flood-prone areas. Little evidence exists that 
the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to floods in Taipei City. On the contrary, the 
high income households face a higher risk of floods. In addition to private properties, 
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a large amount of Taipei City-owned properties are also located in flood hotspots. At 
least 5% of City-owned properties, $12.5 billion worth, are located in the flood-prone 
areas. The lack of awareness of flood risks for City-owned properties exists. In 
addition, the highest density of building permit approvals are located in flood-prone 
areas between 1 and 2 meters in depth. This implies that the process of building permit 
approval may not consistently consider the issue of vulnerability to flooding. This may 
be a result of the lack of accurate flood-prone area simulation and analysis in Taipei. 
Last but not least, the critical facility vulnerability analysis indicates that there is no 
evidence showing that Taipei’s major medical centers, electric power substations, and 
gas/oil stations are located in flood-prone areas. However, many public schools, 
administrative buildings, and major subway stations are located in severe flood-prone 
areas. In the future, flood prevention strategies need to be reinforced for these public 
administrative buildings, schools, and subway stations. 
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6.1 Flooding along the riverside areas of Taipei 
Keelung River is a major river in Taipei City. The riverside levee was designed 
to resist a flood with a 200-year return period (a probability of 0.5% annually) to 
protect from flooding. Nowadays, the total length of the dike has extended up to 117 
kilometers. However, Hsu et al. (2013) simulated flood risk among different districts 
of Taipei using the 200-year return period, and found that Zhongshan, Songshan, and 
Xinyi districts, areas along the Keelung River, are the areas most likely to experience 
increased flooding due to climate change (see Figure 6-1). The flood areas are likely 
to increase by 79% in the Zhongshan district, 59% in the Songshan district, and 16% 
in the Xinyi district.  
 
Figure 6- 1 The increased flood areas due to climate change in the central Taipei area 
Source: Hsu et al. (2013) 
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What if the 200-year-frequency flood occurs in Taipei? Do riverside levees work? 
How can Taipei prepare for flood resilience? This study analyzes the 24-hour duration 
rainfall when the 200-year-frequency flood occurs. The result shows that most areas 
along the Keelung River will be flooded above 1 meter (see Figure 6-2). Some areas 
will be flooded above 2 meters. However, luxury condominiums, with one 
three-bedroom unit exceeding $1 million,
11
 have been planned and built next to 
riverside levees along the Keelung River since the 2000s. There is a 20-meter wide 
road called Ming-Shui, which means “tomorrow flooding” in Chinese, between these 
residential buildings and the levees. In this simulation, these luxury condominium 
areas along the river and Ming-Shui Road could be flooded about 1 to 2 meters (see 
Figure 6-3). Property developers do not necessarily bear the additional costs related to 
floods and water management. This ongoing housing development will eventually 
increase exposure and vulnerability to flood risk. Hence, reducing the density of 
housing along the riverside area or a retreat of residential development from the river 
could reduce flooding vulnerability in the future. 
  
                                                      
11 According to Taiwan Sinyi Realty’s actually selling price, the average price for a 3 bedrooms 
condominium along Ming-Shui Road exceeds $1 million. Retrieved from 
http://tradeinfo.sinyi.com.tw/itemList.html?a1=104&a2=199&c8=500&s2=10308_10401&s4=2&s5=2
(In Chinese) 
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Figure 6- 2 Flooding along Keelung River in 200-year-frequency flood simulation 
 
 
 
Figure 6- 3 Riverside levees and high density development along Keelung River 
(Photographs were taken by the author in 2014)   
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6.2 Taipei flood simulation and hotspot analysis in three scenarios 
Most research simulates Taipei’s floods with rainfall in a 24-hour duration. This 
research includes the extreme weather situation with rainfalls in a 72-hour duration. 
This research develops three scenarios to gauge the vulnerabilities: 1. heavy rainfall 
(24 hour duration/14 inches or 350 millimeters).
12
 2. extreme weather rainfall (72 
hour duration/47 inches or 1,200 millimeters) and 3. typhoon conditions (48 hour 
duration/24 inches or 600 millimeters) in Taipei. The results show that the highest 
flooding depth will reach 4.1 meters in the heavy rain scenario, 5.16 meters in 
typhoon conditions, and 8.34 meters in the extreme weather scenario (see Figure 6-4, 
6-5, 6-6). Some flooding areas are along the Keelung River, however, there are many 
flooding hotspots located in downtown Taipei, where there is a higher population 
density, higher land and property value, and more intense critical facilities (see Figure 
6-7). 
  
                                                      
12 Taiwan Central Weather Bureau officially defines rainfall exceeding 350 millimeters/14 inches in 24 
hours as extremely torrential rain.  
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Figure 6- 4 Taipei flooding area and depth in the heavy rain scenario 
 
Figure 6- 5 Taipei flooding area and depth in typhoon conditions  
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Figure 6- 6 Taipei flooding area and depth in the extreme weather scenario 
 
 
Figure 6- 7 Taipei flood hotspots in downtown in red and yellow and with areas in 
high density, land value, and critical facilities 
In order to analyze the impacts of different flooding depths, this study 
categorizes 5 different flooding levels through GIS. This is a similar way with the 
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Netherlands’s flood simulations. The 5 categories of flooding are: 0-0.5 meter, 0.5-1 
meter, 1-2 meters, 2-3 meters, and above 3 meters (see Figure 6-8, 6-9, 6-10). The 
results show that the total potential flooding area is 43 square miles at different levels 
of flooding, which is approximately 41% of Taipei City.
13
 Most of the flood-prone 
areas are located in downtown Taipei City. If we exclude the land area of 
Yangmingshan National Park, flood-prone areas include 70% of Taipei City. This 
result is higher than Wang’s prediction that more than 50% of Taipei would be 
flooded (Wang 2009; 2013). Among these flooding areas, more than 90% would be 
flooded below 0.5 meter in depth. However, it is estimated that 10% would be flooded 
above 0.5 meter in an extreme weather scenario (see Table 6-1). Rainfall duration 
matters in the results of flooding scenarios. The rainfall causing flooding within a 
72-hour duration will be 5 times more than within a 48-hour duration.  
In an extreme weather condition, Taipei City could possibly have 3% to 4% of its 
total area flooded above 1 meter. The result is different with other research of flooding 
in Taipei’s central area indicating that the inundated area covers from 1% to 3% of the 
total area (Hsu et al. 2013). There are seven major hotspots with severe flooding of 
more than 2 meters. Many critical facilities are included or adjacent to these areas 
                                                      
13 The total area of Taipei City is 104.9 square miles, including Yangmingshan National Park 44 
square miles.  
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such as Taipei’s most important transportation hub, the Taipei Main Station.
14
 
Moreover, there are 3 hospitals adjacent to the flood-prone areas: the Taipei 
Municipal Chronic Disease Hospital, Children’s Hospital of National Taiwan 
University Hospital, and Jen-Chi Hospital. Additionally, many public administrative 
buildings are included. For example, Taiwan’s highest-ranking central government 
buildings, such as the Executive Headquarter, the Legislative Center, and the 
Investigative Center,
15
 are located adjacent to the flood hotspots. Furthermore, there 
are more than 10 public schools that would also face flooding in the future. Hence, 
most of the Taipei flood hotspots are consistent with the current locations of 
highly-developed, high density, high property value, and major facilities. 
                                                      
14 Taipei high speed rail station, Taipei railway station, and Taipei subway station are all located in the 
Taipei Main Station.  
15 In Taiwan, these central governmental branches are officially known as the Executive Yuan, the 
Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan. 
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Figure 6- 8 The 5-category flooding depth and hotspot areas in the heavy rain scenario 
 
 
Figure 6- 9 The 5-category flooding depth and hotspot areas in typhoon conditions 
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Figure 6- 10 The 5-category flooding depth and hotspot areas in the extreme weather 
 
Table 6- 1 The flooding area, depth, and scenarios in Taipei City 
Flood depth 
Extreme weather 
flooding areas: 
Square miles (%) 
Typhoon  
flooding areas: 
Square miles (%) 
Heavy rain  
flooding areas: 
Square miles (%) 
0-0.5 meter 39.3 (90.46%) 42 (98.1%) 43 (99.1%) 
0.5-1 meter 2.4 (5.56%) 0.6 (1.38%) 0.3 (0.75%) 
1-2 meters 1.5 (3.45%) 0.23 (0.51%) 0.05 (0.11%) 
2-3 meters 0.2 (0.49%) 0.01 (0.02%) 0.001 (0.002%) 
above 3 meters 0.02 (0.04%) 0.002 (0.004%) 0.0003 (0.0007%) 
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6.3 Taipei flood simulation in comparison with floods of the past 
This study collects data describing Taipei’s historic floods from 1991 to 2012 
to analyze differences and similarities with earlier flood simulations (see Figure 
6-11).
16
 Results show that historic floods were mainly located in the Taipei outer area, 
the south-side of the upper and lower reaches of the Keelung River. Some floods were 
located in downtown Taipei. However, in the simulations, few floods occurred in the 
south-side of the upper and lower reaches of the Keelung River. Most of the 
flood-prone areas are predicted to occur in downtown Taipei, where some historic 
floods were located.  
 One of the largest areas impacted by historic flooding is composed of 
Taipei’s Songshan, Nangang, and Xinyi districts in the south-east side of the upper 
reaches of the Keelung River. A high density of housing development is adjacent to 
the river and levees, causing significant economic losses in the past two decades. 
Historic floods in the upper reaches of the river mainly resulted from heavy rainfall as 
well as the failure in the operation of pumping stations and flood gates.
17
 Rainfalls in 
a heavy rain event, more than 2.4 inches per hour, often went beyond the design 
                                                      
16 Taipei City Government collects locations of historic floods with 5-400 centimeters in depth in 
1991-2012.  
17 The failure of Taipei Yu-Chan pumping station with its limitation of 42.5mm rainfal l  per  hour .    
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standard of pumping stations and stormwater sewers. For example, one of Taipei’s 
major pumping stations along the middle and upper reaches of the Keelung River is 
the Yu-Chan pumping station (see Figure 6-12): it can function completely when the 
rainfall is below 1.7 inches per hour. The failure of pumping stations caused mass 
floods in this area in 2001. In 2005, the completion of Taipei’s Yuansantz flood 
diversion system helped reduce floods. It is estimated that the underground tunnel can 
divert 1,310 cubic meters per second (CMS) from the upper Keelung River, with 80% 
of flood water in the upper Keelung River diverted through the diversion tunnel into 
the East China Sea. Therefore, assuming the normal functioning of pumping stations, 
flood diversion, and the stormwater sewer system, the massive flooding areas in the 
Songshan, Nangang, and Xinyi districts will be reduced.  
Another historic flooding area was in the south side of the lower reaches of the 
Keelung River. This area is known as Shezi Island in Taipei’s Shilin district, and it is 
surrounded by the Keelung and Danshui rivers. Historic floods mainly resulted from 
the low-lying topography. However, this area is not the most severe flood-prone area 
in simulations in spite of some flooding in the north and south of the Shezi Island. 
The simulations indicate that the main and severe flood hotspots would be located in 
downtown Taipei, where some historic floods were located. In the future, the extreme 
rainfall associated with tropical cyclones is expected to increase by up to a third, 
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reaching 2 to 3.15 inches per hour, indicating a higher level of flood risk in South East 
Asia (The World Bank 2013). The threat of increasingly intense and extensive 
rainfalls to the high density development in downtown Taipei exists. 
 
Figure 6- 11 Taipei flood simulation, in yellow and red areas, in comparison with 
floods from 1991 to 2012, in blue areas  
  
  
Figure 6- 12 The failure of operation in Yu-Chan pumping station in 2001 and its 
nearby high density development  
(Photographs were taken by the author in 2014) 
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6.4 The vulnerability analysis in three scenarios 
In order to analyze the vulnerability in each of the three scenarios, this study 
collects datasets of demographic, social, economic, land-use plan, land value, 
property value, housing, and critical facilities from Taipei City Government, Taiwan’s 
Ministry of the Interior, National Development Council, and Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics. However, because different datasets were produced 
originally by different agencies, inconsistencies occurred. For example, the mismatch 
between the land-use map and the flood map requires adjustment to overlap with the 
land-use or property maps. In order to overcome the limitation of different dataset 
inconsistencies in mapping, one can use the technology of GIS through ArcMap 
10.2.2 software. For example, functions of “Define Projection” and “Geo-referencing” 
can help to adjust different coordinates, projections or mismatch maps to overlap 
accurately. After solving the problems of dataset inconsistency, this study identifies 
four vulnerability analyses in flood hotspots, including: 1. population and households; 
2. land value, buildings and housing; 3. gross domestic product (GDP); and 4. critical 
facilities such as subway station, hospital, public school, electric power substation 
(see Figure 6-13). In summary, it is estimated that the flooding depth above 0.5 meter 
is about 10% of flooding areas in an extreme weather scenario. The vulnerable 
population is estimated at 200,000 people, or 7% of the total population. Eight percent 
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of total households, or 83,000 households, are vulnerable to flooding depth above 0.5 
meter. The GDP impact will be more than $28 billion, accounting for 8% of Taipei 
City’s GDP.
18
 More than $67 billion of land value is vulnerable (see Table 6-2). 
 
Figure 6- 13 The analysis of Taipei flood vulnerability in different scenarios 
 
Table 6- 2 The vulnerability analysis in an extreme weather scenario in Taipei City 
Flooding depth 
in an extreme 
weather scenario 
Vulnerable 
people 
Vulnerable 
households 
Vulnerable 
GDP 
Vulnerable 
land value 
0.5-1 meter 111,575 44,096 $15 billion $39 billion 
1-2 meter 69,820 27,776 $12 billion $25 billion 
2-3 meters 9,718 3,945 $1.4 billion $3.4 billion 
 
  
                                                      
18 According to Taipei City Government, the total GDP is $354 billion (10,636.634 billion New Taiwan 
Dollar) by the end of 2011. 
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6.4.1 How vulnerable are people and households in Taipei? 
This section indicates that approximately 60% of the total city population lives in 
flood-prone areas. 7% of the population, about 200,000 people, living in potential 
flooding areas with above 0.5 meter in depth. Additionally, a highly-dense 
development is located in severe flood-prone areas, which implies that land-use plans 
and housing development policy have not considered vulnerability to flooding. Also, 
8% of total households, 83,000 households, live with potential flooding depth above 
0.5 meter. In the Taipei City case study, unlike other case studies with the urban poor 
living in more environmentally vulnerable areas (The World Bank 2001; 2013; Sinh et 
al. 2012; Thomas et al. 2013; UNISDR 2013), the urban poor in Taipei are not 
concentrated in the flood-prone areas. On the contrary, the high income households 
also face the high risk of floods. 
6.4.1.1 Vulnerable population and employment 
In order to gauge the vulnerability of the population, this study collects 
population distribution and density in Taipei’s 12 districts.
19
 Through mapping flood 
hotspots and population datasets in GIS, the total number, percentage, and density 
distribution of population (see Figure 6-14) were calculated in the three scenarios.  
                                                      
19 The total population of Taipei City is 2,702,315 as of 2014 
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Figure 6- 14 Taipei’s 12 districts’ population and its density distribution (the darker, 
the denser) 
Results show that there are about 1.5 million people, almost 60% of the total 
city population, living in flood hotspot areas.
20
 Assuming that flooding with depth 
below 0.5 meter can be prevented through flood control faculties and other 
fortification structures, there is still 7% of the population, about 200,000 people, 
living in potential flooding areas with above 0.5 meter in depth, and 3% of the 
population, 80,000 people, living in flooding areas above 1 meter in depth (see Table 
6-3).  
                                                      
20 According to The World Bank (2005), there are 73.1% of the total population exposed to multiple 
hazards in Taiwan 
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Table 6- 3 Vulnerable population and its density distribution in three flooding 
scenarios 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth Population 
Percentage 
of total 
population 
Population 
density 
(person/km
2
) 
Employee 
impact 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 1,367,162 50.59% 13,440 (+) 1,145,244 
0.5-1 meter 111,575 4.13% 17,865 (+) 70,343 
1-2 meters 69,820 2.58% 18,000 (+) 43,691 
2-3 meters 9,718 0.36% 17,851 (+) 6,204 
above 3 
meters 
389 
0.01% 
9,014 (-) 518 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 1,525,823 56.46% 13,813 (+) 1,242,009 
0.5-1 meter 24,072 0.89% 15,729 (+) 17,251 
1-2 meters 8,618 0.32% 14,976 (+) 6,447 
2-3 meters 217 0.01% 13,892 (+) 248 
above 3 
meters 
34 0.001% 8,583 (-) 45 
Heavy Rain 
0-0.5 meter 1,544,926 57.17% 13,860 (+) 1,255,132 
0.5-1 meter 11,933 0.44% 14,219 (+) 9,445 
1-2 meters 1,766 0.06% 14,425 (+) 1,387 
2-3 meters 33 0.001% 13,928 (+) 27 
above 3 
meters 
7 0.0003% 8,771 (-) 9 
Note: (+) means the density is higher than Taipei’s average density of 9,942 persons/ km2 in 2014;  
     (-) means the density is lower than Taipei’s average density. 
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Moreover, the vulnerability analysis looks at the density distribution to see if a 
higher density population lives in flood-prone areas. When the population density data 
is mapped, the result shows that most flood hotspot areas have very high population 
density. For instance, the population density in the flood hotspot with 1-2 meter in 
depth is 18,000 persons per square kilometer, which is double that of Taipei City’s 
average density of 9,942 persons per km
2 
as of 2014. This means the higher the 
density population, the more severe and vulnerable to flooding it can be. Therefore, 
highly-dense development is located in severe flood-prone areas, which implies that 
land-use plans and housing development policy have not considered vulnerability to 
flooding.  
Further, this study looks at the impact of employees in flood hotspot areas 
since flooding affects economic activities. However, because Taipei City Government 
does not collect districts’ employment data, this study can only use city-level 
employment data and assumes that the employment density is evenly distributed in 
downtown Taipei. There are 1.266 million people employed in Taipei as of 2013. The 
impact will be 126,000 employees within the 10% of flooding areas with a depth 
above 0.5 meter in an extreme weather scenario, including 5,040 employees affected 
by flooding depth above 1 meter. 
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6.4.1.2 Vulnerable households 
This section studies vulnerable households, household income distribution, and 
low-income population and its distribution in different flood hotspot areas. The results 
indicate that there are more than 600,000 households, 58% of total households,
21
 
living in flood hotspot areas. Although most households in flood-prone areas are at a 
depth of below 0.5 meter, there are 8% of total households, 83,000 households, living 
with potential flooding depth above 0.5 meter. If we analyze the distribution of 
household income and low-income population
22
 in the flood hotspot areas, the 
average annual household income in any flood hotspot area is about $54,000 in the 
extreme weather scenario. There is no relationship between household income and 
living in different levels of flood-prone areas.  
Vulnerability analysis also looks at the low-income population in Taipei’s 12 
districts.
23
 The result indicates that the lowest density of low-income population is in 
the severe flooding area with the depth of above 3 meters in the extreme weather and 
typhoon scenarios. This also implies that there is little poverty concentration in the 
most severe flooding areas with more than 3 meters in depth. (see Table 6-4). 
                                                      
21 The total household of Taipei City is 1,037,402 as of 2014 
22 The household income and low income population data is based on Taipei City Government’s Statistics 
by Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.  
23Taipei low income standard is personal monthly income below $355 (or $10,656 New Taiwan dollars). 
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Therefore, there is little evidence that the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to 
floods in Taipei City. This result is different with some Asian case studies on floods 
indicating that the urban poor live in more environmentally vulnerable areas, that 
poorer people are more adversely impacted by a disaster (The World Bank 2001; 2013; 
Sinh et al. 2012; Thomas et al. 2013; UNISDR 2013). For instance, studies of 
Vietnam and the Philippines show that the urban poor, with 41 percent of the urban 
population of Vietnam and 44 percent of the urban population of the Philippines live 
in informal settlements, where floods associated with sea-level rise and storm surges 
carry significant risks for the urban poor (The World Bank 2013). These Asian case 
studies also show that the urban poor population is less able to deal with 
environmental crisis and suffer most in natural disasters. In the Taipei City case study, 
the urban poor are not concentrated in the flood-prone areas. On the contrary, the high 
income households also face the high risk of floods. 
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Table 6- 4 Vulnerable household and its income in three flooding scenarios 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood 
depth 
Household 
Percentage 
of total 
household 
Househol
d income 
Low 
income 
population 
Average Low 
income 
(person/ km
2
) 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 529,512 50.59% 57,607 21,565 212 
0.5-1 meter 44,096 4.13% 52,618 2,548 408 
1-2 meters 27,776 2.58% 53,433 1,451 374 
2-3 meters 3,945 0.36% 51,951 231 425 
above 3 
meters 
148 0.01% 55,489 8 186 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 592,351 56.46% 56,548 25,262 229 
0.5-1 meter 9,602 0.89% 56.593 402 263 
1-2 meters 3,427 0.32% 55,242 139 244 
2-3 meters 84 0.01% 59.243 3 297 
above 3 
meters 
13 0.001% 54,656 1 196 
Heavy 
Rain 
0-0.5 meter 599,996 57.17% 57,036 25,638 230 
0.5-1 meter 4,765 0.44% 54,256 238 284 
1-2 meters 700 0.06% 59,108 20 166 
2-3 meters 14 0.001% 53,863 1 193 
above 3 
meters 
3 0.0003% 47,831 1 248 
6.4.2 How vulnerable are land and property values? 
The value of vulnerable property is approximately $40 billion in a flooding depth 
between 0.5 and 1 meter by an extreme weather scenario. This study observes that the 
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most valuable land area is also in the most vulnerable location. Meanwhile, a high 
proportion of commercial zones in the city are located in flood-prone areas. In a flood 
hotspot in the Zhongshan district of Taipei, it is estimated that commercial zones 
account for 25.78% of the flood-prone areas. In the Taipei City-owned property, the 
lack of risk awareness and management of potential floods for City-owned property 
remains high. Regarding housing vulnerability, this research finds the vulnerable 
housing units flooded will be approximately 14% of the total units, or 130,000 units. 
Regarding building permit approvals, this study notes that the highest density of 
building permit approvals is located in flood hotspot areas with flooding above 0.5 meter. 
The process of building permit approval has consistently not considered the issue of 
vulnerability to flooding. 
  
 
205 
6.4.2.1 Vulnerable land value 
This section analyzes flood hotspots and the impact on land values. First, it 
extracts a map of government-announced current land values
24
 from the original 
Taipei property map through the function of a conversion tool from “Polygon to 
Raster” in the ArcMap 10.2.2 software. This produces a raster map of the 
government-announced current land values in 2011. Then, this section maps land 
values and flood hotspots through GIS to analyze the vulnerable land values (see 
Figure 6-15).  
The results show that the value of vulnerable land is approximately $40 billion25 in a 
flooding depth between 0.5 and 1 meter. The value is estimated at approximately $25 billion 
in the flooding depth between 1 and 2 meters in the extreme weather scenario (see Table 6-5). 
Additionally, this study finds that the highest land value per square meter is located in the 
flood hotspot with 1-2 meter in depth for all three of the scenarios. This also provides 
awareness that the most valuable land area is also the most vulnerable location. This could 
possibly result from the unawareness of flood risk in past land-use planning and polices. 
                                                      
24 Government-announced current land value is the basis for the land value increment tax. The current 
land value of 2014 in Taipei City is about 89% of the market price of land according to Taiwan’s 
Ministry of the Interior’s statistics. 
25
 Currency exchange is based on $1 US dollar=$30 New Taiwan dollars  
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Figure 6- 15 Taipei current land value created by a raster-based map (top) and 
vulnerable land value in flood hotspots (lower)  
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Table 6- 5 Vulnerable land value in three flooding scenarios 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Area 
(m
2 
) 
Average land 
value per unit 
(US dollar/m
2
) 
Total 
vulnerable 
land value 
(million) 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 101,236,000 5,661 573,132 
0.5-1 meter 6,098,400 6,465 39,424 
1-2 meters 3,800,400 6,628 25,189 
2-3 meters 542,800 6,314 3,427 
above 3 
meters 
34,400 2,022 70 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 109,681,200 5,732 628,718 
0.5-1 meter 1,495,200 6,098 9,118 
1-2 meters 547,200 6,264 3,428 
2-3 meters 19,200 3,930 75 
above 3 
meters 
2,800 1,385 4 
Heavy Rain 
0-0.5 meter 110,794,000 5,744 636,360 
0.5-1 meter 812,400 5,079 4,126 
1-2 meters 110,800 6,953 770 
2-3 meters 1,600 327 1 
above 3 
meters 
NA NA NA 
It is clear that the higher valued lands are likely to be in the flood hotspots. This 
study further analyzes commercial and residential zones in flood-prone areas, looking 
at the percentage of land occupied by the two zones in different flood-prone areas. 
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The results show that there are many commercial zones in the flood-prone areas. In 
the extreme weather scenario, it is estimated that 8% of commercial zones and 26% of 
residential zoned are located in flood hotspots. However, in general, the residential 
zones cover a higher percentage of land than the commercial zones in any level of 
flooding (see Table 6-6). For instance, among flood-prone areas with a depth between 
1 and 2 meters, the proportion of residential zones is 19.94%, and that of commercial 
zones is 12.41%. Because the total area of residential zones is about 4.3 times that of 
commercial zones in Taipei overall,
26
 it is still a very high proportion of commercial 
zones that are located in flood-prone areas compared with residential zones. When 
looking at one severe flood hotspot of 1.2 square miles in Zhongshan district, it is 
estimated that commercial zones account for 25.78% of the flood-prone areas with 
flooding depth between 2 and 3 meters compared with residential zones’ 26.7% (see 
Figure 6-16, Table 6-7). Hence, the high proportion of commercial zones in the city 
that are located in flood-prone areas needs to be reduced in the future. 
                                                      
26 The total area of commercial zone is 3.2% of total Taipei City land areas of 271.8 square kilometers  
or 104.9 square miles in 2014; The total area of residential zone is 14% of total Taipei City land areas 
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Figure 6- 16 Taipei’s commercial and residential zones in flood hotspots (left), one 
1.2-square mile hotspot in the Zhongshan District has approximately 26% commercial 
zones of the hotspot (right) 
 
Table 6- 6 Taipei’s commercial and residential zones in flood hotspots 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Residential 
zone 
(m
2 
) 
Commercial 
zone 
(m
2 
) 
Percentage 
of 
residential 
zone 
Percentage 
of 
commercial 
zone 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 27,630,000 6,962,400 27.15% 6.84% 
0.5-1 meter 1,192,800 922,000 19.08% 14.75% 
1-2 meters 774,000 481,600 19.94% 12.41% 
2-3 meters 128,800 60,000 23.37% 10.89% 
above 3 
meters 
4,000 NA 8.7% NA 
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Table 6- 7 High percentage of commercial zone in a flood hotspot of Zhongshan district 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Residential 
zone 
(m
2 
) 
Commercial 
zone 
(m
2 
) 
Percentage 
of 
residential 
zone 
Percentage 
of 
commercial 
zone 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 593,600 318,800 37.65% 20.22% 
0.5-1 meter 244,400 83,200 36.41% 12.40% 
1-2 meters 258,400 114,400 36.73% 16.26% 
2-3 meters 55,200 53,200 26.74% 25.78% 
above 3 
meters 
NA NA NA NA 
This study also looks at Taipei City-owned property (see Table 6-8).
27
 After 
mapping City-owned property with flood hotspots, the results show that at least 5% of 
property, $12.5 billion, is located in the flood-prone areas (see Figure 6-17). The 
authority of Taipei City-owned property, Department of Finance of Taipei City 
Government, has been the major agency who executes and contributes to important 
development projects and urban renewal plans for City-owned property. However, it 
has not analyzed or collected the potential losses of City-owned property. The lack of 
awareness and management of potential floods for City-owned property remains high. 
 
 
                                                      
27
 The total value is $264 billion (NT$7.922 trillion). Real estate property accounts for 94%, with 
value of $250.4 billion (NT$7.512 trillion) by the end of 2014. 
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Table 6- 8 Vulnerable city-own property value 
Taipei 
City-own real 
estate property 
Number 
Area 
(hectare) 
Property value 
(billion) 
Vulnerable 
property value 
(billion) 
Land 83,245 5,505 $240.7 $12 
Building 16,524 1,311 $9.7 $0.5 
In total 99,769 6,816 $250.4 $12.5 
Source: Taipei City Government’s Department of Finance 
 
 
Figure 6- 17 The large amount of Taipei City-owned properties is in flood hotspots 
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6.4.2.2 Vulnerable buildable land, housing and residential property value 
This section analyzes the vulnerable buildable land, housing units, and 
residential property values in different flood scenarios. Of the total buildable land in 
the flood-prone areas, more than 90% is located in flooding depth below 0.5 meter. 
There is very little possibility (almost 0 percent) that building land would be flooded 
above 2 meters in the heavy rain scenario. However, in the extreme weather scenario, 
approximately 10% of buildable land will be flooded above 0.5 meter, 4% flooded 
above 1 meter (see Figure 6-18).  
  
Figure 6- 18 Buildable lands (in blue dot areas) in flood hotspots 
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Moreover, in order to analyze the housing vulnerability, this study calculates the 
proportion of residential land in different flood scenarios.
28
 The result shows that 
more than 13% of total residential land will be flooded. In an extreme weather 
scenario, the vulnerable housing units flooded will reach 130,000 units, or 14% of the 
total units.
29
 As many as 12,000 housing units, 1.3%, will be flooded above 0.5 meter. 
The residential property value in flooding areas will reach about $91 billion; $82 
billion of housing property will be flooded below 0.5 meter, and $9 billion above 0.5 
meter (see Table 6-9).   
Furthermore, this study collects district data of building permits from Taipei City 
Government,
30
 to analyze how many building permits were approved in the flood-prone 
areas. This study assumes that the building permit approval is related to the construction 
of building in the future. The results show that most building permits approved since 
2006 were in flood-prone areas. In the extreme weather scenario, more than 90% of total 
floor areas in building permit approved are located in flooding below 0.5 meter in depth, 
                                                      
28 According to Taipei City Government’s Development of Urban Development, residential zone accounts 
for 14% of urban development land in 2014 
29
 Most of Taipei’s housing units are condominiums. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior’s 
housing statistics, Taipei City has a total of 935,535  housing units is by the end of 2013; Taipei 
City’s average housing price per unit is estimated at $698,266 in 2014.  
30 Taipei City Government released the total square meter of building permit approval since 2006 in 
Taipei’s 12 districts by the end of 2013. Data was collected by Taipei City Construction Management 
Office. Retrieved from http://163.29.37.101/pxweb2007-tp/dialog/statfile9.asp (In Chinese)   
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10% of total floor areas in building permits approved in flooding above 0.5 meter in 
depth, and more than 4% in flooding above 1 meter.  
Next, the vulnerability analysis looks at the density of building permit approvals; 
the highest density is located in flood hotspot areas with flooding above 0.5 meter (see 
Table 6-10). In the heavy rain scenario, the highest density of building permit approvals 
is located in areas with flooding between 2 and 3 meters. In the typhoon scenario, the 
highest density of building permits approved is located in flooding between 1 and 2 
meters. This implies that the process of building permits approved by the Taipei City 
Construction Management Office may not consistently consider the issue of 
vulnerability to flooding. This may be the result of a lack of accurate flood-prone area 
simulation and analysis in Taipei. When Taipei has a thorough analysis of flood risk, the 
flood risk map can help the decision-making of building permit approval.  
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Table 6- 9 Vulnerable buildable land, housing units, and property in three flooding 
scenarios 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Percentage 
of buildable 
land in 
hotspots 
Percentage 
of 
residential 
land in 
hotspots 
Vulnerable 
housing 
units 
Vulnerable 
value of 
residential 
property 
 (million 
US dollars) 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 90.29% 12.64% 118,257 82,575 
0.5-1 meter 5.64% 0.79% 7,387 5,158 
1-2 meters 3.55% 0.5% 4,650 3,247 
2-3 meters 0.51% 0.07% 668 466 
above 3 
meters 
0.008% 0.001% 10 7 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 98% 13.72% 128,355 89,626 
0.5-1 meter 1.38% 0.19% 1,807 1,262 
1-2 meters 0.49% 0.06% 642 448 
2-3 meters 0.007% 0.001% 9 6 
above 3 
meters 
0.001% 0.0001% 1 1 
Heavy Rain 
0-0.5 meter 99% 13.86% 129,665 90,541 
0.5-1 meter 0.7% 0.1% 917 640 
1-2 meters 0.1% 0.01% 131 91 
2-3 meters NA NA NA NA 
above 3 
meters 
NA NA NA NA 
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Table 6- 10 Building permit analysis in three flooding scenarios 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Building permit 
approval since 
2006 
(m
2 
) 
Percentage of 
building permit 
approval since 
2006 
Density of 
building permit 
approval since 
2006 
(m
2
/km
2
) 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 893,130 90% 8,780 
0.5-1 meter 85,740 5.5% 13,728 
1-2 meters 52,604 3.5% 13,562 
2-3 meters 5,870 0.5% 10,782 
above 3 meters 267 0.04% 6,189 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 1,017,338 98% 9,222 
0.5-1 meter 14,444 1.3% 9,438 
1-2 meters 5,717 0.5% 10,051 
2-3 meters 135 0.01% 8,663 
above 3 meters 22 0.04% 5,544 
Heavy Rain 
0-0.5 meter 1,029,095 99% 9,232 
0.5-1 meter 7,276 0.75% 8,670 
1-2 meters 1,235 0.1% 10,089 
2-3 meters 24 0.002% 10,097 
above 3 meters 3 0.001% 3,733 
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6.4.3 How vulnerable is the GDP in flood-prone areas? 
Taipei City is the capital and economic center of Taiwan. According to Taipei 
City Government, the city’s total GDP is approximately $354 billion.
31
 What if 
devastating floods happen in Taipei? How would the GDP be impacted? This study 
collects GDP data in Taipei’s 12 districts, and creates a map of GDP contribution 
allocated in each square meter of these 12 districts. This helps explain the GDP 
contribution in every square meter in Taipei’s 12 districts. Then, this study overlaps 
with flood hotspot maps to analyze the GDP impact in flood-prone areas.  
The results indicate that approximately 75% of the city’s total GDP is located in 
flood-prone areas. More than 4% of the city’s total GDP is in flooding areas with 
above 1 meter depth for the extreme weather. Furthermore, this study analyzes the 
GDP contribution density in Taipei’s 12 districts.
32
 This result indicates that the highest 
GDP contribution density matches with the highest flooding depth (see Table 6-11). For 
instance, in the heavy rain scenario, the highest GDP contribution density is $3,144 per 
square meter, the location is also with severe flooding areas between 2 and 3 meters in 
                                                      
31 According to Taipei City Government’s statistics website by the Department of Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics, the total GDP is 10,636.634 billion New Taiwan Dollar by the end of 2011. Retrieved 
from http://163.29.37.101/pxweb2007-tp/dialog/statfile9.asp (In Chinese) 
  
32 GDP density is calculated according to Taipei’s 12 districts GDP dataset from the result of “2011 
Industry, Commerce and Service Census” by Taiwan’s Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics; Retrieved from Taipei City Government’s statistics website 
http://163.29.37.101/pxweb2007-tp/dialog/statfile9.asp. (In Chinese) 
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depth. Hence, the higher the GDP contribution density area, the more vulnerable to 
floods it could be. 
Table 6- 11 The GDP impact in three flooding scenarios 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Average GDP 
contribution per 
square meter  
(US dollar/m
2
) 
Total GDP 
impact 
(million US 
dollars) 
Percentage of 
GDP impact  
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 2,340 238,002 67% 
0.5-1 meter 2,463 15,386 4.3% 
1-2 meters 3,176 12,319 3.5% 
2-3 meters 2,509 1,367 0.4% 
above 3 meters 843 36 0.01% 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 2,367 261,066 73.6% 
0.5-1 meter 2,913 4,458 1.26% 
1-2 meters 2,734 1,555 0.4% 
2-3 meters 1,733 27 0.01% 
above 3 meters 730 3 0.001% 
Heavy Rain 
0-0.5 meter 2,377 264,977 74.7% 
0.5-1 meter 2,151 1,805 0.51% 
1-2 meters 2,589 318 0.09% 
2-3 meters 3,144 8 0.002% 
above 3 meters 43 0 NA 
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6.4.4 How vulnerable are major critical facilities? 
This section analyzes critical facilities and how many are located in flood hotspot 
areas in different scenarios though GIS-based mapping in ArcMap 10.2.2 software. The 
result indicates that there is no evidence showing that Taipei’s major medical centers, 
electric power substations, and gas/oil stations are located in flood-prone areas (see 
Figure 6-19, 6-20, 6-21). This implies that planning for those facilities associated with 
life and death would not be at high risk of flooding. However, some major facilities are 
at risk. For instance, public schools, administrative buildings, and some of the subway 
stations are located in severe flood-prone areas.  
One of the most severe floods involving subway stations happened on Sep. 17, 
2001, caused by Typhoon Nari. This made Taipei’s major subway stations a giant 
underground reservoir. The Taipei Main Station was flooded at a level up to 2.3 meters 
in depth.
33
 Subway stations were shut down for more than a month. According to Taipei 
Rapid Transit Corporation’s statistics, the daily ridership before the typhoon was 
998,153 on Sep. 14, 2001, but, it was 14,116 on Sep. 17, 2001. A month after the 
flooding, the daily ridership was 529,808, half of that prior to flooding. In three months, 
the ridership increased up to 828,910, but still had not recovered to the pre-flood 
                                                      
33 Taipei Main Station is the transportation hub of Taiwan High-Speed Railroad, Taiwan Railroad, and 
Taipei Metro. 
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ridership. It was not until the end of 2001 that the daily ridership returned to its ridership 
of that prior to flooding. Hence, once the main stations were flooded, it took more than 3 
months to resume and recover to normal capacity.  
According to the ridership statistics, the affected passengers during the 3-day 
flooding event was almost a million daily. During the first month after flooding, more 
than half million passengers were still affected daily. Nowadays, the daily ridership of 
Taipei Metro is 1.8 million, double that in 2001. In this subway vulnerability study, at 
least 5 Taipei Metro
34
 stations are located in severe flood-prone areas (see Figure 6-22). 
These stations are: Xingtian Temple (7.4 million ridership annually), Songjang (9 
million ridership annually), Minquan E. Road (8.99 million ridership annually), 
Daqiaotou (3.68 million ridership annually), and Sandao Temple (6.85 million ridership 
annually). There are 4 flood-prone stations on the same subway line, Line 4 of Taipei 
Metro (Zhonghe-Xinlu Line or Orange Line), was completed in 2010. Hence, if a 
severe flood caused by a typhoon happens again, it will cause more severe impacts. The 
affected daily ridership will be more than a million passengers.  
                                                      
34 Taipei Metro, formally known as Mass-Rapid Transit System(MRT), has 109 stations. The total 
length is 121.3 kilometers. The ridership is 634,961,083 annually as of the end of 2013. The average 
distance per passenger is 8.34 kilometers.  
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In the hospital vulnerability analysis,
35
 there is no evidence that major medical 
centers are located in flood-prone areas.
36
 However, an analysis of the distribution and 
density of all the 3,382 hospitals and clinics in Taipei’s 12 districts,
37
 shows that about 
65% are located in flood-prone areas, meaning that most smaller local hospitals and 
clinics are vulnerable to floods. In the extreme weather scenario, more than 8% of all 
hospitals and clinics are situated in flood-prone areas above 1 meter (see Table 6-12). 
Additionally, the higher density of hospitals and clinics is located in flood hotspot areas 
between 0.5 and 3 meters.  
More than 90% of all the 232 public schools are located in flood hotspot areas (see 
Figure 6-23, Table 6-13).
38
 In the extreme weather scenario, 12% of public schools 
would be flooded above 0.5 meter in depth. However, the density of schools does not 
show that a high density of schools are located in more severe flood hotspot areas. The 
density is distributed normally in flooding areas between 0.5 and 2 meters. 
                                                      
35
 Jonkman et al. (2009)’s case study after Hurricane Katrine indicate that one-third of the analyzed 
fatalities occurred outside the flooded areas or in hospitals in the flooded area due to causes such as 
strokes, heart attacks, and lack of medical services.  
36 There are 4 types of hospitals: medical center , district hospital , local teaching hospital , local 
hospital 
37
 The dataset of hospitals and clinics data in Taipei’s 12 districts is retrieved from Taipei City 
Government’s statistics website. http://163.29.37.101/pxweb2007-tp/dialog/statfile9.asp. (In Chinese) 
There are 3,382 hospitals and clinics in Taipei by the end of 2013 
38
 Public elementary, junior high, and senior high schools are included. There are 232 public schools 
(92 high schools; 140 elementary schools) 
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Taipei is also the political center of Taiwan; most of Taiwan’s central government 
offices are located in Taipei. The vulnerability analysis of public administrative buildings 
shows that the highest-ranking executive government, the Executive Headquarter is 
adjacent to the flood hotspot with 1-2 meters in depth (Figure 6-24). The Legislative 
Center and the Investigative Center are also both adjacent to it.
39
 Taiwan’s Criminal 
Investigation Bureau and the Taipei Revenue Service are located in flood hotspot 
areas. Hence, if extreme weather happens, these high-ranking central or local 
governments could possibly be flooded between 1 and 2 meters in depth. 
 
Figure 6- 19 Vulnerability of Taipei’s major oil and gas stations, in red dot areas 
                                                      
39
 Executive Headquarter is officially known as the Executive Yuan; the Legislative Center is 
officially known as the Legislative Yuan; the Investigative Center is officially known as the Control 
Yuan in Taiwan. 
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Figure 6- 20 Vulnerability of Taipei’s major electric power substations, in red dot areas  
 
 
Figure 6- 21 Vulnerability of Taipei’s major medical centers, in red dot areas 
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Figure 6- 22 Vulnerability of Taipei Metro lines (top) and stations (lower), in red dot 
areas  
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Figure 6- 23 Vulnerability of Taipei’s public schools in flood hotspots, in blue areas 
 
 
Figure 6- 24 Locations of high-ranking central governments (public administrative 
buildings) in flood hotspots, in orange areas 
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Table 6- 12 Hospitals and clinics vulnerability analysis in three flooding scenarios 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Hospitals and 
clinics 
(3,382 in total) 
Percentage of 
total hospitals 
and clinics 
Density of 
hospitals and 
clinics 
(number/km
2
) 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 1,933 57% 19 
0.5-1 meter 156 4.6% 25 
1-2 meters 105 3% 27 
2-3 meters 15 0.4% 27 
above 3 meters 1 0.01% 9 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 2,206 65% 20 
0.5-1 meter 37 1.1% 24 
1-2 meters 14 0.4% 24 
2-3 meters 1 0.01% 23 
above 3 meters 1 NA 8 
Heavy Rain 
0-0.5 meter 2,229 65% 20 
0.5-1 meter 18 0.5% 22 
1-2 meters 3 0.1% 27 
2-3 meters 1 NA 24 
above 3 meters 1 NA 6 
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Table 6- 13 Vulnerability analysis of public schools in three flooding scenarios 
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Public schools 
(232 in total) 
Percentage of 
total public 
schools 
Density of 
public schools 
(number/km
2
) 
Extreme 
Weather 
0-0.5 meter 203 88% 2 
0.5-1 meter 12 6% 2 
1-2 meters 8 3.3% 2 
2-3 meters 1 0.5% 2 
above 3 meters 1 0.2% 1 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 221 95% 2 
0.5-1 meter 3 1.32% 2 
1-2 meters 1 0.5% 2 
2-3 meters 1 0.01% 2 
above 3 meters 1 NA 1 
Heavy Rain 
0-0.5 meter 223 96% 2 
0.5-1 meter 2 0.7% 2 
1-2 meters 1 0.1% 2 
2-3 meters 1 NA 2 
above 3 meters 1 NA 1 
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Lastly, this study analyzes the relationship between green spaces
40
 and 
flood-prone areas to discover if more green spaces area is associated with less severe 
flooding. Except for the smallest proportion of severe flood-prone area around the 
mountain area, the results indicate that the flooding area with below 0.5 meter in 
depth has the higher green space area per capita. For instance, in an extreme weather 
scenario, the green space area per capita in the flooding area below 0.5 meter is 33 m
2 
, 
double that of the more severe flooding areas above 0.5 meter in depth (see Table 
6-14). When calculating the density of green space area, it is estimated at 439,811 m
2 
green spaces per km
2
 in the least severe flood-prone area, which is higher than that of 
flooding areas with 1-3 meters in depth. Both the green space area per capita and 
green space density indicates that the flood-prone areas with 1-3 meters have the least 
green space area per capita and lowest green space density. This implies that the 
higher green space density and green space area per capita has a relationship with 
flood risk reduction in Taipei City. 
  
                                                      
40 According to Taipei City Government (2014), green spaces (or green resource areas) include the 
areas of constructed parks, green fields, plazas, sports areas for children, athletic complexes, riverside 
parks and scenic areas under the management of Taipei City Government. The total green spaces was 
53.36 square miles (13, 819 hectares) at the end of 2013.   
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Table 6- 14 The relationship between flood-prone area and green space  
Three 
scenarios 
Flood depth 
Green space 
 per capita (m
2
) 
Green space 
density 
(m
2
/km
2
) 
Extreme Weather 
0-0.5 meter 33 439,811 
0.5-1 meter 17 307,388 
1-2 meters 16 293,299 
2-3 meters 18 314,632 
above 3 meters 57 511,555 
Typhoon 
Conditions 
0-0.5 meter 31 428,171 
0.5-1 meter 22 352,519 
1-2 meters 24 364,647 
2-3 meters 29 400,532 
above 3 meters 60 513,688 
Heavy Rain 
0-0.5 meter 31 427,080 
0.5-1 meter 28 398,583 
1-2 meters 27 383,495 
2-3 meters 26 351,595 
above 3 meters 58 510,715 
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6.5 Likelihood and cost-benefit analysis 
Three-quarters of the heavy rain events (24 hour duration/14 inches) in Taiwan 
were caused by typhoons in 2003-2014. This study assumes that the likelihood of the 
three different scenarios are associated with typhoons. Hence, the likelihood of three 
flooding scenarios will be calculated based on the possibility of typhoons and the 
possibility of different levels of rainfalls. For instance, the likelihood of a heavy 
rainfall scenario is based on the possibility of a typhoon and the possibility of rainfall 
above 14 inches within a 24-hour duration, P (heavy rainfall flooding) = P (typhoon) * 
P(rainfall above 14 inches within 24-hour duration). 
6.5.1 The likelihood of an extreme weather rainfall  
This study collects historic data of rainfalls and typhoons during the past four 
decades, 1975 to 2014, from the Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB)’s Typhoon 
DataBase.
41
 Most of the heavy rain events resulted from typhoons in 2003-2014. 
According to Taiwan CWB’s Typhoon DataBase, there were 249 typhoons in 
1975-2014, with an average of 6 typhoons annually. The likelihood of a typhoon is 
622% annually or 1.7% daily (see Table 6-15). When a typhoon hits Taipei, the 
                                                      
41 Taiwan CWB’s Typhoon Database_historic typhoons and cumulative rainfalls 
data:http://rdc28.cwb.gov.tw/TDB/ntdb/pageControl/rain (In Chinese) ; According to Taiwan’s Central 
Weather Bureau, 75% of heavy rain (with 350 m.m./14 inches rainfall in 24 hour duration) caused by 
typhoon in 2003-2014. 
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likelihood of rainfall above 14 inches/350 m.m. in 24 hour duration ranges from 0.8% 
in the downtown area to 6.8% in the mountain area (see Table 6-16 and Table 6-17).
42
 
The likelihood of heavy rain in Taipei’s mountain area is about 8 times as much as 
that in the downtown area. Therefore, if a typhoon causes heavy flooding, the 
likelihood ranges from 4.96% to 42.2% annually. However, there is another 25% of 
weather conditions which also cause heavy rain. The annual likelihood of a heavy rain 
flooding scenario needs to be adjusted to 6.6% in the downtown area 
(1.7%*0.8%*365/0.75) and 56% in the mountain area (1.7%*6.8%*365/0.75).  
Table 6- 15 The likelihood of a typhoon from 1975 to 2014 
Period  Number of typhoon Likelihood of a typhoon  
2005-2014 57 1.56% 
1995-2004 62 1.7% 
1985-1994 66 1.8% 
1975-1984 64 1.75% 
1975-2014 249 1.7% 
Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB)’s Typhoon DataBase; Typhoon Alert Announcement 
by Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB) in 1975-2014 
                                                      
42
 Data of the downtown Taipei is collected from CWB’s Taipei Weather Station; Data of Taipei 
mountain area is collected from CWB’s Taipei Anbu Weather Station. 
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Table 6- 16 The likelihood of typhoon and heavy rain in Taipei from 1975 to 2014 
Year 
Number of 
typhoons 
Downtown 
Taipei_ 
Heavy rain 
Mountain 
area_ 
Heavy 
rain 
Likelihood 
of typhoon 
per day 
Likelihood 
of heavy 
rain in 
downtown 
Taipei 
Likelihood 
of heavy 
rain in 
Taipei 
mountain 
area 
1975-
2014 
249 2 17 1.7% 0.8% 6.8% 
Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB)’s Typhoon DataBase 
Table 6- 17 The likelihood of different rainfall scenarios in Taipei from 1975 to 2014 
Rainfall 
 (24 hour 
duration) 
Number of 
typhoons 
(downtown) 
Number of 
typhoons 
( mountain)  
Likelihood 
of rainfall 
(downtown) 
Likelihood 
of rainfall 
( mountain) 
Likelihood 
of rainfall 
in average 
8 inches  
(200 m.m.) up 
16 58 6.4% 23.3% 14.85% 
12 inches  
(300 m.m.) up 
4 36 1.6% 14.5% 8.05% 
14 inches  
(350 m.m.) up 
2 17 0.8% 6.8% 3.8% 
16 inches  
(400 m.m.) up 
2 15 0.8% 6% 3.4% 
20 inches  
(500 m.m.) up 
1 7 0.4% 2.8% 1.6% 
24 inches  
(600 m.m.) up 
0 5 NA 2% 1% 
28 inches  
(700 m.m.) up 
0 2 NA 0.8% 0.4% 
32 inches  
(800 m.m.) up 
0 1 NA 0.4% 0.2% 
Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB)’s Typhoon DataBase  
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Because Taipei’s rainfall datasets are collected from Taiwan CWB’s Taipei 
Weather Station (downtown) and Taipei Anbu Weather Station (mountain area), this 
study analyzes different likelihoods: conservative (downtown likelihood), medium 
(average likelihood), and aggressive conditions (mountain area likelihood). For 
example, the annual likelihood of heavy rain in a conservative analysis is 6.6%. This 
would be 31.4% in a medium likelihood, and would be 56% in an aggressive 
likelihood analysis. In addition, because Taiwan’s CWB Typhoon Database collects 
rainfall in 6, 12, 18, and 24 hour durations for each typhoon event, there is no 48 or 72 
hour duration rainfall dataset. The likelihood of typhoon conditions in this study, with 
48 hour duration/24 inches, is based on the historically actual data of 24 hour 
duration/16 of inches and up. An extreme weather rainfall, with 72 hour duration/47 
inches, is calculated based on the historically actual data of 24 hour duration/20 
inches up. Therefore, the likelihood of a typhoon scenario with 48 hour duration/24 
inches ranges from 5% (downtown Taipei) to 37% (Taipei mountain area) according 
to the historically actual data over the past four decades. The likelihood of extreme 
weather rainfall, with 72 hour duration/47 inches, is from 2.5% to 17% annually (see 
Table6-18). 
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Table 6- 18 Summary of three likelihood models in three flooding scenarios 
Three scenarios 
Conservative 
likelihood model  
Medium  
likelihood model 
Aggressive 
likelihood model 
Heavy rainfall 
(24 hour 
duration/14 
inches) 
6.6%  
(=1.7%*0.8%*365/0.75) 
31.4%  
(=1.7%*3.8%*365/0.75) 
56%  
(=1.7%*6.8%*365/0.75) 
Typhoon 
conditions (48 
hour duration/24 
inches) 
 
5%  
(=1.7%*0.8%*365) 
21% 
(=1.7%*3.4%*365) 
37% 
(=1.7%*6%*365) 
Extreme weather 
rainfall (72 hour 
duration/47 
inches)  
 
2.5% 
(=1.7%*0.4%*365)  
9.9% 
(=1.7%*1.6%*365)  
 
17% 
(=1.7%*2.8%*365)  
 
Note: 
1.Likelihood of each scenario = possibility of typhoon*possibility of rainfall= P (typhoon)*P (rainfall)  
2.There are 75% of heavy rainfall (24 hour duration/14 inches) caused by typhoon in 2003-2014 . 
3.Typhoon conditions (48 hour duration/24 inches) is based on the historically actual data of 24 hour 
duration/16 inches up 
4.Extreme weather rainfall (72 hour duration/47 inches) is based on the historically actual data of 24 
hour duration/20 inches up 
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6.5.2 The annual vulnerability analysis in three likelihood models 
This study categorizes three different likelihood models, conservative, medium 
and aggressive, to analyze different flooding scenarios. In a conservative likelihood 
model (a probability of 2.5%) of an extreme weather event, the annual expected 
number of vulnerable people in Taipei City is 38,967 persons. The annual vulnerable 
GDP is about $6.7 billion. The annual vulnerable land value is about $63 billion. The 
annual vulnerable housing property is about $2.3 billion (see Table 6-19).  
In a medium likelihood model (a probability of 9.9%) of an extreme weather 
event, the annual expected number of vulnerable people in Taipei City is 154,308. 
The annual vulnerable GDP is about $26 billion. The annual vulnerable land value is 
about $16 billion. The annual vulnerable residential property is about $9 billion (see 
Table 6-20). 
In an aggressive likelihood model (a probability of 17%) of an extreme weather 
event, the annual expected number of vulnerable people in Taipei City is about 
265,000. The annual vulnerable GDP is about $45 billion. The annual vulnerable land 
value is about $109 billion. The annual vulnerable residential property is about $15.5 
billion (see Table 6-21). 
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Table 6- 19 The conservative likelihood model and annual vulnerabilities in an extreme 
weather 
Annual likelihood 
of an extreme 
weather 
Flood 
depth 
(meter) 
Vulnerable 
population  
Vulnerable 
GDP  
(million) 
Vulnerable 
land value  
(million) 
Vulnerable 
residential 
property 
(million) 
Conservative 
model 
2.5% 
 
0-0.5 34,179 5,950 14,328 2,064 
0.5-1 2,789 385 986 129 
1-2 31,746 308 630 81 
2-3 243 34 86 12 
above 3 10 1 2 0.2 
In total 38,967 6,678 16,031 2,286 
 
Table 6- 20 The medium likelihood model and annual vulnerabilities in an extreme 
weather 
Annual likelihood 
of an extreme 
weather  
Flood 
depth 
(meter) 
Vulnerable 
population  
Vulnerable 
GDP  
(million) 
Vulnerable 
land value  
(million) 
Vulnerable 
residential 
property 
(million) 
Medium model 
9.9% 
 
0-0.5 135,349 23,562 56,740 8,175 
0.5-1 11,046 1,523 3,903 511 
1-2 6,912 1,220 2,494 321 
2-3 962 135 339 46 
above 3 39 4 7 1 
In total 154,308 26,444 63,483 9,054 
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Table 6- 21 The aggressive likelihood model and annual vulnerabilities in an extreme 
weather 
Annual likelihood 
of an extreme 
weather 
Flood 
depth 
(meter) 
Vulnerable 
population  
Vulnerable 
GDP  
(million) 
Vulnerable 
land value  
(million) 
Vulnerable 
residential 
property 
(million) 
Aggressive model 
17% 
 
0-0.5 232,418 40,460 97,432 14,038 
0.5-1 18,968 2,616 6,702 877 
1-2 11,869 2,094 4,282 552 
2-3 1,652 232 583 79 
above 3 66 6 12 1 
In total 264,973 45,409 109,011 15,547 
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6.6 The cost of a severe flood in Taipei metropolitan region 
Taipei City’s flood vulnerability and likelihood analysis finds that the annual expected 
number of vulnerable people is approximately 40 thousands people, GDP impact is 
approximately $6.7 billion, and residential property is approximately $2.3 billion in a 
conservative likelihood model (a probability of 2.5%) of an extreme weather event 
with rainfall of 72 hour duration/47 inches. However, this study also notes that some 
flooding areas exist on the border of the west-side of Taipei City, where one river runs 
between Taipei City and New Taipei City. The Taipei Twin Cities, as a metropolitan 
region, have a population of 6.7 million people. The population of Taipei 
metropolitan region is larger than the U.S.A.’s Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of 6,034,678 as of 2013. New Taipei City is 
the most populous city of Taiwan. Besides, Taipei Twin Cities are intensely 
interdependent regarding housing, jobs, transportation, environment, and facilities. 
Hence, this study broadens the research scope into a metropolitan region scale and 
asks some questions: How much does flooding cost if 1% of Taipei metropolitan 
region is flooded above 1 meter in depth?
43
  
                                                      
43
 Taipei metropolitan region refers to Taipei Twin Cities: Taipei City (2.7 million people within 104.9 
square miles) and New Taipei City (3.95 million people within 760.7 square miles); This section 
assumes that a flood above 1 meter is viewed as a severe flood. In Taipei City, the severe flood-prone 
areas accounts for approximately 1.7% (1.8 out of 104.9 square miles) of total land areas.   
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However, due to the data limitation of New Taipei City, this study does not allow 
a thorough vulnerability, likelihood, and cost-benefit analysis of the Taipei 
metropolitan region as it did for Taipei City in previous sections. Nonetheless, this 
section simplifies the evaluation based on limited datasets and some assumptions. For 
instance, this section assumes that 1% of the Taipei metropolitan region will be 
flooded at a depth of 1 meter. The cost analysis is based on the 
government-announced current land value,
44
 residential property value, and unit 
damage to understand the cost.
45
 First, this section finds that there is approximately 
2.6%, or 20 square miles of New Taipei City in flood-prone areas. This is less than 
Taipei City’s 41%, 43 square miles. Additionally, because New Taipei City’s land 
value per unit is lower than Taipei City, the vulnerable land value in New Taipei City 
is lower. The damage per unit from floods in New Taipei City is half that of Taipei 
City. For instance, the medium unit damage is $300 per square meter in Taipei City, 
and it is an estimated $150 in New Taipei City (Wang 2003). Despite this, New Taipei 
City has many highly developed areas within the flood-prone areas, particularly in 
Banqiao, Zhonghe, Xinzhuang, Sanchong, and Xindian districts,
46
 which are adjacent 
to Taipei City and major rivers (see Figure 6-25 and 6-26). 
                                                      
44 Government-announced current land value of 2014 in Taipei City and New Taipei City is about 89% 
of the market value according to Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior’s statistics 
45
 The unit damage is based on flood damage of central Taipei areas (Wang 2003; Hsu 2013). 
46 There are 29 districts in New Taipei City. The municipal seat is located at Banqiao district. 
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Figure 6- 25 Flood hotspots in the extreme weather scenario in Taipei metropolitan 
region 
 
 
Figure 6- 26 The vulnerable land value in the extreme weather scenario in New Taipei 
City 
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Further, how much will a flood covering 1% of the Taipei metropolitan region 
cost in property and land value? In estimating the cost, this study adopts the 
government-announced current land value of 2014, which adjusts the market land 
value. For example, the current land value is 89% of the market land value in Taipei 
City and New Taipei City in 2014. The total land value of Taipei’s metropolitan region 
is estimated at $1,531 billion. A flood covering 1% of the metro Taipei area at more 
than 1 meter could cost $1.5 billion. The cost is larger than previous studies measured by 
the unit damage (Wang 2003; Hsu 2013). Hence, when there is extreme weather with 47 
inches of rainfall in 72 hours, this study estimates that 1% of Taipei metropolitan region 
flooding above 1 meter will cost up to $ 1.5 billion in damage, presented in Table 6-22, 
Table 6-23, and Table 6-24. 
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Table 6- 22 Cost analysis of a flood by property-based estimation in Taipei  
Cost estimation Taipei City New Taipei City Taipei Twin Cities 
Average housing price: 
US dollars 
(a 1,260 square feet 
unit) 
$687,333 
($546 per square 
foot) 
$350,280 
($278 per square 
foot) 
$519,306 
Number of housing 
units (most are 
condominiums) 
935,535 1,546,874 2,482,409 
Total housing asset 
(billion US dollars) 
$644 $541 $1,185 
1% of housing flooded 
above 1 meters  
(billion US dollars) 
$6.44 $5.41 $11.85 
The proportion of 
buildings older than 30 
years  
58% 37% 47% 
Possible damages of 
vulnerable old 
buildings in the 1% of 
housing flooded above 
1 meters 
(billion US dollars) 
$3.74 $2 $5.74 
Estimated cost of the 
floods damage 
(assuming 20% of 
vulnerable old 
buildings damage) 
(billion US dollars) 
$0.75 $0.4 $1.15 
Note:  
1. Average housing price is based on housing statistics from Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior in 2013;  
2. The average housing price of purchase contrast is $698,266 in Taipei City and $385,866 in New 
Taipei City. It’s based on the Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior’s statistics in 2014 Q2.;  
3. Taipei’s standard housing price in 3 districts of 2013 is $687,333, Taipei City Government’s 
Department of Land; 
4. The proportion of buildings over 30 years old is based on Taipei City Government’s Department of 
Urban Development’s and New Taipei City Government’s statistics. This study assumes that older 
buildings are more vulnerable to floods.   
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Table 6- 23 Cost analysis of a flood by land value-based estimation in Taipei  
Cost estimation Taipei City New Taipei City Taipei Twin Cities 
Total parcels of land 
 
415,194 1,092,233 1,507,427 
Total land area 
(hectare) 
25,970 197,013 222,983 
Government-announced 
current land value 
(billion US dollars) 
$850.707 $511.794 $1,362.5 
Adjustment to market 
land value  
(billion US dollars) 
$955.851 $575.049 $1,530.9 
Possible floods damage: 
1% of land flooded 
above 1 meters 
(billion US dollars) 
$9.56 $5.75 $15.31 
Estimated cost of the 
floods damage 
(assuming 10% of 
possible floods damage) 
(billion US dollars) 
$0.96 $0.58 $1.54 
Source: Taiwan Ministry of the Interior; Taipei City Government 
Note: Government-announced current land value is based on land value statistics from the Taiwan’s 
Ministry of the Interior, Taipei City Government, and New Taipei Government in 2014. 
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Table 6- 24 Cost analysis of a flood by the unit damage in Taipei  
Cost estimation Taipei City New Taipei City Taipei Twin Cities 
Total land area 
(hectare) 
25,970 197,013 222,983 
Urbanized area 100% 60% 80% 
1% of urban area in 
flooding (m²) 
2,597,000 11,820,780 14,417,780 
The least unit damage  
(US dollars/m²) 
$100 $50 NA 
Estimated cost of the 
floods damage based on 
the least unit damage  
(billion US dollars) 
$0.26 $0.59 $0.85 
Note: The unit damage is based on flood damage of central Taipei areas (Wang 2003; Hsu 2013). The 
unite damage ranges from $100-$600 per square meter in central Taipei areas. This study assumes the 
least unit damage of $100 per square meter for cost analysis. The unit damage of New Taipei City is 
estimated on the property value in comparison with Taipei City.  
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Research has found that every dollar invested into disaster preparedness would 
save $4 to $7 dollars in post-disaster damages (Multihazard Mitigation Council 2005; 
United Nations Development Programme, UNDP 2012; The National Academy of 
Sciences 2012). Wahlström (2015) also indicates that typical cost-benefit ratios lie in 
the range of 3:1 to 15:1. The European Union states that 1 euro dollar invested in 
disaster-risk reduction saves from 4 to 7 euro dollars in disaster response. New York 
City and Randstad provide examples. New York City’s resilience plan is expected to 
cost approximately $20 billion over 10 years to save future flood damage of $35 
billion by 2020 or $90 billion by 2050. The Dutch government is spending $2.9 
billion over 10 years to protect 4 million citizens from floods. Taipei Twin Cities have 
similar characteristics in common with Randstad
47
 and New York City. For instance, 
the population size is similar, approximately 7 million. There is more than 50% of the 
national GDP concentrated in Randstad, which is similar to Taipei Twin Cities. 
Randstad’s flooding area is estimated at 5% of total land submerged, but the worst-
case scenario is 50% of total land submerged, costing approximately $180 billion 
(The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2007). In New 
                                                      
47The Randstad is a polycentric urban area in western Netherlands, comprising Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
The Hague, Utrecht and several smaller cities. Randstad is one of the most densely populated areas in 
the OECD, and has developed into an advanced urban economy with many leading sectors, such as 
logistics, horticulture and financial services (OECD 2007).  
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York City, it is estimated that the flooding areas with severe economic losses
48
 
accounts for 5% of the total land area in 2013 to almost 25% by 2050s (The City of 
New York 2013).  
In New York, Randstad, and Taipei, at least 5% of total land is likely to flood. 
This will cost Taipei metropolitan region approximately $7.7 billion if 5% of the total 
area is flooded more than 1 meter in depth. When calculating the damage per capita, 
Randstad is the highest: 5% of the land flooding with $21 billion in damage, costing 
$2,943 per person (The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 
2007). The second highest is New York City, the damage of $19 billion from 
Hurricane Sandy would cost $2,260 per person (The City of New York 2013). Then, 
the damage per capita in Taipei metropolitan region is the lowest, with an estimated 
cost of $1,149 per person (see Table 6-25). However, although Taipei has the lowest 
flood damage per capita in comparison with Randstad and New York City, Taipei 
metropolitan region’s 1% of total land submerged above 1 meter, costing 
approximately $1.5 billion, is still a huge amount. Urban and regional resilience 
planning policies using land-use and environment planning to reduce its vulnerability 
and damages from flooding is essential and critical in Taipei. 
  
                                                      
48Each neighborhood, defined by the zip code, with economic losses of more than $30 million from 
flooding 
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Table 6- 25 Cost analysis of floods in New York City, Randstad, and Taipei 
Cost analysis 
New York City, 
U.S.A. 
Randstad, 
the Netherlands 
Taipei Twin Cities, 
Taiwan 
Population 
(million) 
8.4 7.1 6.7 
Percentage of the 
country’s 
population 
2.6% 44% 29% 
GDP 
(billion US dollars) 
$1,358 $343 $300 
Percentage of the 
country’s GDP 
8% 51% 60% 
Projection of severe 
flooding areas 
5%~25% 5% ~ 50% 
5% 
(Assuming 5% of 
land submerged 
above 1 meter in 
depth) 
The possible cost 
of a severe flood 
$19 billion in 2012 
$35 billion in 2020 
$90 billion in 2050 
$20.9 billion 
(5% of total land 
submerged) 
$180 billion 
(worst-case 
scenarios: 50% of 
total land 
submerged) 
$7.7 billion 
Floods cost per 
capita (US dollars) 
$2,260 $2,943 $1,149 
Source: The City of New York 2013; The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 
2007 
Note: 
1.The GDP of New York City is the gross metropolitan product; New York City’s severe flooding 
areas is based on a neighborhood (zip code) with economic losses of $30 million. 
2. The GDP of Randstad is estimate at approximately 271 billion euros. 
3. In Taipei Twin Cities, 1% of total land submerged above 1 meter could cost approximately $1.5 
billion 
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In order to save future flood damages of $7.7 billion in Taipei metropolitan 
region, Taipei should formulate resilience-related policies of at least $1 billion over 
the next 10 years. These resilience-related policies and strategies can include: 1. 
setting up organization, funding, and analysis of a resilient city as defined by the 
United Nations; 2. implementing land use policies and urban growth management to 
direct development away from floodplains providing a strategy for reducing flood risk 
and vulnerability; 3. reducing development density in severe floods areas; 4. 
redirecting riverside condominium development projects and to retreat from flood 
risks; 5. creating more wetlands and parks; 6. planning more open spaces, water 
retention ponds, and permeable surfaces to accommodate floods (see Table 6-26). 
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Table 6- 26 Policy plans toward resilience in New York City, Randstad, and Taipei 
Resilience-related 
policy plan 
A Stronger, More 
Resilient New York 
Randstad’s  
Spatial Planning Key 
Decision: Room for 
the River 
Suggested Policies 
for a Resilient Taipei 
Budget $20 billion $2.91 billion $1 billion 
Period 
(year) 
2013-2022 2006-2015 2016-2025 
Benefit of 
implementing 
resilience-related 
policy plan 
Save $35 billion 
by 2020 
Save $$90 billion 
by 2050 
Save at least $9.6 
billion by 2015 
Safety for 4 million 
Dutch citizens 
Save $7.7 billion 
by 2025 
Strategy 
A scenario planning 
method towards natural 
disasters; citywide 
infrastructure and the 
built environment; 
developing community 
rebuilding and resilience 
plans 
Lowering and 
broadening floodplain; 
creating river diversions 
and temporary 
water storage areas; 
restoring marshy 
riverine landscapes; 
natural water storage 
sponges 
Setting up organization, 
funding, and analysis 
towards a resilient city; 
implementing urban 
growth management; 
reducing density in 
severe floods areas; 
redirecting riverside 
condominium 
development; creating 
more wetlands and 
parks; planning more 
open spaces, water 
retention ponds, and 
permeable surfaces to 
accommodate floods 
Source: The City of New York 2013; Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 
2007 
Note: 1.A Dutch human life has an estimated value of approximately $2.4 million; The Dutch 
resilience plan is to provide safety for 4 million people, 25% of the country’s total population, 
and assumes a resilience plan can save the lives of 0.1% of 4 million people. The benefit is 
estimated at $9.6 billion.  
     2. New York City’s resilience plan is also to adapt for 30 inches of sea level rise and twice the 
number of residents (up to 800,000) living in the 100-year-floodplain by the 2050s. 
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CHAPTER 7: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A RESILIENT TAIPEI 
Major cities around the world, New York City, London, Tokyo, and Randstad, 
are all preparing for flood resilience (see Chapter 3). The research suggests that 
Taipei’s resilience planning for flooding should shift from controlling water through 
costly engineering and structural construction to accommodating and absorbing water 
through land-use and environmental planning. In other words, rather than structural 
planning, land-use and environmental planning should play a proactive role in urban 
flood resilience. However, at this time a disconnect between flood prevention and 
land-use planning remains. Hence, this research suggests that Taiwan’s central and 
local governments reorganize agencies and increase funding for resilience. A budget 
of at least $100 million each year should be allocated to strengthen flood resilience in 
Taipei. A ten-year Taipei flood resilience plan with a total budget of $1 billion would 
save the possible cost of approximately $7.7 billion in the Taipei metropolitan region 
by 2025. 
Taiwan is now planning to create the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources, which could be used to strengthen the coordination of urban flood 
resilience. In local governments, a regional government agency that can promote the 
coordination of policies in the Taipei metropolitan region is needed, as demonstrated 
by the Greater London Authority and Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Additionally, 
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Taipei should address the gaps of a resilient city’s essentials as defined by the United 
Nations. Taipei also needs to coordinate with planning-related universities and 
institutions to strengthen the study of urban resilience and data collection. Moreover, 
Taipei should adopt a growth management policy to direct development away from 
flooding hotspots. Furthermore, urban regeneration policy should require developers 
to improve storm sewers, water retention ponds, and permeable surfaces. Planning 
more space for rivers, more constructed wetlands, and more ecological ponds to 
accommodate water is important. Also, Taiwan’s central and local governments 
should promote an actuarially fair flood insurance program which can reflect actual 
flood risks. Finally, a bottom-up community resilience plan would assist achieving 
urban resilience.  
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7.1 Address the gaps of a resilient city’ essentials as defined by the United Natons 
This section identifies the needs for Taipei resilience. Although the United 
Nations has identified the 10 essentials for resilient cities (see Table 7-1), Taipei’s 
priorities for urban resilience should focus on organization, funding, and land-use 
planning policy to reduce flood risk. A comprehensive flood risk analysis is necessary 
in Taipei. In the future, Taipei needs to do more research on flood risk assessment and 
provide the results of vulnerability mapping to citizens. This would increase people’s 
risk awareness and allow them to take actions to reduce or transfer the risk. 
Additionally, risk compliant land-use principles and policies need to be promoted in 
Taipei.  
In disaster management, Taipei City Government established two related 
organizations to coordinate risk reduction: the Disaster Prevention and Rescue 
Committee in 2002 and the Office of Disaster Management in 2011. The former is to 
plan, supervise, and integrate disaster prevention and rescue tasks. The latter is to 
reduce the impact of and respond to disasters. However, with both organizations, 
rescue after a disaster is the primary focus, not risk reduction and prevention. Both 
organizations should put their priorities into preparedness and prevention, and then 
cooperate with different departments such as the Department of Urban Development, 
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Department of Transportation, Department of Rapid Transit Systems, Department of 
Public Works to plan for disaster risk reduction.  
According to Taipei City Disaster Reduction and Prevention White Paper in 2013, 
the annual execution budget for disaster reduction and prevention was approximately 
$7.7 million, meaning that only $3 dollars per capita has been spent annually on 
disaster reduction. In this annual execution budget, 53% was spent on levee-related 
and other flood control projects, 27% on disaster organization and responsiveness, 
and only 6% on disaster risk reduction education. Based on this, Taipei still relies on 
levees and other public works to reduce disaster risk. As a result, very little of the 
budget has been allocated to providing incentives for homeowners, low-income 
families, communities, and businesses to invest in risk reduction. The annual budget 
of $200,000 in risk education programs in public schools of Taipei City should be 
increased. Reducing money spent on levee-related and other flood control projects 
and using that money for land-use planning for resilience and increased risk reduction 
education programs would help to achieve urban resilience. Increasing funding for 
flood prevention is important. It is estimated that a budget of at least $100 million 
each year should be allocated to strengthen flood resilience in the Taipei metropolitan 
region.  
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Table 7- 1 The gaps and needs of Taipei in the United Nations 10 essentials of a resilient 
city  
United Nations  
10 essentials for 
a resilient city 
Gaps of urban resilience in Taipei City 
Organization and coordination 
to understand and reduce 
disaster risk 
 Taipei City Disaster Prevention and Rescue 
Committee was established in 2002 to plan, 
supervise, and integrate disaster prevention 
and rescue tasks 
 Taipei City Office of Disaster Management 
was established in 2011 to reduce effect, 
prepare for, respond to disasters. This 
office is a newly-established organization 
and coordination system under Taipei City 
Fire Department 
 Both organizations mainly focus on rescue 
after a disaster, rather than risk reduction 
planning   
Assign a budget for disaster risk 
reduction and provide 
incentives for homeowners, 
low-income families, 
communities, businesses and 
public sector to invest in 
reducing the risks 
 The annual budget of disaster reduction and 
prevention is approximately $7.7 million in 
2013 
 53% was spent in levee-related or flood 
control projects, 27% in disaster 
organization and responsiveness, and only 
6% in disaster risk reduction education 
 A lack of budget in providing incentives for 
homeowners, low-income families, 
communities, businesses to invest in 
reducing the risks 
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United Nations  
10 essentials for 
a resilient city 
Gaps of urban resilience in Taipei City 
Maintain up-to-date data on 
hazards and vulnerabilities, 
prepare risk assessments and 
use these as the basis for urban 
development plans and 
decisions 
 Little study in flood risk assessment and 
vulnerability analysis 
 A lack of applying the up-to-date flood risk 
maps as the basis for urban development 
plans and decisions 
Invest in and maintain critical 
infrastructure that reduces risk, 
such as flood drainage, adjusted 
where needed to cope with 
climate change 
 Flood drainage has been improved since the 
1990s, but not significantly improved 
 Continuing improvement of flood drainage is 
necessary 
Assess the safety of all schools 
and health facilities and 
upgrade these as necessary 
 Most of public schools and public buildings 
are located in flood-prone areas 
 A lack of risk assessment among public 
schools, public buildings, and health 
facilities 
 A lack of budget investment in public 
schools, public buildings, and health 
facilities for disaster risk reduction 
Apply and enforce realistic, risk 
compliant building regulations 
and land use planning 
principles. Identify safe land for 
low-income citizens and 
develop upgrading of informal 
settlements, wherever feasible 
 Risk compliant building regulations 
adjustment is mostly focused in the 
earthquake risk reduction. But, little for 
flood risk 
 Need more land-use planning principles for 
flood risk reduction 
 Growth management policy can be adopted 
to direct urban development away from 
flood-prone areas 
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United Nations  
10 essentials for 
a resilient city 
Gaps of urban resilience in Taipei City 
Ensure education programs and 
training on disaster risk 
reduction are in place in schools 
and local communities 
 A lack of education and programs 
 A lack of budget in education programs and 
training 
Protect ecosystems and natural 
buffers to mitigate floods, storm 
surges and other hazards to 
which your city may be 
vulnerable. Adapt to climate 
change by building on good risk 
reduction practices 
 Need more wetlands to reduce flood risks. 
For example, Taipei Guandu floodplain is 
an example for reducing flood 
 Green infrastructure strategies such as green 
roof, drainage system, water retention 
ponds, and permeable surfaces can also be 
applied for flood risk reduction  
 Need to plan for more ecosystems and natural 
buffers to mitigate floods 
Install early warning systems 
and emergency management 
capacities in your city and hold 
regular public preparedness 
drills 
 Although the automatic remote surveillance 
systems for storm sewer systems were 
established in 2007, there are 26 pumping 
stations along Keelung River and 50 
stations along Tamsui River that have not 
been implemented completely yet 
 Need more comprehensive early warning 
systems for river flooding, pumping 
stations, and sewer systems  
The risk compliant building regulations in Taipei are primarily focused on 
earthquake risk. Taipei has adopted an urban renewal policy as a strategy to reduce 
damage from earthquakes. However, there are fewer land-use planning principles for 
reducing flood risk and damage. In the future, more studies of urban flood resilience 
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through land-use planning are necessary. Urban growth management can be adopted 
to prevent intensive development in or adjacent to flood-prone areas. Moreover, not 
only does the need of natural buffers to mitigate floods exist in outer Taipei, but  
downtown Taipei also needs natural buffers such as man-made wetlands, parks, and 
natural conservation to reduce flood risk. The implementation of green infrastructure 
strategies such as green roofs, drainage systems, water retention ponds, and permeable 
surfaces can also be applied for flood risk reduction when developers apply for new 
building permits. Finally, improving the early warning system is essential. Taipei’s is 
not sufficient yet. Although automatic remote surveillance system for storm sewers 
was established in 2007, most pumping stations, 76 out of 86 stations along rivers, 
have not yet been completely implemented. In the future, strengthening 
comprehensive flooding early warning systems can help to implement an efficient 
evacuation plan and reduce damages. 
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7.2 Strengthen data collection and the study of urban resilience 
Data insufficiency, inconsistency, and the lack of urban resilience study exist in 
Taipei. Since data collection is the basis for risk analysis, local and central 
governments can arrange a task force in coordination with planning-related 
universities and institutions to collect up-to-date and consistent data on disaster 
exposure, losses, locations, reasons, and physical or social vulnerabilities. Since 2006, 
Taiwan’s National Development Council has managed the multiple organizations 
involved with the national geographic information system (NGIS). A ten-year 
(2006-2015) NGIS project has now been implemented. Nine groups of different 
central government agencies have been established for the collection of nine 
databases.
49
 However, because different datasets were produced originally by 
different agencies, inconsistency occurred. For example, this research on Taipei flood 
vulnerability (see Chapter 6) indicates a mismatch between the land-use and flood 
GIS-based maps. Different coordinates and projections of GIS shape files remain in 
these databases. Additionally, there is little data collection of actual economic losses 
or cost estimation of flood events by local governments, but Taipei City Government 
                                                      
49 Nine databases include: the Natural Environment Database, Natural Resources and Ecological 
Database, Environmental Quality Database, Social Economic Database, Transportation Network 
Database, Land Information Database, Land-use Planning Database, Public Pipeline Database and 
Topographic Database. 
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began to collect this data in 2011. Further, New Taipei City, the most populous city in 
Taiwan, lacks a city-wide flood vulnerability and risk map as the basis for urban 
development decisions.  
Data collection and further study of Taipei flood resilience is necessary. Taipei 
Twin Cities should strengthen data collection of flood losses, cost estimation, 
locations, reasons, and impacts. Additionally, the consistency of databases among 
different agencies also needs to be strengthened. Taiwan’s National Development 
Council and other central government agencies should cooperate with 
planning-related universities and institutions to help to review data consistency among 
the nine databases of the NGIS project. Further, strengthening the study of flood risk 
assessment, vulnerability analysis, and risk maps will be important. This could 
provide citizens with better risk awareness and information. A thorough study of risk 
assessment regarding properties, schools, subways, and other critical facilities would 
also provide local governments and policy makers with a tool to make better urban 
development policies and land-use planning decisions. 
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7.3 Emphasize the importance of land-use and environmental planning for resilience 
Most cities adopt costly engineering and structural facilities for flood resilience. 
Some cities provide financial support directly to buyout occupants living in 
flood-prone areas. Approximately $200 million was spent each year from 1982 to 
2005 by Taiwan’s Water Resource Agency to build numerous public works to control 
floods in Taipei. Dikes and pumping stations both tripled. A man-made river, a 
floodway, was completed in the 1980s. An underground flood diversion built at the 
cost of approximately $100 million per kilometer, began operation in 2005. Storm 
sewer systems have been improving. These costly flood control facilities have been 
completed in Taipei. However, with all these structures, floods still threaten Taipei. 
Recent experience shows that stormwater overtopped some of dikes and that the storm 
sewer systems and pumping stations could not handle the amount of water from some 
storms or heavy rainfalls caused primarily by typhoons. While adding height to the 
levees or more capacity to the storm sewer systems and pumping stations may help in 
reducing flood damage, this solution is costly and, in the case of levees, less 
sustainable than dedicating funds to other solutions in land-use and environmental 
planning such as adopting a growth management policy to direct development away 
from flood-prone areas, planning for more space to accommodate water, preserving 
natural buffers, designing water retention ponds and permeable surfaces, and 
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implementing green infrastructure strategies. These alternatives in planning, rather 
than engineering, will strengthen Taipei’s flood resilience. 
Since it has been established that Taipei’s costly structures cannot protect the 
city from flooding, this research suggests the importance of land-use and 
environmental planning to achieve urban resilience in the future. However, to date 
land-use planning has been little used in the decision-making of water resource 
management and flood control projects. Chang et al. (2013) discover that the 
management of Tamsui River in Taipei is governed by the water resource agency, but 
the land use agency has little authority to participate in the control of land use 
activities on rivers. In Taipei, the Department of Urban Development makes minor 
revisions of urban plans when Taiwan’s Water Resources Agency announces an 
adequate width for floodway according to the protection criteria of a flood in every 
200 years. Planning, building or rebuilding levees and drainage systems are primarily 
decided by the central government. Little coordination exists between the central and 
local governments as well as the water resource and the land-use agency. Thus, the 
land-use agency in the local government often either ignores flooding issues or plays 
a minor role in alleviating the problem.  
Major cities’ engineering strategies to reduce flood risk by costly dikes, dams, 
storm-surge barriers and dunes have proved their inadequacy. Taipei had a similar 
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experience, discussed in Chapter 5. Hence, increasing the local government’s role in 
land-use and environmental planning for urban flood resilience is essential. 
Additionally, ensuring the policy integration of land-use and water resource 
management is necessary. First, Taiwan’s National Development Council can 
coordinate with the Water Resource Agency and the Construction and Planning 
Agency to develop a project of urban and regional flood resilience planning policies 
and guidelines. With this planning policy either recommended or mandated by the 
central government, local governments can play a more proactive role in the 
implementation of land-use plans, growth management, zoning ordinances, 
subdivision regulations, infrastructure investment, and building codes to consider 
flood resilience. Any pro-growth action by the local government should also require 
developers to implement any needed storm sewer improvements, provide water 
retention ponds, more open spaces, constructed wetlands, and more permeable 
surfaces in each development. Rather than engineering structures, emphasizing the 
importance of land-use and environmental planning towards flood resilience can 
perform better in preventing and reducing flood damages.   
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7.4 Accelerate reorganization of public agencies to strengthen resilience 
Capable organizations play an important role in achieving urban resilience. 
Taiwan is working to create the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 
(MENR) by merging different ministries and agencies in Taiwan’s central 
government. The MENR is expected to integrate the policies of environmental 
protection and conservation, water resource management, disaster reduction and 
prevention, and urban resilience. Similar to the Netherlands’ creation of the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and Environment in 2010, Taiwan’s reorganization of public 
agencies would strengthen collaboration and resources to achieve resilience.  
This section suggests that the reorganization of Taiwan’s central and local 
governments adapt a focus toward urban resilience because recent rebuilding 
examples indicate little integration of natural disaster management and spatial 
planning existed. Taiwan’s National Development Council, reorganized in 2014, can 
become an important platform in the central government and coordinate with different 
agencies to promote urban resilience through existing major national development 
plans regarding disaster resilience. The management for natural disaster prevention 
and response needs to be restructured and integrated with national spatial planning. 
National spatial planning strategies should also be based on risk assessment and 
vulnerability analysis of natural disasters. 
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Water resource planning is often viewed as a factor of economic development in 
Taiwan. Taiwan’s Water Resources Agency, under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
is the central authority of water resource and flood prevention. At the local level, 
Taipei City’s Hydraulic Engineering Office of the Department of Public Works often 
adopts the central government policies. Thus, flood resilience relies on structural 
facilities because the central and local agencies have concentrated on civil 
engineering and structure construction, rather than land-use planning for risk 
reduction.  
Because there is no river basin management agency in Taiwan, fragmented river 
management authorities also exist. A river’s upstream conservation, middle stream 
management, and downstream control belongs to three different central agencies: the 
Soil and Water Conservation Bureau of the Council of Agriculture, the Water 
Resource Agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Construction and 
Planning Agency of the Ministry of the Interior. Coordination problems exist in river 
management, conservation, and land-use planning. Moreover, Taiwan’s 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with primary focus on clear water and 
pollution improvement, plays a passive role in flood resilience and prevention. Further, 
in disaster management, Taiwan’s National Fire Agency, under the Ministry of the 
Interior, is mainly involved with disaster rescue, rather than prevention. Taipei’s Fire 
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Department plays a similar role. In the future, in order to address these coordination 
problems among public agencies, it is necessary to accelerate the ongoing central 
government reform and the creation of the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources to ensure the integration of river management and land-use planning for 
strengthening urban resilience.  
At the local level, the land-use planning sector ought to play a proactive role in 
urban flood resilience. Because structural facilities cannot completely prevent Taipei 
from flooding (see Chapter 5), Taipei Hydraulic Engineering Office of the Department 
of Public Works cannot be viewed as the only authority on flood resilience. Taipei 
Department of Urban Development has to develop a comprehensive resilient plan to 
prevent floods by land-use principles and strategies. A growth management policy can 
be evaluated toward flood resilience by identifying the location, time, and density of 
development in a safer place. A zoning revision and down-zoning strategy for 
ensuring lower density development in the flood-prone areas should be initiated.  
Local government reorganization also improves coordination. New Taipei City 
was established as a special municipality in 2010, when 29 townships and cities of 
Taipei County were consolidated into the 29 districts of New Taipei City. The 
reorganization of New Taipei City reduced local governments and improved 
coordination problems. However, there is still a need for cooperation in the Taipei 
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metropolitan region. Although, in 2011 the two mayors of Taipei and New Taipei City 
did establish a task force, the Tamsui River Management Committee, to integrate 
policies of river management. This committee is a temporary organization with lack 
of funding and personnel to initiate and implement policies of river basin management. 
Besides, the goal of this committee mainly focuses on water pollution improvement, 
and little on flood prevention. In the future, formulating a new river basin 
management authority to replace the Tamsui River Management Committee will 
allow continuing funding and personnel to implement the goals of the integration of 
river management and spatial planning. Another commission, the Northern Taiwan 
Development Commission, formed in 2004, was established by eight local 
governments. This commission provides a platform for cooperation in the Taipei 
metropolitan region. However, the agenda at this commission’s annual meeting 
concentrates on transportation, tourism, crime prevention, and disaster rescue. Little 
attention is given to disaster resilience and flood prevention. In the future, urban flood 
resilience should be promoted in Taipei. A new organization integrating river 
management, land-use and environmental planning on a regional approach should be 
considered. Taipei needs to create a regional organization or authority to promote 
coordination of resilience policies in the Taipei metropolitan region. 
  
 
267 
7.5 Increase budget and allocation of tax for flood resilience 
The lack of an adequate sewer system in a city increases its flood risk. Notable 
was the city of New Orleans with insufficient sewer systems which increased the 
severe flooding when Hurricane Katrina devastated the city in 2005. Tokyo improved 
its sewer systems after the city’s most severe flood in 1958. Nowadays, Tokyo’s 
metropolitan area outer underground discharge channel provides an example for flood 
risk reduction by strengthening drainage systems (details are found in Chapter 3). 
Thus, this research suggests an increased budget for water resource management and 
sewer system improvement in Taiwan’s central government. At the local level, Taipei 
should consider making use of the existing land value increment tax, which is based 
locally on the total incremental value at the time of the transfer of the title of the land. 
Taipei and New Taipei City can reallocate some portion of this for flood resilience. 
The Property Transfer Tax Program of Berkeley, California provides an example. In 
1992, Berkeley adopted an additional 0.5% transfer tax on top of the existing 1% tax 
on all real estate transactions to fund for disaster resilience from earthquakes. This 
program has led to more than 60% of the residences in Berkeley becoming more 
disaster resilient (The National Academy of Sciences 2012). Taipei can make use of 
the existing land value increment tax to invest in urban resilience. However, since 
2002, Taipei followed the national policy that reduced by half the rate of land value 
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increment tax on all real estate transactions in order to boost real estate and economic 
development. In 2002, $333 million was collected in Taipei City. Nowadays, Taipei 
and New Taipei City account for more than 41.1% of Taiwan’s total land value 
increment tax on real estate transaction.
50
 If 5% of the annually collected tax can be 
allocated for urban flood resilience, Taipei Twin Cities can allocate approximately 
$55 million each year for flood risk reduction. In the future, when Taiwan’s policy of 
land value increment tax returns to its normal rate, this will result in an increase of 
$110 million each year to implement urban resilience plans. However, the allocation 
of tax revenues needs strong political leadership and support. In the Chapter 6 
vulnerability analysis, Taipei City-owned properties are estimated at approximately 
$40 billion in the flooding depth between 0.5 and 1 meter in an extreme weather 
condition. At least $12.5 billion of Taipei City-owned properties are located in the 
severe flood-prone areas. Hence, when Taipei’s political leaders are aware of the risk 
and its vulnerability, more attention and support will be gained to allocate tax revenue 
for urban resilience plans in Taipei. In flood resilience planning and implementation, 
increased funding of at least $100 million annually for Taipei metropolitan region is 
necessary.  
                                                      
50According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance, Taiwan’s total land value increment tax on all real estate 
transactions is approximately $2.7 billion in 2012. Taipei City accounts for 20.2%, and New Taipei 
City accounts for 20.9%.  
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At the national level, Taiwan’s central government should also increase the 
budget for storm sewer systems. The budget of storm sewer improvement remains a 
small proportion, approximately 6% of the total budget among major infrastructure 
projects
51
 scrutinized by Taiwan’s National Development Council. Water resource 
management accounts for another 8% at the budget. However, transportation accounts 
for half of the total budget, a large amount of which goes to highway and road 
construction and maintenance. For example, the 2015 annual budget for major 
infrastructure is approximate $5.6 billion, with 23% of that total budget going into 
highways, expressways, and roads. However, massive highway or expressway 
construction would reduce the ability to accommodate water and increase flood risk in 
the city. Taipei found that highway and expressway construction caused the moving of 
some parts of rivers and irrigation tunnels. This resulted in more vulnerability and 
damage from flooding. Hence, highway budget should be adjusted and lowered in order 
to increase the budget for storm sewer improvement. In doing so, urban flood resilience 
can be strengthened by reducing highways and increased storm sewer investments. 
Thus, in order to promote urban flood resilience, the proportion of storm sewer 
improvement and water resource management should both be increased to 10% of the 
                                                      
51 A single infrastructure investment project over $34 million ($1 billion New Taiwan dollars) of the 
central government agency should be scrutinized and approved by Taiwan’s National Development 
Council for further budget allocation. This is known as the Annual Preliminary Work and Screening of 
Government Infrastructure Project. 
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total budget among major infrastructure projects. This will create an additional $280 
million each year for investing in flood resilience in Taiwan. Taipei can benefit from the 
increased budget. This provides more funding for improving storm sewers and water 
management, especially in the older communities with no adequate drainage systems. 
Continuing storm water sewer improvement and water management integrated with 
land-use planning would reduce flood risk and damage in Taipei.  
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7.6 Plan more space for rivers to accommodate flood 
This research suggests a planning strategy for more space to accommodate flood 
water, rather than blocking water out by building massive dikes. McHarg (1969) 
explains that the 50-year floodplain in a river basin has little tolerance for urban 
development because floodplains are suitable for accommodating water and natural 
resources instead of intensive urban development. However, in the Taipei Basin, many 
floodplains were converted into development lands. Taipei’s fast urbanization has 
threatened floodplains, which increased vulnerability. For example, after the 
completion of a river reshaping project, the Straightening Project of Keelung River, in 
1993, a large amount of floodplains, approximately 270 hectares, were converted into 
urban development lands (see Figure 7-1). High density developments were located 
on what was previously floodplains, especially in some newly developed areas in the 
Neihu, Songshan, and Zhongshan districts of Taipei City. This resulted in increased 
floods and damages. Taipei’s floods from 1991 to 2012 show that those areas along 
the Keelung River were flooded frequently. 
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Figure 7- 1 Urban development in floodplains (in black dot) after reshaping the river 
in 1993 
Source: Taipei City Government’s Department of Urban Development 
Chapter 6, Flood Simulation, found that many areas along the Keelung River will 
be flooded above 1 meter with the 24-hour duration rainfall when the 
200-year-frequency flood occurs. Because high-rise condominiums, highways, and 
massive riverside levees were built along the Keelung River after the 1990s, and the 
relocation of these structures for creating more space for the river is costly, thus 
impossible to achieve. Hence, a cost-effective way to create more space to 
accommodate flood water is to lower floodplains and plan for constructed wetlands 
and water retention ponds in the floodplains, instead of the existing plans for more 
public works in floodplains such as flood control facilities, roads, parking lots, 
basketball courts, and bike lanes. However, this project needs strong political support 
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to change the plans for public works in floodplains. A new strategy of planning more 
space for the river to accommodate flood water, rather than to block water out by 
building massive dikes, is necessary in Taipei. Rather than creating more public works 
and activities in floodplains, planning to lower and broaden floodplains, and to create 
river diversions and water storage areas can help to accommodate water, which would 
reduce flood risk in Taipei. 
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7.7 Strengthen flood resilience in transportation hubs 
As explained in Chapter 6, Flood Simulation, 4 out of 5 existing Taipei Metro 
lines run through flood-prone areas. Subway stations such as Xingtian Temple, 
Songjang, Minquan E. Road, Daqiaotou, and Sandao Temple stations are located in 
flood hotspots. In addition, Taipei Main Station, the most important transportation hub, 
with Taipei high-speed rail, Taipei railway, Taipei inter-city bus, and Taipei Metro 
stations, is also adjacent to the flood-prone area. Historic floods in 2001 inundated 
Taipei Main Station, more than 2 meters in depth. The Nangang Depot was also 
flooded. When Taipei Metro subway systems flood, this research finds that at least a 
million ridership daily would be affected (see Chapter 6). Hence, in order to prevent 
Taipei Main Station from flooding, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication, Taipei City Government’s Department of Rapid Transit Systems, and 
Department of Transportation should play a proactive role in flood prevention based 
on flood risk assessment. Strengthening drainage systems, electricity back-up 
facilities, flood protection facilities, and evacuation plan will be necessary in Taipei. 
Another transportation hub, the Taipei Songshan International Airport, built in 
1950 within a 0.7 square mile area, is one of the busiest airports in Taiwan with more 
than 6 million passengers in 2014. This airport is partially located in a flood-prone 
area and adjacent to the Keelung River. Some areas along the river have overflowed 
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in the past. Because of the limitation of property development around the airport, 
many nearby neighborhoods are decaying, having inadequate sewer systems, which 
has led to increased vulnerability. This airport redevelopment has been debated for 
more than 10 years. The arguments are to expand its capacity, or to move the airport 
to another area, and use this space for real estate development. In fact, this airport has 
provided a global connection and convenience for both business and tourism in Taipei. 
This airport is expanding its capacities, however, in order to prevent it from flooding, 
Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration has to coordinate with Taiwan’s 
Construction and Planning Agency and Taipei City Government to strengthen 
drainage and plan more space around the airport for water storage. The argument for 
moving this airport suggests a plan for property development of approximately 183 
hectares of land. The idea of moving the airport primarily focuses on real estate 
development, which would cause more vulnerability to floods since this area is 
located in the flood-prone area along the Keelung River. If the relocation of the 
airport becomes a national spatial development policy, environmental resilience 
should be the priority of any redevelopment, rather than property development. Thus, 
a resilient planning concept should be at the root of whether to expand or relocate the 
Taipei Songshan International Airport. In the future, Taipei City Government, 
Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Ministry of Transportation and 
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Community, and the National Development Council can coordinate together to 
rethink the airport’s function, and to improve flood resilience in and around the 
airport.  
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7.8 Plan for wetlands, water plazas, green roofs, and permeable surfaces  
Wetlands, water retention areas, and permeable surfaces can reduce flood risk 
(details are found in Chapter 2). Wetlands are a most significant factor for flood risk 
reduction (Brody et al. 2007). In 2013, Taiwan passed the Wetland Conservation Act, a 
legal basis for conserving natural wetlands and creating constructed wetlands. One 
main purpose of this act is to ensure natural flood control. Both the conservation of 
natural wetlands and the creation of constructed wetlands are important in Taipei. For 
instance, the Daan Park, approximately 25 hectares, was built in downtown Taipei in 
1994. This park was designed with an ecological wetland pond in the center, and most 
parts of the park are permeable surfaces (see Figure 7-2). But, in the 1970s, major 
plazas were built in downtown Taipei, which were mostly impermeable surfaces such 
as the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall Plaza (approximately 25 hectares) and Sun 
Yat-Sen Memorial Hall Plaza (approximately 13 hectares) (see Figure 7-3). These 
plazas have both a lack of permeable surfaces and man-made wetlands in it. 
Surrounded by expensive residential properties, intensive commercial activities, and 
subway systems, these major plazas should play a role in absorbing water to reduce 
flood risk in downtown Taipei. 
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Figure 7- 2 Permeable surfaces and a wetland pond in Daan Park 
(Photographs were taken by the author in 2014) 
  
Figure 7- 3 The need for the improvement of impermeable surfaces in major plazas: 
Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall (left) and Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hall (right) 
(Photographs were taken by the author in 2014) 
Since 1998, Taiwan’s Construction and Planning Agency has been promoting 
permeable pavement and sidewalks. Recently, a permeable pavement with a built-in 
system of hollow cylinders which act as water diversion pipes and increase 
underground water storage has been used to reduce runoff in Taipei. Additionally, 
Taipei can learn from the Randstad’s adaptive innovation of “water plazas”, the 
alternative form of water storage. The Rotterdam Water Plan 2030 is planning for an 
additional 600,000 m
3
 of water storage space. Moreover, another adaption option is to 
develop green roofs to decrease the total amount of runoff. In Rotterdam, a green roof 
can retain an average of 100-200 m
3
 water. There is a large government support 
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program in place for the development of green roofs in Rotterdam (Aerts et al. (2009).  
Therefore, creating space for rainwater storage becomes important for flood 
resilience in Taipei. In order to reduce downtown flood risk and damage, local 
governments should review major parks and plazas to revitalize them with ecological 
ponds, water plazas, water retention ponds, and permeable surfaces. Additionally, 
green roofs should be promoted, subsidized, and implemented. These efforts can 
retain and absorb flood water, resulting in flood risk reduction in Taipei.   
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7.9 Revitalize expressways and roads to accommodate floods 
Two major north-south elevated expressways, Xinsheng and Jianguo, cross Taipei 
City, with lengths of 2.5 and 3.7 miles. They were built in the 1980s to mitigate traffic 
congestion. As Chapter 6, Flood Simulation, indicates some flood hotspots are located 
between the two elevated expressways. Because Taipei has been developed as a city 
with convenient public transportation systems,
52
 the revitalization of the two elevated 
expressways should be taken into consideration. The two elevated expressways could be 
used for elevated highland parks to provide for flood risk reduction and aesthetic 
landscape. New York City’s Highland Park was developed by revitalizing abandoned 
railways and provides an example for the retrofitting of Taipei’s Xinsheng and Jianguo 
elevated expressways. Taipei City Government, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication, and National Development Council can rethink the revitalization of 
Taipei’s Xinsheng and Jianguo elevated expressways to become Taipei’s 
“Green-pressway”, thriving greenway corridors. This project can create greenway 
corridors and highland parks, which will also help to increase flood resilience in Taipei.  
Taipei’s irrigation systems were converted into roads during the 1970s. Since the 
convenience of public-transit systems, the demand for roads has reduced. Some major 
                                                      
52 The first line of Taipei Metro began operation in1996. Within less than 20 years, the total length 
increased from 10 to 121 kilometers with 109 stations, and the daily ridership increased from 82,678 in 
1996 to 2 million in 2014. 
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roads can be reduced by a lane, and that area can be used to create a water tunnel or a 
greenway corridor. For example, some areas along Taipei’s major north-south 
boulevard, the Xinsheng South Road, with its 40 meters of width, was part of a major 
irrigation system before 1972. Taipei City Government’s Department of Urban 
Development was planning for a lane reduction of Xinsheng South Road to create a 
river corridor in 2005, however, the resistance from the automobile drivers postponed 
this project. Nowadays, when citizens are made aware of Taipei flood risk based on 
this research, the public will be more likely to embrace the concept. Hence, in terms 
of urban flood resilience and risk reduction, converting some parts of roads into a 
water or green corridor can help to increase space for accommodating flood water and 
creating more permeable surface to absorb runoff, which leads to reduced flood risk. 
Taipei City Government’s Department of Urban Development can coordinate with the 
Department of Transportation to create a Taipei road revitalization project, working 
towards flood risk reduction by converting parts of a road into a water storage space 
or a greenway corridor with permeable surfaces, reducing flood risk in Taipei.  
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7.10 Implement urban growth management to reduce vulnerability  
Areas along the Keelung River and downtown Taipei are vulnerable to flooding 
(details are found in Chapter 6). Currently two polices encourage higher development 
density along this riverside. First, the zoning incentive policy encourages developers 
to build higher density residential developments if the residential site is located in 
front of a river. The current Taipei zoning ordinance, implemented in 1983, gives a 
zoning bonus in a residential zone located in front of the river as decided by Taipei 
Urban Planning Commission. Because of this zoning incentive, a large number of 
condominiums have been built along the Keelung River.  
Another planning policy in Taipei City is the implementation of the transfer of 
development rights. This policy has created dense developments in flood-prone areas. 
Starting in 1999, Taipei City implemented transfer of development rights, and most of 
the transferable rights have been received in new development areas
53
 such as Neihu 
and Nankang districts, which are adjacent to floodplains along the Keelung River and 
are flood-prone areas. Thus, a policy review of the transfer of development rights 
based on urban flood resilience is necessary in Taipei.   
Luxury condominiums, a 3-bedroom unit exceeding $1 million, have been built 
next to riverside levees along the Keelung River starting in the early 2000s. Because 
                                                      
53 The received site is allowed to have an additional 30% to 50% of its original floor area ratio (FAR) 
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developers did not bear the external costs related to floods, the ongoing housing 
development eventually increased higher vulnerability to floods in those flood 
hotspots. Thus, managing urban growth away from the flood-prone areas is essential 
to reduce Taipei’s vulnerability. In the future, Taipei City Government can adopt a 
growth management policy to limit and direct new development away from these 
flood hotspots. In the U.S.A., Florida’s Growth Management Act in 1985 provided an 
example for reducing damages from hurricane flooding. A policy of urban growth 
management directing development away from floodplains would provide a strategy 
for reducing flood risk and vulnerability in Taipei. 
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7.11 Provide zoning incentives as a strategy to increase urban resilience 
Urban regeneration policy plays a major role in strengthening disaster resilience 
in Taipei, primarily in fire and earthquake disasters. In order to improve flood 
resilience, Taipei City Government’s Department of Urban Development and the Taipei 
Urban Regeneration Office can provide developers with zoning incentives when they 
strengthen a neighborhood’s drainage systems, open spaces, and permeable surfaces. In 
fact, Taipei City Government adopted zoning incentives for creating open spaces in 
the process of urban regeneration in 2009. Because the International Flora Expo was 
held in Taipei City in 2010, Taipei City Government initiated the “Taipei Beautiful 
Program” in 2009, allowing owners of abandoned buildings, located within 500 
meters of major tourist attractions and transportation hubs, to earn an extra 3% to 10% 
zoning bonus when owners agreed to tear down their buildings, and provide green or 
open spaces for 18 months. This program eventually made Taipei greener. The 
“Taipei Beautiful Program” also included the large-scale demolition of more than 600 
City-own abandoned buildings to create green spaces. The “Taipei Beautiful Program” 
revitalized abandoned places and created approximately 20 hectares of green space. 
The higher green space density had a positive effect on flood risk reduction (see 
Chapter 6). The “Taipei Beautiful Program” resulted in more green and open spaces 
which helps to retain water, reduces runoff, and thus reduces flood risk. Taipei can 
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move from a beautiful Taipei toward a resilient Taipei by providing developers with 
zoning incentives to create more open spaces and green spaces. Particularly in the old 
communities, adopting zoning incentives in the process of urban revitalization would 
provide a strategy to make a resilient community of Taipei. 
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7.12 Revitalize public-owned vacant lands to accommodate floods 
Most Taipei City-owned properties are in flood-prone areas (see Chapter 6).  
Taipei City’s Department of Finance needs to take actions on city-owned properties to 
prevent damages from flooding. Revitalizing vacant city-owned properties in order to 
create open spaces and to accommodate water can reduce risk and damage. According 
to Taipei City Government’s estimation, there are approximately 14,034 vacant 
public-owned properties, with a total of 2 square miles of vacant lands in Taipei City. 
Three major property owners are Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
National Defense, and the Ministry of Transportation and Communication. These 
public-owned vacant properties should be revitalized, strengthening urban flood 
resilience.  
Since the late 1990s, Taiwan’s National Property Administration, under the 
Ministry of Finance, has been revitalizing public-owned property for efficiency. A 
National Property Revitalization task force was established in 2009 to achieve the 
goal of the revitalization of public-owned property. However, the revitalization 
focuses primarily on the sale and lease to private developers in order to increase 
national tax revenue, rather than maintenance and management of public-owned 
property. In the future, Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance can review and evaluate 
public-owned vacant properties, and coordinate with Taipei local governments to 
 
287 
revitalize and to create open spaces and water storage spaces to improve flood 
resilience.  
Further, since 2006, a large amount of building permit approvals are for properties 
located in flood-prone areas (see Chapter 6). This implies that the process of building 
permit approval has not consistently considered the issue of vulnerability. In the architect 
checklist of building permit approval, drainage improvement is not yet a major 
concern. In the future, the Taipei Construction Management Office, under the 
Development of Urban Development, requires developers to improve drainage, storm 
water management, and storage of water when they apply for building permit approval. 
Every individual building permit needs to strengthen its drainage system requirements. 
When developers postpone actual construction after building permit approval, Taipei 
City Government can require them to provide a temporary water storage park or open 
space before the construction, which can increase storm water storage and reduce flood 
risk. 
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7.13 Promote an actuarially fair flood insurance program which can reflect risks  
Insurance, a non-planning strategy, is an economic strategy to allow financial 
risk to be transferred from a single entity to a pooled group of risks through a contract 
(Kunreuther and Roth 1998). In Asian countries, most properties are not insured. The 
uninsured losses in Asia account for approximately 83% of all losses in 2011, in 
comparison with America’s 49%. In Germany and France, only 20% of losses are 
uninsured. Flood or other natural disaster insurance should be promoted in Taiwan to 
transfer risks and reduce homeowner’s burden. Notable is the U.S.A.’s National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968. Although there are some criticisms of 
the NFIP such as increasing debt, out-of-date flood maps, insurance premiums with 
little reflection of actual flood risks, and the encouragement of new developments in 
floodplains, as discussed in Chapter 2. The NFIP still can provide a financial strategy 
to reduce homeowner’s burden from floods. Moreover, in the Netherlands’s 
experience indicates that many homeowners are willing to invest in adaption 
measures in exchange for discounts on their insurance premium. Insurance plays an 
important role in requiring or promoting the adoption of stricter building codes and 
other adaption measures (Aerts et al. (2009). 
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In Taiwan, there is less than 1% of residential properties covered by flood 
insurance. Flood insurance is not familiar to property owners because the insurance 
industry is still developing, and people are not generally aware of where flood risk 
exists. After 2001’s devastating Typhoon Nari damaged Taipei, the purchase of flood 
insurance increased significantly. However, starting three years after Typhoon Nari, 
flood insurance purchases have been declining. In general, property owners purchase 
flood insurance after a severe flooding occurs and they suffer losses from it, but they 
often cancel their policies several years later if flooding doesn’t occur again. People 
often view flood insurance as a poor investment (The National Academy of Sciences 
2012). In the future, Taiwan central government should mandate and regulate banks to 
require homeowners to have flood insurance when there is a mortgage.  
Taipei City flood-prone areas account for 41% of total land area, higher than that 
of Tokyo, New York City, and London. Approximately 26% of residential zones are 
located in flood hotspots. The annual vulnerable residential property is estimated at 
approximately $2.3 billion in a conservative likelihood model of extreme weather in 
Taipei City. In Chang et al. (2008) study, they indicate that Taiwan had approximately 
3,000 buildings damaged by floods with an economic loss of approximate $43 billion 
annually, 4.5 times the losses from fire damages. Many insurers became extremely 
cautious when underwriting their flood policies for people living in areas that are 
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frequently struck by floods. The increasing damage from flooding demands an 
adequate flood insurance program which can reflect actual flood risks.  
A flood insurance program should be promoted to reduce losses. However, flood 
insurance, compared to earthquake insurance,
54
 has not been promoted in Taiwan. 
Currently, a flood insurance contract is a sub-contract under the residential fire 
insurance. The premium is calculated based on three factors: the location, the 
structure, and the height of building. The average annual premium is from 0.1% to 
0.5% of the coverage. Supposing Taipei’s annual premium is based on 0.3% of 
coverage, the average property value is $687,333 in Taipei City and $350,280 in New 
Taipei City. Thus, the average annual premium would be approximately $2,062 in 
Taipei City and $1,051 in New Taipei City if a property is covered. This premium of 
flood insurance would be more than 10 times that of its property tax. People are 
reluctant to accept the expensive premium of flood insurance, and would like to take 
the flood risk by themselves. However, a government-subsidized flood insurance 
program, taking the U.S.A.’s NFIP for example, would cost a lot of money. A 
government-subsidized flood insurance program would also encourage intensive 
                                                      
54 In Taiwan, earthquake insurance has been promoted since the Jiji earthquake in 1999. All residential 
fire insurance policies must automatically include basic coverage for residential earthquake risk since 
2002, with a maximum insured amount of $40,000 per household. The annual premium was set at 
approximately $50 (Taiwan Residential Earthquake Insurance Fund). Retrieved from 
http://www.treif.org.tw/e_contents/A_aboutTREIF/A1.aspx). (In Chinese)  
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property developments in flood-prone areas because of the lower cost for people to 
live in these areas. This would induce greater damage. Therefore, in the future, 
Taiwan central and local governments should promote an actuarially fair flood 
insurance program. This will increase the insurance cost if people choose to live in the 
flood-prone areas, and then discourage people from moving in these areas. Thus, 
Taiwan’s National Development Council, the Ministry of Finance, the Insurance 
Bureau under the Financial Supervisory Commission, Taiwan’s Water Resource 
Agency, and Taipei and New Taipei City Governments can initiate a coordinating 
committee to initiate an actuarially fair flood insurance program which reflect actual 
flood risks in Taipei and to mandate and regulate the purchase of flood insurance in 
flood-prone areas when the property owner has a mortgage.  
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7.14 Initiate bottom-up community resilience plans 
This research suggests a bottom-up neighborhood resilience plan in Taipei based 
on the location of a flood hotspot (see Chapter 6 and Figure 7-4). This section further 
creates a neighborhood GIS-based property map,
55
 approximately 0.2 to 1 square 
miles, to explain and suggest future community development strategies toward 
resilience. Seven neighborhoods are identified: 1. Xingtian Temple neighborhood of 
Zhongshan district; 2. Daqiaotou (Taipei Bridge) neighborhood of Datong district; 3. 
Huashan neighborhood of Zhongzheng district; 4. Lungshan Temple neighborhood of 
Wanhau district; 5. Zhongzheng bridge neighborhood of Shilin district; 6. Dazhi 
neighborhood of Zhongshan district; and 7. Gangqian neighborhood of Neihu district. 
 
Figure 7- 4 Taipei City’s seven flood hotspots (in red and yellow)   
                                                      
55
 Data is retrieved from the Taipei city GIS-based map center of the Taipei City Government’s 
Department of Information Technology. 
http://www.tpgos.taipei.gov.tw/ (In Chinese) 
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Every property in each flood hotspot is identified in the neighborhood. In general, 
the seven neighborhoods have different land-use development patterns, characteristics, 
and strategies to achieve flood resilience (see Table 7-2). However, strong political 
committee and leadership are essential to achieve the goals of these neighborhood 
resilience plans. This section also lists the central and local government agencies to 
support these projects. In doing so, Taipei flood resilience can be strengthened by a 
bottom-up community resilience plan. 
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Table 7- 2 Community resilience plan, strategy, and government cooperation in Taipei 
City 
 Community 
resilience plan 
Development suggestion Government cooperation 
Xingtian Temple 
neighborhood, 
Taipei 
Zhongshan 
District 
1.Accelerate storm sewer 
improvement 
2.Revitalize Taipei’s First 
Funeral Parlor and plan for 
parks, wetlands, and water 
retention ponds 
3.Plan for green corridors 
4.Revitalize elevated 
expressway to become a 
“green-pressway”  
Taipei City Government, 
Taiwan’s Ministry of the 
Interior, the Ministry of 
Transportation and 
Communication, and the 
National Development Council 
Daqiaotou 
(Taipei Bridge) 
neighborhood, 
Taipei Datong 
District 
1.Initiative public school green 
infrastructure planning 
2.Manage water by using 
vegetation, soils, and 
natural processes to reduce 
runoff and flood risk 
Taipei City Government, 
Taiwan’s Environmental 
Protection Agency, the 
Ministry of Education, and the 
National Development Council 
Huashan 
neighborhood, 
Taipei 
Zhongzheng 
District  
1.Increase permeable surfaces 
in the public administrative 
buildings 
2.Initiative public school green 
infrastructure planning 
3.Create water storage spaces 
and improve drainage 
around Taipei Main Station  
4.Revitalize Huashan Creative 
Park for a constructed 
wetland or a water retention 
pond 
Taipei City Government, 
Taiwan’s Construction and 
Planning Agency of the 
Minister of the Interior, the 
Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Ministry of 
Transportation and 
Communication, and the 
Ministry of Education  
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 Community 
resilience plan 
Development suggestion Government cooperation 
Lungshan 
Temple 
neighborhood,  
Taipei Wanhau 
District 
and 
Zhongzheng 
bridge 
neighborhood,  
Taipei Shilin 
District 
1.Accelerate storm sewer 
improvement 
2.Initiate zoning incentives for 
urban flood resilience 
3. Increase open spaces and 
permeable surfaces 
Taipei City Government, 
Taiwan’s Construction and 
Planning Agency of the 
Minister of the Interior  
Dazhi 
neighborhood,  
Taipei 
Zhongshan 
District  
and 
Gangqian 
neighborhood, 
Taipei Neihu 
District 
1.Growth management policy 
2.Consider down-zoning 
strategy  
3.Reduce housing development 
density along the Keelung 
River and retreat residential 
development from the river 
4.Buyout occupants living in 
severe flood hotspots. 
Taipei City Government, 
Taiwan’s Water Resource 
Agency of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, and the 
Construction and Planning 
Agency of the Minister of the 
Interior 
 
  
 
296 
7.14.1 The Xingtian Temple neighborhood suggestions 
There is a lack of open spaces, green spaces, and storm sewer systems in the the 
Xingtian Temple neighborhood, which is approximately 0.2 square mile (see Figure 
7-5). The Xingtian Temple is one of Taipei’s most important religious centers for 
citizens. Next to the temple is a government-owned property, Taipei City’s first funeral 
center (approximately 2 hectares). This funeral center was built in 1965 on swamp 
land at the end of Taipei’s irrigation system. Now most of Taipei mortuary services 
have moved to a newer and bigger funeral center in the outer area of Taipei. Thus, this 
downtown funeral center could possibly be revitalized. In order to improve resilience 
in this neighborhood, the relocation of Taipei City’s first funeral center could help to 
create a park with a constructed wetland and water retention ponds and to restore 
wetlands for reducing floods in this community. Taipei City Government, Taiwan’s 
Ministry of the Interior, and the National Development Council can coordinate to plan 
for the relocation of the first funeral center, and to create a resilient community by 
planning for a flood prevention park.  
One major east-west boulevard is located in this neighborhood, the Minquan E. 
Road or 9th Boulevard, with a width of 30 meters. In 2010, a new subway line, the 
orange line of the Taipei Metro, was built under the Minquan E. Road. Hence, a subway 
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station for this new line, Xingtian Temple Station, with an annual ridership 7.4 million, is 
located in this flood-prone area. If this subway station floods, it will have a big impact on 
the community because this line provides service for most commuters from populous 
New Taipei City. In order to reduce the flood risk of this new subway line, more water 
storage spaces are needed above ground. Because of this new subway line, plus a new 
bus-exclusive lane of the Minquan E. Road, the traffic volume on the road is expected to 
decline. Thus, one lane of the Minquan E. Road can be eliminated, and this space used of 
for a greenway and permeable corridor, which will help to increase water storage and 
strengthen community resilience. 
 
Figure 7- 5 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Xingtian Temple 
neighborhood of Zhongshan District 
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7.14.2 The Daqiaotou neighborhood suggestions 
The Daqiaotou (Taipei Bridge) neighborhood, approximately 0.26 square mile 
(see Figure 7-6), is one of the Taipei’s oldest neighborhoods. A lack of green spaces 
and storm sewer systems exist in this neighborhood. Besides, the Tamsui River on its 
west side increases the flood risk. There are 6 public schools in this neighborhood: 
Yongle Elementary School, Taiping Elementary School, Daqiao Elementary School, 
Shuanglian Elementary School, Minquan Junior High School, and Chenyuan Senior 
High School. These schools could play an important role in strengthening community 
resilience. The idea of green infrastructure should be applied, integrated, and 
implemented in these public schools. These public school should take advantage of 
vegetation, soils, and natural processes to manage water, and create a resilient and 
healthier community. Hence, Taiwan’s Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry 
of Education, the National Development Council, and Taipei City Government can 
coordinate to initiate a project of public school green infrastructure planning, and 
promote a pilot in this flood-prone community. 
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Figure 7- 6 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Daqiaotou 
neighborhood of Datong District 
 
7.14.3 The Huashan neighborhood suggestions 
There is a smaller proportion of residential buildings in the Huashan neighborhood, 
approximately 0.2 square mile (see Figure 7-7). A large number of the Taiwan central 
governmental agencies are located in this flood-prone area, especially Taiwan’s 
highest-ranking executive, legislative, and investigatory headquarters56. Many 
Cabinet’s Ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, 
and Taiwan’s Joint Central Government Office Buildings are located in this 
neighborhood. If this flood-prone neighborhood floods, the country will suffer a big 
impact. Although the relocation of the Taiwan political center has been debated, this 
needs more comprehensive national spatial planning and complicated political 
decisions to be made. This section does not discuss the options of relocation. 
                                                      
56 In Taiwan, these headquarters are officially known as the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, and 
the Control Yuan. 
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Currently, improving these administrative sites to become more flood resilient is 
essential since they are covered with impermeable surfaces. Taiwan’s Construction 
and Planning Agency of the Minister of the Interior and Taipei City Government can 
cooperate with these agencies to improve permeable surfaces to reduce flood risk. 
Additionally, there are also many colleges in this neighborhood: National Taiwan 
University’s Law School, College of Social Science, and College of Public Health, 
National Taipei University of Business, and Kainan University. Green infrastructure 
practices can be implemented to strengthen community resilience. Further, there is a 
Huashan Creative Park, approximately 9 hectares, in this neighborhood. Taipei City 
Government can consider the redesign for water retention ponds to increase the ability 
to accommodate storm water, and then promote community flood resilience. 
 
Figure 7- 7 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Huashan 
neighborhood of Zhongzheng District 
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7.14.4 The Lungshan Temple and Zhongzheng bridge neighborhood suggestions 
The Lungshan Temple neighborhood, approximately 0.27 square mile (see Figure 
7-8), is another old neighborhood. There is a lack of storm sewers, open spaces, and 
green spaces in this neighborhood. The Zhongzheng bridge neighborhood of Shilin 
district has a similar situation (see Figure 7-9). Taipei City Government has accelerated 
the urban renewal policy in thess two neighborhoods. Urban renewal policy in this 
community can also be viewed as a community resilience policy. Taipei City 
Government’s Department of Urban Development and Taipei Urban Regeneration 
Office can consider zoning incentives, for example the maximum zoning bonus of an 
additional 20% of a site’s floor area ratio when developers strengthen the neighborhood’s 
drainage systems, create open spaces, green spaces, and permeable surfaces. The “Taipei 
Beautiful Program” in 2009 was implemented to increase open spaces and green spaces, 
which helped to retain water, reduce runoff, and thus reduce flood risk. Thus, it is 
essential to adopt zoning incentives in the process of urban regeneration to move 
Taipei’s old communities toward resilience communities. 
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Figure 7- 8 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Lungshan Temple 
neighborhood of Wanhau District 
 
 
Figure 7- 9 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Zhongzheng 
Bridge neighborhood of Shilin District 
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7.14.5 The Dazhi and Gangqian neighborhood suggestions 
The Dazhi neighborhood, approximately 0.2 square mile (see Figure 7-10), and the 
Gangqian neighborhood, approximately 1 square mile (see Figure 7-11), are both 
located along the middle stream of the Keelung River. The two neighborhoods are 
comparatively new development areas, most of the housing developments were built 
after the completion of the reshaping of the river in the 1990s. Around this area, the 
average floor area ratio of the residential zone is 4. However, Taipei zoning ordinance 
since 1983 has provided a zoning bonus to a residential zone located in front of the 
river. More intensive residential developments were built. Additionally, the 
implementation of the transfer of development rights increased its development 
density because many transferable floor areas were being received in these 
newly-developed communities. High-rise condominiums were developing adjacent to 
the river levee, ranging from approximately 25 meters to 55 meters, which also led to 
higher vulnerability and potential flood damage. In order to reduce vulnerability and 
create community resilience, a down-zoning policy to reduce development density 
adjacent to floodplains should be considered. However, this requires strong political 
support in order to provide a resilience community practice in the future. 
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Figure 7- 10 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Dazhi 
neighborhood of Zhongshan District 
 
 
Figure 7- 11 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Gangqian 
neighborhood of Neihu District 
In summary, effective strategies and strong political committees discussed above 
would strengthen communities resilience in these neighborhoods in flood hotspots. 
Taipei flood resilience can also be achieved through these bottom-up community 
resilience plans. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
Every city’s common goals include an environmentally responsible development 
in the face of continued population growth and being resilient regarding natural 
disasters (Birch and Wachter 2011). A resilient city can be achieved when the 
resilience concept and initiation of it are rooted in the minds of planners, policy 
makers, and political leaders. Urban resilience planning encourages rethinking, 
regenerating, and reinventing polices toward resilience. A risk-based analysis, risk 
awareness, preparedness, and adaptiveness, before and after a disaster, will strengthen 
a city’s resilience. Rather than the common definition of resilience, “bouncing back”, 
resilience should focus on the ability to “bounce forward” or “forward planning”. The 
public sector, Taiwan’s central and local governments, with the inclusion of involved 
citizens, have opportunities to reinforce urban resilience, leveraging adequate 
organization, sufficient budgeting and funding, and insightful research of resilience. 
Finally and most importantly, a resilient city needs a strong political commitment and 
leadership to implement policies toward resilience. 
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8.1 Concluding Remarks 
Resilience is the increasing ability to evolve, adapt, and regenerate after a 
disaster. Urban resilience means that a city is adaptive, adjustable, and flexible 
enough to evolve in the face of uncertainty and disasters (The National Academy of 
Sciences 2012). There is still a lack of research regarding urban resilience in the world. 
But over the next 15 years, the United Nations will be encouraging cities to take 
actions toward urban resilience to reduce disaster mortality, reduce the numbers of 
people affected, reduce economic losses, and reduce the impact on critical 
infrastructure.  
Taiwan ranked as the country most exposed to multiple hazards (The World Bank 
2005). This research concludes that Taiwan, over the past three decades, indeed has 
had the highest disaster occurrence and the highest death toll using the natural disaster 
density indicator (NDDI) model, in comparison with Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., 
France, and the Netherlands. China has the highest number of affected people from 
natural disasters, and Japan has the highest economic losses. Cities in Asia have to 
take responsibility and take action moving toward disaster risk reduction and urban 
resilience.   
Taipei City is the capital as well as the economic, political, and cultural center of 
Taiwan. Floods caused huge amounts of damage during the 1960s while Taipei was 
 
307 
experiencing fast urbanization. Farms, irrigation systems, and parts of rivers were 
converted into urban development areas. In order to reduce flood damage, which 
accompanied urbanization, in the 1970s a relocation policy to move people away from 
flood risk areas was adopted. However, since the 1980s, achieving urban flood 
resilience by using the engineering strategy for flood control has prevailed over the 
retreat and land-use planning strategies for reducing the risk of flooding in Taipei. 
Costly engineering structures were constructed to resist flooding. Dikes have tripled 
in the past three decades. However, floods occurred after the completion of these 
structural protection facilities in the twenty-first century. Rebuilding, resistance, and 
fortification against floods eventually created a false sense of security. This false 
sense of security resulted in planning for more intensive development in Taipei, which 
has led to a higher level of vulnerability to floods. In 2012, Taipei City was third on 
the list of the top 10 urban areas with a population of 750,000 or more inhabitants 
exposed to three or more natural hazards, and with the highest risk of cyclones, floods, 
and landslides (United Nations 2012). 
This research finds that Taipei City’s flood-prone areas account for 
approximately 41% of its total land area in an extreme weather rainfall scenario with 
72-hour duration/47 inches. This percentage of flood-prone areas is higher than other 
global cities such as London’s 15%, Tokyo’s 10%, and New York City’s 25%. In 
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Taipei City’s severe flooding areas, it is estimated that 10% would be flooded above 
0.5 meter. Based on severe flooding, the vulnerable population is estimated at 200,000 
people, or 7% of the total population. Ten percent of the buildable land and eight 
percent of the total households, or 83,000 households are vulnerable to flooding. The 
GDP impact will be more than $28 billion, accounting for 8% of Taipei City’s GDP. 
More than $67 billion of land value is vulnerable. Approximately 126,000 employees 
will also be impacted. Flooding in subway stations will impact at least one million 
passengers each day. 
Taipei City’s future flood locations will be different from the floods of the past. 
Many flood hotspots are located in downtown Taipei, where there is also higher 
population density, higher land and property values, and more critical facilities. In 
general, approximately 26% of residential zones are located in flood hotspots in an 
extreme weather scenario. Some hotspots have a large number of commercial zones. 
For instance, in a hotspot in Zhongshan district of Taipei City, the area of commercial 
zones account for 25.78% of the flood hotspot. This also implies that land-use plans, 
residential, and commercial developments have not considered vulnerability to 
flooding in the past.  
Research of urban flood resilience indicates the urban poor live in more 
environmentally vulnerable areas (The World Bank 2001, 2013; Sinh et al. 2012; 
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Thomas et al. 2013; UNISDR 2013). This is not the situation in Taipei City. Taipei 
City shows no tendency toward different levels of household income living in 
different levels of flood-prone areas. In other words, there is little evidence that the 
urban poor are particularly vulnerable to floods in Taipei City. On the contrary, 
neighborhoods with high income households also face a higher risk of floods.  
The vulnerability of critical facilities in Taipei City indicates that a large number 
of public schools, administrative buildings, and major subway stations are located in the 
severe flood-prone areas. For instance, the national highest-ranking government 
executive, legislative, and investigatory headquarters and their buildings are all 
located in a flood-prone area. Additionally, this research estimates that 4 out of 5 
existing Taipei subway lines partially run through flood-prone areas. Subway stations 
such as Xingtian Temple, Songjang, Minquan E. Road, Daqiaotou, and Sandao Temple 
stations are located in flood hotspots. At least one million passengers each day could be 
impacted during flooding. In addition, two important transportation hubs, the Taipei 
Main Station, including high-speed rail, railway, and Taipei Metro stations, and the 
Taipei Songshan International Airport, are all adjacent to flood-prone areas.  
The likelihood analysis of flooding in an extreme weather rainfall scenario 
concludes that the possibility of a severe flood will be five times that of the existing 
assumption of a flood in every 200 years. This is more severe than that of New York 
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City projection indicating that “current 1 in 100 year flood will occur approximately 
four times more than often by the end of the century” (Aerts et al. 2009). In Taipei, 
the probability of a severe flood is estimated at 2.5% annually using a conservative 
model, meaning that a severe flood occurs once in every 40 years. Thus, Taipei City’s 
infrequent “once-in-two-century” floods are likely to occur more frequently. Every 
citizen in Taipei will experience at least two overwhelmingly devastating floods based 
on an average life expectancy of 82 years. The annual number of vulnerable people is 
estimated at 38,967 persons. The annual vulnerable GDP is about $6.7 billion. The 
annual vulnerable residential property is approximately $2.3 billion. This research 
predicts that 1% of Taipei metropolitan region floods above 1 meter, the cost would be 
up to $1.54 billion in damage. This would be a cost of $7.7 billion if 5% of Taipei 
metropolitan region floods. An annual budget of $100 million for ten years should be 
allocated in Taipei Twin Cities to reduce flood damages in the future. A worst-case 
scenario assumes that a super cyclone floods 10% of the Taipei Twin Cities with 
flooding above 1 meter in depth, with damage estimated at an cost of $2,300 for every 
person, which is similar to New York City’s damage from Hurricane Sandy in 2012 
with a cost $2,260 for every person (The City of New York 2013) and Randstad’s 
projection with at least 5% of its land submerged, costing $2,943 every person (The 
Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2007).  
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8.2 Future Research 
This research conducts a Taipei flood simulation that assumes the normal 
operation of flood control facilities, sewers, reservoirs, and average tide patterns. How 
does one evaluate the scenarios of vulnerabilities and likelihood possibilities if there 
is a failure of flood control facilities such as dikes or pumping stations? This needs to 
be studied further. This worst-case scenario with the failure of facilities would help to 
implement an evacuation plan in order to reduce the damage and save lives. 
Additionally, a sea level rise will increase flood damages. For example, a sea level 
rise of 30 cm in Rotterdam could cause an increase in the fatality rate by 20% (Aerts 
et al. 2009). Hence, the sea level rise increases vulnerability and threatens resilience, 
which also needs to be studied in the future.  
Moreover, since there is no sufficient database on flood loss or damage of the 
past, a regression model of urban flood resilience cannot be adopted to evaluate key 
factors associated with flood loss. However, since 2011, Taipei City has collected 
flood loss data every year. In the future, this flood loss data can provide more 
information for the further study of a regression model and factor analysis such as 
land-use pattern, type of building, the distance to floodplains, the improvement of 
storm sewers, and the ratio of permeable surfaces. This further study can help to 
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identify important factors associated with flood losses, and then address them. Further, 
urban resilience needs to consider the spatial interdependence between two 
neighborhoods or cities. What is the impact when a neighborhood strengthens its 
resilience, but the other does not? The effect of externality between two 
neighborhoods or cities needs to be studied in the future, especially in Taipei and New 
Taipei City in the Taipei Basin. How to strengthen resilience in a metropolitan region 
also needs to be further studied, which can also provide a basis for regional 
cooperation.  
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8.3 Suggestions 
This research demonstrates a case study of flood resilience in Taipei City. Other 
cities in Taiwan and Asia should initiate a study of urban resilience. A resilient city 
needs both a strong political commitment and strong leadership to implement policies 
toward resilience. Taipei flood resilience should shift from controlling water by costly 
structures to accommodating water by land-use and environmental planning. Land-use 
and environmental planning should play a proactive role in local governments to 
achieve urban resilience. In planning for the future, Taipei should address the gaps 
and needs of a resilient city as defined by the United Nations, especially regarding 
organization, funding, and research. An annual budget of $100 million for ten years 
should be allocated in Taipei Twin Cities to reduce flood damages of $7.7 billion by 
2025. Taiwan’s central and local governments also need to coordinate with 
planning-related universities and institutions to strengthen the study of resilience and 
data collection.  
Taipei City should consider a growth management policy to direct development 
away from flooding hotspots. Two current polices, the transfer of development rights 
and the zoning incentive, have encouraged extensive development along the 
flood-prone areas of the Keelung River. A revision of the two polices is essential. 
Additionally, Taipei’s urban regeneration policy should require developers to 
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implement green infrastructure, improve storm sewers, water retention ponds, and 
permeable surfaces, which can strengthen the city’s resilience. Further, planning more 
space for rivers, restoring wetlands, redesigning permeable surfaces and water 
retention ponds, and creating thriving greenway to accommodate water are also 
important. Also, a non-planning strategy, an affordable flood insurance program, 
should be promoted to reduce financial losses. A bottom-up community resilience 
plan in Taipei would help to achieve urban resilience.  
Last but not least, the public sector, especially Taiwan’s central and local 
governments, with the citizens being included, have opportunities to reinforce urban 
and regional resilience leveraging adequate organizations, sufficient budgeting and 
funding, and insightful research of resilience. These measures will demand a strong 
political commitment, the leadership, and vision to implement urban or regional 
policies toward resilience. 
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